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The Ultimate Independence of the Federal Courts:
Defying the Supreme Court in the Exercise of Federal
Common Law Powers

RONALD H. ROSENBERG•

I. INTRODUCTION
A

Defining Federal Court Functions.

What does a federal court do and what makes a federal court "federal?"
When a federal court properly obtains subject matter jurisdiction over a
dispute, where does it find the legal rules for its decision? These seemingly straight-forward and fundamental questions have existed throughout
the nation's history and they rest at the heart of modem questions analyzing the legitimacy of certain contemporary federal court decisions. As we
know, federal courts in the American constitutional system differ from
their state counterparts in a number of significant ways-not the least of
which is their lawmaking power. This judging authority operates within
limits. Although federal legislative power may be expansive, federal judicial authority under mainstream theory has its restrictions imposed by considerations of the separation of powers or those related to federalism. 1
While federal judges may decide cases within their jurisdiction on the basis
of statutes, constitutions and treaties, they, generally, may not create law
• Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law.
1

The Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in the Su·
preme Court and "in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. From this textual base it has been argued that Congress is provided with
sweeping discretion whether or not I) to create any lower federal courts and 2) to define the jurisdiction
of any such court it does establish. This view finds support in a long line of Supreme Court decisions
running back as far as 1850. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 429-31 (1944) {upholding a
restriction on federal forum to hear challenges to wartime price controls); Laufv. E.G. Shinncr & Co.,
303 U.S.323, 325, 327 ( 1938) (upholding a restriction on federal court's ability to issue injunctions in
labor disputes); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922) (upholding preclusion of federal
injunction of a simultaneous state court proceeding for breach of contract); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441, 448, 450 (1850) (upholding a restriction on diversity jurisdiction). Taking this approach,
Congress would certainly have the power to define the rules of decision for the federal courts.
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themselves using the common law methodology available to state court
judges. 2 Following the Supreme Court's 1938 decision in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 3 the proposition has become axiomatic that "(t]here is no
federal general common law.'>4 This broad statement sprang from Justice
Brandeis's holding that the federal Rules of Decision Act required federal
courts to apply all forms of state law as their rule of decision in the absence
of specific federal law. Under the U.S. Constitution, federal courts are not
granted open-ended lawmaking powers and they, "unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction."5 Such a view of "limited jurisdiction" has been the position of widely-held legal theory regarding the
extent of the federal judicial power, at least in cases brought under diversity jurisdiction. Increasingly, this has also been the direction given by the
United States Supreme Court in a number of non-diversity cases-like
those brought under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLAt-which arise under federal law.
The degree of adherence to this "limited jurisdiction" vision is the subject
of this article.
Most generalizations are subject to exception and the restricted
description of federal judicial authority is no different. While it is true that
federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
also held that they may create and apply a federal common law in a limited
2

The vesting of federal jurisdiction in courts does not create the authority to formulate federal
common law. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,640-41 (1981). The
definition of the term "federal common law" can be said to refer "to the development of legally binding
federal law by the federal courts in the absence of directly controlling constitutional or statutory provisions." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICfiON 33 I (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis added). Professor
Thomas W. Merrill has defined federal common law as "any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text-whether or not that rule can be described as the
product of 'interpretation' in either a conventional or an unconventional sense." Thomas Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of Federal Couns, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. I, 5 (1985).
3
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4
/d. at 78. Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I, 18-19 (1842) and reversed a longstanding practice in the federal courts to recognize a general federal common law, at least in cases
involving a court's diversity jurisdiction. This development had seemingly been at odds with the earliest Congressional policy defining the boundaries of federal court decisional rules. The Rules of Decision Act, derived from the Judiciary Act of 1789 and currently found at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000),
provides that "[t)he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." This statute would appear to
form a mandate requiring that federal courts must use state law as rules of decision in the absence of
treaty, federal statute or constitutional provision. See Martin Reddish, Federal Common Law. Political
Legitimacy. and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761,
766 (1989) (discussing the rule and indicating that it "is not free from ambiguity in either language or
histo1' ....").
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981 ). See generally U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States."); id. art.lll, § 2 (enumerating the extent of the judiciary's powers).
6
42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
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number of areas in order to effectuate Congressional intent or "to protect
uniquely federal interests."7 Providing an example of this principle, in
another case decided on the same day as Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
Justice Brandeis held that the apportionment of an interstate stream was a
question for federal common law rather than the law of the adjoining
states. 8 Therefore, federal common law has been recognized as a source of
legitimate and necessary rules of decision in certain enumerated areas,
standing as a necessary exception to the Erie rule which describes a much
more limited federal judicial power. The phrase "federal common law"
represents those circumstances when federal courts may fashion legal rules
in a common law way. But when, in theory, can federal courts exercise
this "special" judicial power and when, in reality, do they actually create
their rules of decision?
Since the 1938 Erie decision, this authority to "find" federal common
law has been increasingly restricted by the Supreme Court. This is especially true in recent years. The clear trend in Supreme Court pronouncements over the last quarter century has been to confine, not expand, the
common law powers of federal judges. 9 Undoubtedly, this contraction
reflects the Court's changing views regarding the "appropriate" judicial
role. However, one situation where court-made common law has been
found to be appropriate is where a federal court has been asked to fill the
"interstices" of federal legislation or to create law "[i]n absence of an applicable Act of Congress." 10 In these instances, the courts have been implored by litigants to consider and to decide federal questions "which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone." 11 Obtaining a legislative
amendment to clarify or "fill in" the missing law apparently is not practical
or politically possible. Therefore, establishing a federal common law rule
of decision in this context is a "necessary expedient" to the lawmaking
process in certain limited situations.
7

Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 64 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,426
(1964)). The Court has identified certain areas as being appropriate for the creation of federal common
Jaw rules. They include:
a) federal proprietary interests, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,
366 (1943);
b) international relations, Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425 ( 1964);
c) admiralty, Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961 );
d) interstate disputes, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304
U.S. 92, I 10-11 (1938);
e) interstate pollution, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 45 I U.S. 304, 317 (I 981 ), and
f) enforcement of constitutional rights, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388,392 (1971).
8
Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at I 10-1\.
9
See CHARLES A. WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW Of FEDERAL COURTS 419 (6th ed. 2002)
("The Court ... more recently has taken a cautious course toward the recognition of federal common
law.").
10
Clearfield Trust, 3\8 U.S. at 367.
11
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 3\5 U.S. 447, 469 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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All too often, federal legislation is not a model of clarity and specificity. Important statutory omissions and unanticipated issues frequently arise
and are brought before federal courts for resolution. These courts must
then determine the meaning of federal statutes within the context of highly
contested, high-stakes litigation. The CERCLA litigation that is the focus
of this article presents an example of this phenomenon. In undertaking this
common lawmaking judicial function, these courts are asked to "create
law" in order to fill the interstices or silences of statutory schemes and to
implement Congressional objectives. While it is possible to say there is no
law that applies to the matter at hand, courts find it irresistibly attractive to
answer the questions presented to them by litigants and to resolve the disputes. Congress cannot anticipate every statutory consequence, implication, or nuance and there must be some means of deciding conflicts that
arise in implementing these statutes. 12 To do this, the judging process requires courts to determine a rule of decision applicable to the dispute coming before the court-often when comprehensive Acts of Congress fail to
address certain issues or are ambiguous. 13 The creation of "interstitial federal common law" has been upheld in circumstances where it is necessary
to carry out an apparent yet not clearly specified federal purpose. 14 Assuming that a court should fashion federal common law in these situations,
where should it look for guidance as to the substance or content of the rule
when federal statute itself fails to supply the answers? 15 How much independence should a federal court have to fashion a rule of decision?
On these questions, the Supreme Court has given specific guidance. In
1979, the Court set the backdrop for these decisions when it held in United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., that in the absence of a congressionally
12

/d. at 469-70 (Jackson, J., concuning) ("Were we bereft of the common Jaw, our federal system
would be impotent.").
13
Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367 {"In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the
federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.").
14
The function of this kind of federal common law rule is to effectuate a Congressional plan or
program. Professor Linda Mullenix has expressed the rationale for interstitial federal common law in
the following terms:
In enacting federal statutory law, Congress often expressly delegates federal lawmaking authority to the courts, or implicitly does so by creating a general regulatory
scheme with gaps or general language. In both instances, federal courts have created
and applied interstitial federal common law to fill in the gaps in federal statutory
provisions.
17A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §124.41(1] {3d ed. 1997). In certain
instances, Congress may specify that state law should be used as the substantive law for decisions in a
federal scheme like the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346{b), 2672 (2000). However, in
other cases, the Supreme Court has upheld the judicial development of a federal common law rule
structure to give meaning to a statutory gap. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 356-57 {1957) {Justice Douglas finding Congressional intent for federal courts to develop a body
of common law principles to resolve labor disputes).
15
HenryS. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383,410 {1964) {articulating this two-stage inquiry).

2004]

THE ULTIMATE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

429

mandated rule, federal courts must "fill the interstices of federal legislation
according to their own standards." 16 As expansive as this statement might
sound, this pronouncement did not mean that in designing the "substance"
of the federal common law, courts would always develop applicable federal rules of decision in every case. Rather, in the Court's way of thinking,
courts could adopt either state decisional rules or fashion their own
uniquely federal rules. In either case, they would be creating federal law
using a common law or non-statutory method. To do this, the Supreme
Court in Kimbell Foods recommended that federal courts should choose
their rules of decision by using a three-part balancing test which would
consider whether: (1) the federal program at issue must be uniformly applied nationwide to effectuate its purpose, (2) the application of the state
rule would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program, and (3) the
application of a uniform federal rule of decision would disrupt existing
relationships based upon state law. 17 This tripartite test was later reinforced by the Supreme Court in 1994 in 0 'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,
where it further restricted the instances in which the creation of a uniform,
federal body of common law would be permissible. 18 After 0 'Melveny &
Myers, a federal law-based common law rule of decision would be appropriate in the "few and restricted" situations where there is both a uniquely
federal interest at stake and "a significant conflict between [the] federal
policy or interest and the use of state law." 19 Therefore, state law would
generally provide the rule of decision.
This decision, and others handed down during the 1990s,20 reflected a
substantial narrowing of the situations when federal courts would be free to
fashion a truly "federal" common law-that is, non-statutory and nonconstitutional-rules of decision. The significance of this emergent trend
is threefold: 1) to reinforce the primary function of legislation as the original source of federal, non-constitutional law, 2) to emphasize the primacy
of state law as the rule of decision in the absence of an explicit federal
16

440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979). The Court's pronouncements in Kimbell Foods were directed at
cases involving "controversies directly affecting the operations of federal programs .... " /d. at 727
(citin~pealjield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367).
/d. at 728-29.
18
512 u.s. 79,85 (1994).
19
/d. at 87 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
20
See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1997) (holding that in a negligence action
brought by a federally insured bank, state law sets the standard when it is stricter than federal law);
Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991) (holding that when there is a gap in
federal law concerning "the allocation of governing powers within the corporation, federal courts
should incorporate state law into federal common law" unless the state law is inconsistent with the
federal statute's underlying policies).
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statutory provision,21 and 3) to limit the power of federal judges to "improvise" federal common law solutions to problems presented by federal statutes and programs. The Supreme Court's message to the lower federal
judiciary was clear: instances of true common law rule development would
be the exception and not the rule. Federal courts would be more restrained
judicial actors. As this article demonstrates, the Supreme Court's directives have rarely been followed in the CERCLA context. A serious and
perplexing question resulting from this fact is: why has this been so?

B. Choice ofLaw and Environmental Law-Interpreting CERCLA 's
Liability Provisions

Four years after its decision in O'Melveny & Myers, the Supreme
Court addressed the question of selecting an appropriate rule of decision in
the context of an environmental statute-the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Acf2 or CERCLA. CERCLA was a hurriedly enacted and poorly drafted statute, whose main purpose was to cleanup hazardous waste sites and to allocate the costs of doing so to "responsible parties." As a statute assessing potentially significant cleanup liability, CERCLA constituted a specialized federal tort statute operating under the minimalist guidance of section 107.23 In the years
following its 1980 enactment, federal courts have been presented with innumerable questions unanswered by the statute and they were asked to
improvise solutions to many knotty legal questions. In the 1998 case of
United States v. Bestfoods/4 Justice David Souter, writing for a unanimous
Court, considered the issue of how to determine the liability of parent corporations for CERCLA-imposed hazardous waste site cleanup expenses
carried out at the site of one of its corporate subsidiaries. The Bestfoods
case concluded that a parent corporation's liability under CERCLA could
be founded either 1) upon direct action as an "operator" of the polluting
facility or 2) upon indirect or derivative liability based upon "general" and
"fundamental" principles of corporate law permitting a "piercing of the
corporate veil," thereby making the parent corporation responsible for the
conduct of its subsidiary.25 On this second point of "veil piercing" or derivative liability, would state law or a CERCLA-based federal common law
21

In O'Melveny & Myers, Justice Scalia stressed that a clear federal statute should be followed
when it provides the answer. However, he anticipated the situation of statutory omission or oversight.
He wrote:
Nor would we adopt a court-made [federal common law] rule to supplement federal
statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed; matters left unaddressed in
such a scheme are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state law.
512 U.S. at 85.
22
42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
23
/d.§ 9607.
24
524 u.s. 51' 55 (1998).
25
/d. at 63-64, 70-72.
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determine liability? Justice Souter strongly suggested, but did not clearly
confirm, 26 that state corporate law principles should serve as the rule of
decision for determining this type ofCERCLA liability. His opinion stated
that state corporate law provided a presumptive starting point for this inquiry and he concluded that CERCLA gives "no indication that 'the entire
corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiffs cause of action is based upon a federal statute. "'21
Going even further in this direction, Justice Souter stated that in order
for a federal statute to reject "bedrock principle[s] ... against this venerable common-law backdrop," a law must speak "directly" on the question.28 CERCLA, being silent on the topic of corporate successor liability,
did not "directly" provide an alternative to state corporate law and consequently, the decision suggested that state law should govern. 29 The Bestfoods decision strongly reinforces the Supreme Court's recently promoted
idea that state law should serve as the guide of crucial meaning for federal
statutory law in the absence of legislative language to the contrary. This
view reflects and reinforces the increasing preference or presumption in
Supreme Court opinions running in favor of state legal concepts serving as
the fundamental meaning of "silent" federal statutes.30 The Court's Kimbell Foods, O'Melveny & Myers, and Bestfoods decisions represent a continuous and an unmistakable message discouraging judicial improvisation
in the name of creating federal common law.
26

CERCLA is silent on the question of how to determine whether a parent corporation is liable
for waste site cleanup expenses and the Bestfoods court refused to directly resolve the choice of law
dilemma. Justice Souter wrote:
[T]here is significant disagreement among courts and commentators over whether, in
enforcing CERCLA 's indirect liability, courts should borrow state law, or instead
apply a federal common law of veil piercing .... Since none of the parties challenges the Sixth Circuit's holding that CPC and Aerojet incurred no derivative liability, the question is not presented in this case, and we do not address it further.
/d. at 63 n.9.
21
/d. at 63 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,478 (1979)).
28
!d. at 62-63.
29
On remand, the district court ruled that the parent corporation, CPC, was not liable for CERCLA cleanup costs either as an "operator" or as a successor corporation under a theory of de facto
merger. Bestfoods v. Aero-Jet Gen. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 729,759 (W.O. Mich. 2001). Of special
note was the fact that the court felt bound by the Sixth Circuit's rule that "state law provides the standard for determining the liability of successor corporations under CERCLA." /d. at 757. As a result, it
applied Michigan law to determine the successor liability question. /d. at 757-759.
30
It is not always clear from Supreme Court and Court of Appeals opinions just how the courts
conceive of the choice of law question. Are they merely implementing the preference for state law, in
the absence of a clear federal command, expressed in the Rules of Decision Act? Or are they assigning
substantive content or meaning in a federal common law-making activity? If the final choice of a rule
for decision is state law, then it does not matter which route the courts take. However, if the decisional
principle is a newly developed federal (and not state) common law position, then the method for reaching this decision is important. Lower court opinions spuming state corporate law guidance for the
freedom of establishing their own "common law" view not only ignore Supreme Court direction but
also choose to set their own policy in a direct lawmaking way.
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The Bestfoods holding has potential significance in many other CERCLA contexts. Beyond the limited issues of parent/subsidiary liability
presented in the Bestfoods case, CERCLA contains numerous crucial, definition and liability issues; many lacking specific statutory answers. The
statute's far-reaching liability scheme was designed to further the Act's
purpose of "initiat[ing] and establish[ing] a comprehensive response and
financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated
with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites."31 However,
CERCLA is not a model of legislative clarity, and the federal courts frequently have been called upon to determine significant liability issues
raised by the Act. One question-the liability of corporate asset purchasers-has been frequently litigated in the courts of appeal. This litigation
has reflected substantial confusion over the proper method for determining
the appropriate rule of decision. It has also produced inconsistent standards for imposing liability that vary from circuit to circuit all over the
country. 32 While the courts have consistently recognized that CERCLA's
legislative scheme generally provides for successor-in-interest liability,
they have also ruled that asset purchasers generally are not liable for the
conduct of predecessors-in-interest under state corporate law. 33 However,
there are exceptions to this general rule of non-liability for asset purchasers
under prevailing state corporate law rules. The interesting question that
arises from an examination of these cases is how are courts selecting their
rules of decision in these asset purchaser fact situations? The federal circuit courts are evenly split regarding this fundamental choice of law question; some adhering to state law and others fashioning a more expansive
rule under their presumed federal common law powers. 34 After the Best31

Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991). "Liability under
CERCLA has been described as a black hole that indiscriminately devours all who come near it."
Gregory C. Sisk & Jerry L. Anderson, The Sun Sets on Federal Common Law: Corporate Successor
Liability Under CERCLA After O'Melveny and Myers, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 505 (1997) (internal
quotations omitted).
32
See Bradford C. Mank, The Demise ofCERCLA 's Federal Common Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REv.
1157-58 (2000); Lawrence P. Schnapf, CERCLA and the Substantial Continuity Test: A Unifying Proposal{r Imposing CERCLA Liability on Asset Purchasers, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 435 (1998).
3
See Sisk & Anderson, supra note 31, at 512-13.
34
For those circuits that apply state law to determine asset purchasers' CERCLA liability, see
United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d I, 54 (1st Cir. 2001 ); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown
& Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 383 (9th Cir. 1998); Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1248. For circuit court decisions adopting federal common law principles, see B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 519 (2d
Cir. 1996); United States v. Mel(ico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478,487 n.9 (8th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 1992); Smith Land & Improvment
Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1988). The Eleventh Circuit, faced with an analogous issue, has held that absent a showing that the Kimbell Food factors show the need for a federal
common law rule, state law should be adopted as the federal standard for determining whether a limited
partner may be held accountable for the CERCLA liability of the partnership. See Red wing Carriers,
Inc., v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501-02 (lith Cir. 1996).
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foods, Atherton, and 0 'Melveny & Myers decisions of the 1990s, it would
seem as though the federal courts would only rarely establish and enforce a
truly federal common law rule of decision in the limited circumstances
described by the Supreme Court. This has not been the case with asset
purchaser liability.
The principal focus of this article is the way federal courts choose a
rule of decision in cases of statutory silence. As a specific example of this
inquiry, this article examines the decisional issue faced by federal courts
attempting to determine whether corporate asset purchasers should be liable for response costs under CERCLA-how they have interpreted the
Act's silence with respect to asset purchaser liability and how they have
ruled. As this introduction reveals, federal courts have been confronted
with the question of selecting an appropriate rule of decision in a large
number of these cases. Importantly, this choice of law issue arose with an
established backdrop of Supreme Court precedent strongly suggesting a
method for making these decisions. As this article's analysis will indicate,
the lower federal courts have largely ignored the Supreme Court's direction. Part II of this article will discuss the federal courts' limited power to
apply federal common law in instances of statutory omission. This important inquiry focuses upon federal court authority to choose a rule of decision and the general approach to statutory interpretation with respect to the
application of federal common law. How should a court select its rule of
decision-should it incorporate state law as the rule or should it exercise its
limited legislative powers to fashion a common law rule? The framework
for evaluating the merits of a federal rule articulated by the Supreme Court
in Kimbell Foods and further refined in O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton
will be discussed in greater detail in this part.
Part III examines the precise legal matter at issue in the cases under review-does CERCLA liability apply to corporate successors who have
been asset purchasers? After analyzing the threshold question of whether
the statutory liability applies to corporate successors at all, the discussion
then analyzes the general corporate law norms that are available for selection as the "appropriate" rule of decision in these CERCLA cases. Part IV
of this article then turns to the issue of how federal courts have acted in
choosing the appropriate rule of decision in this highly important CERCLA
context-the assignment of CERCLA liability for purchasers of corporate
assets. The varying positions taken by the U.S. Courts of Appeal with respect to this question are analyzed, revealing a range of different approaches to this significant choice of law issue. The Part ends with the
main conclusion that there has been virtually no appellate court consideration of the Supreme Court's recent precedents. Beyond that, the review
concludes that these courts appear uncertain about what their proper role is
in a case such as this. Only a few decisions analyze the question before
them as a proposition to create federal common law to fill statutory gaps or
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to provide "interstitial meaning." Finally, Part V evaluates the judicial
opinions under review and suggests a number of explanations for answering the question of why the federal appellate courts do not obediently follow Supreme Court mandate.
II. IDENTIFYING RULES OF DECISION USING FEDERAL COMMON LAW
POWER

A. When Does the Authority Exist?

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, generally, they
must apply federal statutory, constitutional, or state law when resolving
disputes that properly come before them. However, in certain circumstances, they may act as courts of general jurisdiction and fashion a rule of
decision under their federal common lawmaking authority--one having a
non-statutory or non-constitutional basis. The exercise of this lawmaking
power, being the product of rather unconstrained federal court initiative,
has been the subject of serious academic dispute in the last two decades. 35
Federal jurisdiction alone does not convey authority to create common
law-the issue in dispute must implicate a uniquely federal interest or the
court must have been granted authority to create common law under the
statutory scheme at issue for the court to exercise its limited lawmaking
powers.36 In recent times, the Supreme Court has approved of the application of federal common law rules in six specific areas. 37 These include
suits (1) based on federal statutes that contain gaps in the applicable law,
which requires courts to create interstitial federal common law; 38 (2) by or
against the United States, or between private parties involving federal proprietary interests; 39 (3) involving controversies between states; 40 (4) involv35

Numerous academic articles have been published examining the emerging federal common law
doctrine in various areas of the law. Some views have been tolerant, even encouraging, assessments of
federal court's presumptive lawmaking powers while others have considered this kind of court action to
be both a violation of the Rules of Decision Act and politically illegitimate. See George D. Brown,
Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudication-A (New) Erie
Problem?, 12 PACE L. REV. 229,260-61 (1992).
36
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 45 I U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981 ).
37
These categories are not mutually exclusive and certain cases may fall under multiple categories. For instance, in 0 'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, the suit at issue was brought by the FDIC under the
Financia1tnstitutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 and the questions brought to the
Court implicated both findings of "interstitial meaning" and matters involving federal proprietary
interests. 512 U.S. 79, 85,88 (1994).
38
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,450-51 (1957).
39
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500,512 (1988).
40
E.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336,342-43 (1931). In the absence of a relevant statute, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over suits between states, and applies federal common
law to resolve the dispute because neither states' laws can be applied to resolve the dispute fairly. 28
U.S.C. § 125l(a) ("The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies between two or more States.").

2004)

THE ULTIMATE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

435

41

ing international relations or international law; (5) involving admiralty
jurisdiction;42 and (6) involving Indian relations. 43 This list reinforces the
idea that, at least in non-diversity cases,44 there is a well-developed common law tradition in the federal courts reaching at least to these six categories.45
These categories of cases found suitable for federal common law
treatment exhibit traits of necessity and fragility. Regarding need, they all
appear to reflect the necessity of identifying some form of federal law to
resolve important disputes touching significant federal interests.46 For instance, it is hard to imagine the resolution of interstate, international, admiralty, or Indian cases without such legal doctrine. Concerning the fragile
nature of federal common law, this doctrine is clearly a "temporary fix"
pending a possible, more permanent legislative solution provided by Congress. Federal common law is "subject to the paramount authority of Congress'>47 and is pre-empted when federal statutes or regulations address the
specific question decided by the federal court.48 With these two principles
41

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16,20-21 (1963).
43
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
44
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (holding that federal judge-made
law is unconstitutional when applied to diversity cases).
45
The fortunes of the federal common law doctrine seem to ebb and flow with changing perceptions of the appropriate role of the federal courts. See discussion supra Part I. A (discussing how the
court's views regarding the appropriate judicial role have changed over time). In D 'Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,472 (1942), Justice Jackson set forth a strong statement endorsing federal
common law as a legitimate form of federal law when he wrote in his concurring opinion that,
[Federal law] is found in the federal Constitution, statutes, or common law. Federal
common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by
them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the traditional commonlaw technique of decision and to draw upon all the sources of the common law in
cases such as the present.
/d. at 471-72 (citations omitted). Ahhough not explicitly attempting to "fill gaps" in the statute under
consideration, the case identifies a federal rule to resolve the conflict over which defenses would apply
to block the payment of a note currently held by a federal agency. See id. at 456-57, 459 (discussing
how the federal statute informed the court's decision). In finding that the "no consideration" defense
would not be applicable, the Court effectively used its common law powers to amend the statute before
it. See id. at 459-60 (holding that the Court would not allow the defense in these circumstances).
46
See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 344 (1931) (discussing the United States
Army's interest in the case because the decision effected potentially navigable waters); Sabbatino, 376
U.S. at 410 (discussing how severance of the federal government's diplomatic relations with Cuba
could effect the outcome of the case).
47 New Jersey, 283 U.S. at 348.
48
See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) ("[W]hen Congress addresses a
question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual
exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears."). The availability of federal common law theory
can depend upon a determination that federal statutory law has or has not extinguished it. /d. Often the
answer given to this question depends upon the Court's attitude about implied federal judicial power.
See id. at 315 (discussing how federal common law implicates separation of powers concerns in certain
circumstances (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1981))). The City of Milwaukee
42
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in mind, it is the judicial "gap-filling" or interstitial interpretive function of
the first category of cases that is the subject of inquiry in this article. When
exercising their "common law" powers in this context, the federal courts
function in the closest analogy to legislative lawmaking by providing decisional rules which give meaning to an incomplete statute. 49 It is this lawmaking function that holds with it the broadest judicial power-the creation of critical legal principles in the absence of specific statutory guidance.
In recent decades, the potential breadth of this authority has given rise to
Supreme Court doctrinal directives discouraging this behavior. 50
1. Interstitial Gap Filling by Federal Courts Pursuant to
Congressional Grants ofLawmaking Authority

As stated above, the Supreme Court has ruled that federal courts may
create "interstitial federal common law" when Congress has enacted a
regulatory scheme and has granted, implicitly or explicitly, the federal
courts the authority to create substantive rules to effectuate the scheme. 51
Congress may delegate such authority by express statutory direction. 52
Apparently, it can achieve the same result indirectly by creating a statutory
scheme replete with gaps or one using generalized language without a clear
solution to specific problems. 53 In these instances, the federal courts conclude, sometimes disingenuously, that Congress intended for them to fill
the "interstices" of the legislation. 54 When this implied grant of lawmaking
case provides a good example of this phenomenon. This 1981 ruling concluded that Congress, by
enacting the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, had impliedly displaced the federal common
law in interstate water pollution conflicts. /d. at 317. This litigation had previously reached the Supreme Court and resulted in a decision holding that federal common law principles applied to such
cases. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972) (discussing the applicability of
federal common law to air and water disputes).
49
See discussion infra Part II.A.I (discussing courts' legislative function when they engage in
"gap-fi II ing").
50
See, e.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (confining the development of
federal common law to situations where there is a significant conflict between a federal policy or interest and state law); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 9, at 419 (discussing the Supreme Court's recent
reluctance to recognize federal common law).
51
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,450-51 (1957).
52
See 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1j 124.41 [I] (3d ed. 2003)
("In enacting federal statutory law, Congress often expressly delegates federal law-making authority to
the courts").
53
See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,366-67 (1943) (discussing how
the Court must devise its own rules oflaw when there is no applicable act of Congress).
54
For example, in Textile Workers Union, a union sued an employer under§ 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA") to compel arbitration required by a collective bargaining agreement. 353 U.S. at 449. Section 301(a) grants federal subject matter jurisdiction over suits
involving contract violations between unions and employers. /d. at 449-50. After an exhaustive review
of the LMRA's legislative history, the Court held, however, that§ 30l(a) "authorizes federal courts to
fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective
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authority is found by courts, it is as a convenient explanation or legal fiction justifying their intervention in cases that they believe need resolution.
As a matter of perceived necessity, the federal courts find the common
law power to fill the gaps in an incomplete statute. 55 Although sometimes
confusingly similar to statutory interpretation, the exercise of federal common lawmaking power is different in that it does just that-it makes new
law. 56 As the Court has said, the authority of the courts to construe or interpret statutes is "fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a
new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to
adopt." 57 However, there are clear limits on the fashioning of an expansive
federal common law. 58 For instance, courts generally are not free to supplement the rights and remedies provided for by congressional enactments.59 Furthermore, this common law power to fill statutory interstitial
gaps has been further restricted by stated policies reinforcing traditional
legal understandings represented by general or common law rules. 60 Statutes that "invade the common law [however] are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles,
except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'>6 1 To abrogate
a common law principle, Congress must draft a statute that speaks directly
bargaining agreements." /d. at 450-52. Federal courts have followed the reasoning and approach taken
by the Court in Textile Workers Union to create and apply federal common law to multiple federal
statutory schemes. E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brunch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (finding
that "given [the ]language and history [of ERISA] courts are to develop a federal common law of rights
and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans."); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
379-80 (1983) (finding a private right of action under§ IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
The inquiry into whether a congressional grant is present involves examining (I) the text of the statute
for express grants and (2) the statute's legislative history for implied grants. See Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 451-52 (discussing the "force of the Act" and going on to examine the legislative
histo'1'JSee, e.g., Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 455-57 (indicating that the court must, out of necessi~, fashion a remedy in order to achieve the statute's goals).
6
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77,97 (1981).
57 !d.
58

See, e.g., O'Me/veny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 87 (outlining the limits on courts' power to fashion
federal common law).
59
This has been especially true in recent efforts to identify an implied right of action for damages
in federal statutes. See, e.g., Kraholios v. Nat'! Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527 (1989) (no
implied right of action for breach of a duty of fair representation in Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act); see also United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 537-38 (1993)(holding that the Court cannot
alter a common law remedy regime that Congress implicitly adopted when it enacted the statute).
60
See, e.g., O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 86-87 (discussing how the long standing common
law policy acknowledged by 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (2000) directs courts to use traditional, state common
law rules when Congress does not say otherwise).
61
Texas, 507 U.S. at 534 (citing lsbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). This
presumption applies to both federal and state common law. !d. In considering whether a federal statute
pre-empts state common law however, courts start with the assumption that "the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superceded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,316 (1981).
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to the question addressed by the common law. 62 Federal courts are to assume that Congress legislates with the expectation that common law principles will remain valid, unless the statute or its legislative history evidences a contrary purpose; 63 congressional silence generally does not evidence intent to supplant the existing common law.64
The effect of Congress's legislating against a common law background
is that the federal courts' limited authority to create common law is further
restrained. Federal courts must refrain from filling gaps in statutes that
were drafted in recognition of firmly established common law principles.65
The onus is on the federal courts, when faced with such statutes, to conduct
a thorough investigation of the statute's legislative history and the common
law setting in which it was drafted to determine whether Congress intentionally omitted a right or remedy, relying instead on established state law
principles. 66 It is only when there is either a grant of authority to legislate
62

Texas, 507 U.S. at 534. When a statute has spoken directly to a question historically determined by reference to federal common law, the courts' "commitment to the separation of powers is too
fundamental to continue to rely on federal common law by judicially decreeing what accords with
common sense and the public weal when Congress has addressed the problem." City of Milwaukee,
451 U.S. at 315 (internal quotation omitted).
63
Texas, 507 U.S. at 534. For example, the Court has held that the "absence of any reference to
contribution in the legislative history [of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts] or of any possibility
that Congress was concerned with softening the blow on joint wrongdoers in this setting makes examination of other factors unnecessary." Texas Indus., Inc., v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639
(1981 ). The Court concluded that "Congress neither expressly nor implicitly intended to create a right
to contribution." /d. at 640. The Court then examined whether a contribution right was available to
parties liable for anti-trust violations under federal common law. /d. Contribution was held to be
unavailable in anti-trust actions because Congress had not authorized the federal courts to fashion such
a common law right, and because no uniquely federal interests are implicated as contribution actions
involve private litigants. /d. at 642-43.
64
Texas, 507 U.S. at 535. The Texas Court held that the Debt Collection Act of 1982 ("OCA")
left in place the longstanding common law obligation of States' to pay prejudgment interest on debts
owed to the United States government. /d. at 539. Texas incurred the debts at issue through its participation in the Food Stamp Program, under which states must reimburse the federal government for a
portion of the replacement cost for any lost or stolen coupons above a certain "tolerance level." /d. at
530-31. Texas argued that the DCA precluded imposition of prejudgment interest on any amounts
owed by states to the federal government. /d. at 532. The Court held that the OCA's silence as to
states' prejudgment interest obligations was not reason to conclude that the DCA was meant to abrogate Texas's common law obligations. /d. at 537.
65
See id. at 533 (discussing limits on judicial gap-filling when there is a common law backgroun~.
·
See generally id. at 534; Radclifl Materials, 451 U.S. 630. Separation of powers and federalism concerns are implicated when a federal rule that would displace state law in an area of national
concern is enacted, and therefore, it is generally the province of the elected representatives in Congress,
and not of the federal courts (which are insulated from the political process) to fashion such rules. See
Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (discussing why the Court must be cautious
about formulating federal common law). These concerns dictate the presumption against fashioning a
federal common law rule when a federal statute or state law addresses the issue in dispute. See id.
(finding that the presumption against formulating federal common law was not overcome because there
was no significant conflict between "a federal policy or interest and the use of state law"). Federal
courts must heed comprehensive and clear Acts of Congress that expressly or impliedly address dis-

2004]

THE ULTIMATE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

439

or a uniquely federal interest at stake, a gap or ambiguity in the applicable
statutory scheme, and no existing and applicable state law with which to
answer the question left unaddressed by statute, that federal courts may
apply federal common law.67 These principles, echoed by Justice Souter's
Bestfoods opinion, suggest a much less free-wheeling federal common law
gap-filling power in these situations. 68

2.

Cases Implicating "Uniquely Federal Interests"

Federal common law may also be applied when a case implicates
uniquely federal interests.69 "Uniquely federal interests" are present if
there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or if the controversy implicates the basic interests of federalism. 70 In
such cases, state law, which presumptively would apply to resolve the issues left untouched by federal statute/ 1 cannot resolve the controversy either because the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign are
intimately involved, or because the interstate or international nature of the
controversy makes disposition under state law inappropriate. 72 This is
hardly surprising as a general proposition yet the difficulty exists in identifying those cases where "uniquely federal interests" are or should be paramount. Federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those
concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, 73 interstate
and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of states, or
national relations with foreign nations/" and in admiralty cases. 75 Federal
courts may not create new federal common law outside of these few areas.
In all other cases, state law or federal Constitutional or statutory law applies.76 But what about the many government programs authorized by fed-

puted issues, and only fashion new federal rules in the absence of such. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 314 ("[F]ederal common law
applies '[u]ntil the field has been made subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative standards."') (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236,241 (lOth Cir. 1971)).
67 WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 9, at 413-14; see discussion supra Part II.A.I, infra Part II.A.2.
68 See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
69 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
70 E.g., id. at 508, 5 II.
71
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77,94-95 (1981).
72
Texas Indus., Inc., v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630,641 (1981).
73 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943). Civil liabilities arising out
of defense procurement contracts, obligations and rights of the United States under contracts, and
liability of federal officers for official acts are included within this class of actions determined under
federal common law. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504-06.
74
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,400 (1964).
75
Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963).
76 "State laws 'should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state inter-
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eral legislation yet missing crucial statutory guidance? When should the
resolution of these programmatic issues be found to present "uniquely federal interests" justifying a court-made rule of decision? These questions
are found in the CERCLA issues presented below.

B. Finding the Substance of Federal Common Law Rules of Decision
A court's determination that federal common law should apply to a
disputed issue, because the issue implicates a uniquely federal interest or
Congress has been found to have granted authority to fill legislative gaps,
does not automatically grant the court license to establish a rule as it sees
fit. Once the threshold decision has been made to identify federal common
law, the court must next determine whether the rule of decision should be
incorporated from the existing state law or fashioned by the judge. 77 This
has been an interesting and complicated question. In a series of decisions
reaching back to the 1970s, the Supreme Court has established a nearpresumption in favor of incorporating state law as the rule of decision in
cases attempting to "fill the gaps" ·in federal programmatic statutes. 78 The
central case creating this preference was United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc., which articulated a three-pronged inquiry for courts to undertake
when deciding whether to adopt state law or fashion the applicable rule
ostensibly under its common law powers. 79 The Supreme Court, however,
consistently has held that federal law governs questions involving the
rights of the United States that arise under nationwide federal programs. 80
ests, will suffer major damage if the state law is applied."' Boyle, 487 U.S. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77
See discussion infra, this Part (discussing the rules governing the Court's decision regarding
which law it applies). In some cases the federal legislation will indicate that state law should serve as
the rule of decision for cases arising under the federal statute. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b), 2674 (2000) is the prime example of this phenomenon.
78
See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79,87 (1994) (discussing how cases from the time
of Kimbell Foods to the present have held that the instances when the Court should develop a special
federal rule are "few and restricted").
79
See discussion infra Part II.B. I. Kimbell Foods does not speak of the issue as a federal common law matter. See generally United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). Clearly, the
Court was filling in the interstitial meaning of the Small Business Act which did not specify the priority
rules to govern Small Business Administration security interests as against private creditors. /d. at 727.
It was not interpreting the meaning of the federal Jaw in a conventional sense. In the end, it specified a
federal rule of decision on the issue of security interest priorities from Texas law, id. at 740, and this
must be the finding of federal common law. As stated by well-regarded scholars,
Whether state law or federal law controls on matters not covered by the Constitution
or an Act of Congress is a very complicated question, which yields to no simple answer in terms of the parties to the suit, the basis of the jurisdiction, or the source of
the right that is to be enforced. Whenever the federal court is free to decide for itself
the rule to be applied, and there are many such situations, it is applying, or making,
"federal common Jaw."
WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 9, at 414-15.
80
E.g., O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. 79 (Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989); United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 530 (1993) (Debt Collection Act of
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Federal courts are directed to "fill the interstices of federal legislation by
their own standards" when Congress has failed to speak to areas that comprise "issues substantially related to an established program of government
operation."81 But what is "federal law" in these contexts? Controversies
that directly affect the operation of such federal programs, however, do not
inevitably require a resort to uniform federal rules. 82 State law, as Kimbell
Foods holds, can admirably serve as the federal rule of decision. 83 When
well-established commercial rules that have proven workable over time
govern an area of federal concern, the uncertainties of altering such settled
commercial practices dictate that courts refrain from creating new uncertainties and "adopt the readymade body of state law as the federal rule of
decision until Congress strikes a different accommodation. " 84 The Rules of
Decision Act,85 as interpreted by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 86 provides
that state laws impart the rule of decision in federal court cases, unless the
matter in litigation is governed by the Constitution or by a federal statute.
Kimbell Foods and subsequent Supreme Court decisions consistently agree
with this statement. 87 Curiously, this view has only been occasionally followed in the CERCLA holdings under consideration below.
1982); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 89-90 (1981) (Equal Pay Act of
1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,
67 (1966) (Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands).
81
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979) (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)), accord United States v. little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580, 594 (1973) (holding that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal
courtsJ.
2
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727-28.
83
!d. at 740.
84
/d. at 739-40.
8S
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000). But see Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367 (holding that federal law,
rather than state law, applies to disputes involving the rights and liabilities of the federal government).
At issue in Clearfield Trust was whether federal common law or state law rules determined Clearfield
Trust Co.'s liability to the federal government for collecting on a forged check issued by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. /d. at 364-65. The Court found that federal law governed the dispute
because the United States exercises a constitutional function or power when it disburses its funds or
pays its debts. /d. at 366. The authority to issue the check in question originated in the Constitution
and federal statutes, and therefore the duties imposed on, and the rights acquired by, the federal government should come from the same source. /d. Where no explicit congressional directive exists, the
court must consider whether state law should apply, or whether the application of state law would
subject the rights and duties to exceptional uncertainty. /d. at 367. The Rule of Decision Act, therefore, is inapplicable where rights and duties of the United States are drawn from federal statute or the
Constitution.
86
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938).
87
See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1994) (discussing how cases from the
time of Kimbell Foods to the present have held that the instances when the Court should develop a
special federal rule instead of applying state law are "few and restricted").
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Kimbell Foods

The case of United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. sets forth the Supreme
Court's modem template for deciding when federal courts may fashion
federal common law rules. The Court, in this 1979 decision, devised a
three-factor test to determine when federal courts should ignore the
"readymade body of state law" and create new common law rules of decision. 88 It found that federal programs that by their "nature are and must be
uniform in character throughout the Nation necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules," however, "when there is little need for a national
uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of
decision. " 89 The Court articulated that federal courts' first inquiry when
deciding whether to incorporate a state law rule of decision into federal
common law should be whether the federal program at issue required uniform national rules to effectuate its purpose.90 Whether application of a
state law rule of decision would frustrate specific objectives of federal programs,91 and whether application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law were two other factors set forth by
the Court as framing the decision. 92 In the twenty-three years following the
Kimbell Foods case, these three elements have continued to serve as the
88

Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29.
/d. at 728 (citing Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1977)). The Court in Miree
held that state law, rather than federal common law, applied in determining whether representatives of
passengers killed in an airplane crash could recover as third-party beneficiaries to contracts between the
defendant county and the Federal Aviation Administration. 433 U.S. at 32-33. The Court found that
only the rights of private litigants were at issue and resolution of the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim
did not directly affect the United States. /d. at 29. No duties, interests, liabilities, or substantial rights
of the federal government hinged on the outcome of the litigation, and, therefore, a uniform federal
common law rule was unnecessary. See id. at 32-33 (discussing the federal government's very limited
and speculative interest in the case).
9
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.
91 /d. (citing United Statesv. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944)). The Allegheny Court
held that a Pennsylvania tax law violated the United States Constitution insofar as it purported to authorize taxation of United States' property interests in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 322 U.S. at
192. The Court found that state law could not defeat or limit government actions when the federal
government properly exercised a constitutional grant of power. /d. at 189-91. Exercise of such constitutional functions presented questions of federal concern that could not be controlled by laws of any
state. /d. at 183. The Supremacy Clause, the purpose of which was to avoid the introduction of
disparities, conflicts, and confusions, would be violated if state laws did control the federal government's constitutionally authorized functions. /d.
92
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (citing United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 241-42
(1960)). As a matter of federal law, state law was held to govern divestitures of federal tax liens, except to the extent that federal statutes had entered the field. Brosnan, 363 U.S. at 240-42. The Court
recognized that tax liens form part of the machinery for collecting federal taxes, but that Congress
"came into an area of complex property relationships long since settled and regulated" when it resorted
to the use of liens. /d. at 241-42. The need for a uniform federal rule was outweighed "by the severe
dislocation to local property relationships which would result from [the Court] disregarding state procedures" that governed enforcement of the liens. /d. at 242.
89

°
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Supreme Court's standard setting the judicial policy for federal courts
grappling with the difficult question of whether they should enter upon the
field of federal common law rule development and adjudication.93 The
application of this three-part decision making structure over the years has
indicated the Supreme Court's decreasing tolerance of the lower federal
courts' exercise of common law rulemaking powers. It reinforces the
theme of judicial restraint in the federal courts and a more limited view of
the legitimate function offederal courts as "law-makers."
The issue before the Supreme Court in Kimbell Foods was whether
contractual liens which arose out of federal loan programs took precedence
over private liens in the absence of a federal statute setting priority for
creditors. 94 The Court first held that the priority of liens stemming from
federal lending programs was to be determined by reference to federal
law.95 Both the Small Business Administration ("SBA") and the Farmers
Home Administration ("FHA") had derived their authority to enter into
loan transactions from specific federal statutes that had been enacted by an
exercise of "constitutional function or power;" the Court therefore reasoned that the agencies' rights in those transactions also should derive from
a federal source.96
The question remaining for the Kimbell Foods Court was whether the
federal rule of decision regarding the priority ofliens should be determined
under existing state law or a judicially-created federal rule. 97 The Court
applied the three-factor analysis it had set out and held that the relative
priority of federal and private liens was to be determined pursuant to nondiscriminatory state laws.98 The agencies' operating practices, which recognized that states' commercial laws control the Government's security
interests, undercut the assertion that "a federal rule of priority [was] needed
to avoid the administrative burdens created by disparate state commercial
rules.'.w In addition, the unforeseeable consequences of "altering settled
93

See, e.g., Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881, 890 (5th Cir. 2001)
(exem£1ifying a federal court's recent application the Kimbell Foods test).
4
440 U.S. at 718. The Court consolidated two appeals from the Fifth Circuit in Kimbell Foods.
ld. at 718, 723. Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat. Bank, 551 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), involved a
United States' contractual lien that was guaranteed by the SBA. Jd. at 493. The Court affirmed the
circuit court's decision. 440 U.S. at 740. United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977),
involved a security interest taken by the FHA in a borrower's farm equipment and crops for loans
obtained under the Consolidated Farmers Horne Administration Act of 1961. ld. at 679-80. The Court
vacated and remanded the circuit court's decision to fashion a special federal common law rule giving
priority to a private repairman's lien over the FHA's lien. 440 U.S. at 740.
95
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 726-27.
96
ld. at 726 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)).
97
440 U.S. at 718.
98 ld.
99

ld. at 732.
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commercial practices" 100 and the states' relatively uniform laws concerning
commercial transactions 101 deterred the Court from adopting a federal rule
regarding loan priorities. With this decision, the Court set out an extremely
narrow course for federal judges ruling in cases involving federal programs
lacking clear statutory guidance. The emphasis in Kimbell Foods was
placed on the maintenance of stable and predictable rules of decision even
if they were to be derived from the laws of states. Justice Marshall's opinion cast a skeptical eye towards federal agency arguments favoring the
development of uniform, court-determined rules and found them wanting.
Apparently, the Court's position has been that Congress must act clearly to
set forth statutory rules favoring federal interest to a greater degree. Following the Kimbell Foods decision, the freedom of federal judges to control the development of new legal doctrine under their common law powers
seemed significantly curtailed. Further Supreme Court opinions would
reinforce this view, but, as the following analysis of CERCLA decisions
will reveal, the Court has found very little support in the decisions of the
lower federal courts, which have largely ignored it.
2. Post-Kimbell Foods Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding the
Source ofFederal Common Law Rules ofDecision
a.

Pre-O'Melveny & Myers Cases

Justice Marshall's opinion in the unanimous Kimbell Foods case set
the benchmark for finding rules of decision in "interstitial meaning" federal
common law cases. Several other Supreme Court holdings rendered between 1979 and 1991 reinforced the same view. This principle may be
stated in the following terms: With the exception of the relatively few cases
in which a federal common law rule of decision is mandated by the federal
statute or right at issue, 102 the general presumption has been that in the absence of a statutorily provided rule, if state law may be applied to resolve a
dispute, there would be no need for federal courts to fashion a different
100

/d. at 739. The Court found that "[i]n structuring financial transactions, businessmen depend
on state commercial law to provide the stability essential for reliable evaluation of the risks involved."
/d. (citing Nat'! Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99, 102 (1881)). Creditors who rely on state law to ensure
lien priority would have had their expectations thwarted whenever a federal contractual security interest
appeared and took precedence had the Court created a federal rule of decision in Kimbell Foods. /d.
101
/d. at 732 n.28. The Government failed to assert any concrete conflicts between the interests
promoted by the SBA and FHA loan programs and existing state laws. /d. at 740. The Court did
acknowledge that a federal rule would have been justified if the Government had shown that formulating special rules to govern priority of federal liens was necessary to ''vindicate important national
interests." /d.
102
Generally, there must exist a "significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and
the use of state law" for federal courts to legitimately fashion common law rules of decision. Wallis v.
Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).
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common law rule. 103 This view of judicial authority appeared to rein in the
federal judge's discretion and force courts to presumptively start from a
position of using state law as the relevant rule of decision.
After Kimbell Foods, a federal court's decision whether to adopt state
law or to fashion nationwide federal rules become a "matter of judicial
policy dependent upon a variety of considerations always relevant to the
nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon them
of applying state law." 104 In the case of Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,
decided in the same year as Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court applied the
Kimbell Foods three-part test to determine whether a nationwide rule was
necessary to decide whether changes in a river's course affecting riparian
land owned or possessed by the United States or an Indian tribe had been
avulsive or accretive. 105 Wilson involved consolidated actions to quiet title
to land originally granted to the Omaha Indian Tribe under an 1854
treaty. 106 The eastern boundary of the reservation land was fixed as the
center of the main channel of the Missouri River, into which a peninsula
protruded. 107 Over time, the river changed its course, and certain tribal
land was separated from the bulk of the reservation by the river. 108 Petitioners asserted that the river's movements washed away part of the reservation and the soil accreted to the Iowa side of the river, vesting title in
them as riparian owners. 109
The Wilson court held that Nebraska state law, and not a judicially created federal common law rule, should provide the rule of decision in this
matter. Even though the case involved a matter concerned with Indian
tribal property rights, the Court concluded that there was no need to develop a uniform national rule to determine whether changes in a river's
course affecting riparian ownership rights of an Indian tribe or the United
States had been accretive or avulsive, so long as the applicable state stan103

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 n.7 (1981). The strength of the Kimbell
Foods view was so strong that it even prompted Justice White to dissent from the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari in a case raising the issue in a factual context similar to Kimbell Foods. In Missouri
Farmers Ass'n v. United States, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986), the Court was asked to review the Eighth Circuit's ruling that a federal agency regulation provided the appropriate rule for deciding whether the
Farmers Home Administration retains a continuing security interest in certain collateral following sale.
For Justice White, making the federal regulation the controlling source of a decisional rule was difficult
to reconcile with Kimbell Foods, which preferred "non-discriminatory state law" in the absence of a
"congressional directive." /d. at I 054 (White, J., dissenting). Due to the denial of certiorari, the Supreme Court never addressed his concerns.
104
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653,672 (1979) (internal quotes omitted).
lOS /d. at 672-73.
106

!d. at 658-60.
/d. at 658-59.
108
/d. at 659.
109
/d. at 657.
107
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dard was applied evenhandedly to particular disputes. 110 Given the Court's
belief that state law was being equitably applied, the Court found that there
would be little likelihood of injury to federal trust responsibilities or tribal
possessory interests. 111 Referring back to an element of the Kimbell Foods
test, it concluded that the likelihood of injury to tribal interests did not pose
an actual and significant conflict that would mandate fashioning a federal
rule. Finally, the Court recognized that states have a substantial interest in
having their own real property laws resolve such controversies, in that
there was merit "in not having the reasonable expectations of . . . private
landowners upset by the vagaries of being located adjacent to or across
from Indian reservations .... " 112 The Wilson holding showed that, at least
in 1979, the judicial policy of emphasizing established state law principles
held sway and this view would control the federal courts until extremely
strong evidence of countervailing federal interests could be demonstrated.
However, in 1987 a federal rule of decision was recognized in West
Virginia v. United States, a case that allowed the federal government, as a
matter of right, to collect prejudgment interest in breach-of-contract actions
where the amount due was liquidated, ascertained, or agreed to. 113 After
suffering two natural disasters in 1972, the State of West Virginia had contracted with the Army Corps of Engineers for the federal agency to prepare
sites for mobile homes. 114 Under the Disaster Relief Act of 1970 ("ORA"),
the federal government was authorized to prepare mobile home sites
"without charge to the United States." 115 West Virginia acknowledged the
bills for services rendered by the Corps, but it failed to make payrnents} 16
As a result, the United States brought suit against the state to recover
amounts due on the contract as well as prejudgment interest. 117
The Court analyzed the Kimbell Foods factors in light of the circumstances and held that a federal common law rule allowing for recovery of
prejudgment interest by the United States was preferable to incorporation
of state law on this issue} 18 More specifically, the rule "governing the
interest to be recovered as damages for delayed payment of a contractual
obligation to the United States" was found not to be controlled by state
110

/d. at 673. The Court cited United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,730 (1979), for
the proposition that courts should not accept "generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting state law would aversely affect [federal interests]." Wilson, 442 U.S. at
673.
111
Wilson, 442 U.S. at 673.
112
/d. at 674.
113
479 u.s. 305, 308 (1987).
114
/d. at 307.
liS /d.
116 /d.
117 /d.
118

/d. at 309.
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statutory or common law. 119 Reminiscent of the well-known decision in
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,' 20 the Court ruled in a way favorable
to the federal government's financial interest. In its view, incorporation of
state law would not give due regard to the federal interest in maintaining
the apportionment of responsibility for payment that Congress devised in
the DRA. 121 Also, alluding to the Kimbell Foods test, application of a federal rule would not disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state
law because a state law would not (of its own force) govern contracts between a state and the federal govemment. 122 The Court recognized in applying the federal rule that no state policy compelled deviation from the
common law rule allowing the federal government to collect prejudgment
interest and that federal policy called for an interest award. 123 Seemingly,
in this case the Court considered that the federal interest was great and the
state interest much less substantial.
Finally, in the 1991 case of Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,
Inc., 124 the Court refused to fashion a federal rule of decision that would
oblige the representative shareholder in a derivative action brought under
the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA") 125 to make a precomplaint
demand 126 on the board of directors, even when the demand would be futile
under state law. 127 Kamen was decided under federal common law because
119

/d. at 308 (internal citation omitted).
318 U.S. 363 (1943). Clearfield Trost involved the payment of a United States government
check that had been stolen and was cashed on the basis of a forged endorsement. /d. at 364-65. The
federal government had delayed in notifying the bank that had paid the check of its forged endorsement. /d. at 365. Under Pennsylvania law, this delay would bar the United States from suing the bank.
/d. at 366. The exact question before the Court was whether state law or a federal rule of decision
would control the question of delay. /d. A unanimous Court ruled in favor of a uniform federal rule as
more appropriate. The Court noted, "The application of state law ... would subject the rights and
duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in results by
making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The desirability
of a uniform rule is plain." /d. at 367.
121
West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305,309 (1987).
120

122/d.
123

/d. at 310.
500 u.s. 90 (1991).
125
15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(a) (2000).
126
The demand requirement obligates the representative shareholder in a planned derivative suit
against the board of directors to state its complaint to the board and allow the board either to take over
the litigation or oppose the suit. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 96. Usually, the board's decision to assume
control of the suit ends the shareholder's involvement in the action. /d. at I 01. The futility exception
to the demand rule allows the shareholder to forgo making the demand when a majority of directors are
financially interested in the challenged transaction or have participated in or approved the alleged
wrongdoing. /d.
127
/d. at 92. See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (examining whether disinterested directors can terminate a stockholders' derivative suit under federal statutory law).
124
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the cause of action was provided for under the ICA, a federal statute; 128
however, the rule of decision was derived from state law. 129 The Court
found that the structure of the demand requirement-that is, when it is required or excused-actually determines who has the power to control corporate litigation. Therefore, such a basic matter of corporate organization
relates to the fundamental allocation of governing powers within the corporation, a traditional state-law matter. 130
In Kamen, application of the Kimbell Foods factors led Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, to hold that the states' laws regarding
whether a demand was required before a shareholder initiates a corporate
derivative suit, and whether a futility exception to the requirement existed,
should control the outcome of the case. 131 He reasoned that fashioning a
universal demand rule would upset the balance of power that state corporate doctrines had struck between the power of shareholders and corporate
directors to control corporate litigation. 132 Furthermore, the futility exception recognized by a majority of states did not impede the regulatory objectives of the ICA because both the exception and the ICA function primarily
to "impose controls and restrictions on the internal management of investment companies." 133 The Court affirmed that "where a gap in the federal
securities laws must be bridged by a rule that bears on the allocation of
governing powers within the corporation, federal courts should incorporate
state law into federal common law unless the particular state law in question is inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal statute." 134 Obviously, the Court believed that state corporate law was compatible with
these federal statutory policies.
Throughout this period, the Court's consistent application of the Kim128

Kamen, 500 U.S. at 97.
"The presumption that state law should be inco'l'orated into federal common law is particularly strong in areas in which private parties have entered legal relationships with the expectation that
their rights and obligations would be governed by state-law standards .... Corporation law is one such
area." /d. at 98. The Court recognized that corporations "are creatures of state law, ... and it is state
law that is the font of corporate directors' powers," id. at 98-99 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,
478 (1979}), and discerned nothingin the ICA's regulatory objectives that "evidenced a congressional
intent that federal courts ... fashion an entire body of federal COJ1'0rate law out of whole cloth."
Kamen, id. at 99 (internal citations omitted).
130
/d. at 101.
131
/d. at 108-09.
132
/d. at 103.
133
/d. at 107. Although the Court held that the futility exception did not conflict with the purposes of the ICA, the Court did state that it would "be constrained to displace state law in this area were
[it] to conclude that the futility exception to the demand requirement is inconsistent with the policies
underlying the ICA." /d. This statement indicates that the Court places greater emphasis on the second
prong of the Kimbell Foods test, whether state law conflicts with the puJ1'oses and intent of the federal
statutory scheme at issue, than on the need for a uniform national rule, or whether a federal rule would
disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.
134
!d. at I 08.
129

2004]

THE ULTIMATE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

449

bell Foods test indicates that the three-part test's applicability extends to all
cases in which federal common law might apply. In these instances, the
question before the Court was whether to create a federal common law rule
of decision or to incorporate a pre-existing state law rule. In making that
decision, the Kimbell Foods holding has established a durable test requiring the federal court to evaluate (1) whether a uniform national rule is required to effectuate the federal program's purpose; (2) whether application
of a state law rule would conflict with a policy underlying the federal program; and (3) whether application of a uniform federal rule would upset
existing relationships predicated on state law. The Court used this approach to evaluate judicial choice of law during the fifteen year period following Kimbell Foods. Rather than waning over the years, the emphasis
on the Kimbell Foods test has been reinforced by the Supreme Court's
more recent pronouncements in 0 'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC 35 and Atherton v. FDIC. 136 These two decisions in the mid-1990s strengthen the notion
that federal courts should fashion federal common law when necessary but
that they should use state rules of decision as their starting point. As the
discussion concerning CERCLA decision-making indicates, federal judges
have been reluctant to hear the Supreme Court's message.

b.

O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton

In these two decisions over a three-year span, the Supreme Court restricted the common lawmaking powers which had been asserted by a
number of the federal circuits and affirmed its prior holding in Kimbell
Foods. In O'Melveny & Myers, the Court unanimously rejected a federal
common law scheme that displaced traditional matters of state concern,
such as issues of corporate governance and whether the knowledge of corporate directors may be imputed to the corporation, 137 and it held that resort
to federal common law is warranted only in "extraordinary cases." 138 If
anything, the 0 'Melveny & Myers case emphatically stressed the basic
135

512 U.S. 79 (1994).
519 u.s. 213 (1997).
137
O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 83-89.
138
/d. at 89. In constitutional law battles occurring during the latter part of the 1990s, some more
conservative justices argued that Kimbell Foods represented a limitation in expansive judicial power to
fashion non-statutory legal principles. In a commerce power case, several dissenting members of the
Court even emphasized the limited power of federal courts to create federal common law to cases
which involve "uniquely federal issues or the rights and responsibilities of the United States or its
agents." Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 615 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas identified Kimbell
Foods as standing for the idea that "where a federal rule is not essential, or where state law already
operates within a particular field, we have applied state law rather than opting to create federal common
law." /d. But even conservative justices can identify "uniquely federal issues" in cases presenting state
law based challenges to federal military procurement activities. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487
u.s. 500, 503-507 (1988).
136
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policy of Kimbell Foods and reinforced the notion that a federal common
law rule was presumptively to be selected from applicable state law principles absent an extraordinary conflict with extremely important federal interests. At issue in the 0 'Melveny & Myers case was whether, in a suit
brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") as the
receiver for a federally insured bank, federal law or state law provided the
proper rule of decision to determine the malpractice liability of attorneys
who had provided services to the bank. 139
FDIC asserted that a federal common law rule should determine the
outcome of the adjudication of its claims, which were based upon California state law. 14° FDIC further contended that the "content of the federal
common law rule corresponds to the rule that would independently be
adopted by most jurisdictions." 141 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
forcefully admonished the FDIC, stating that its first assertion was "so
plainly wrong," that "(t]here is no federal general common law," 142 and
even if "there were a federal common law on such a generalized issue
(which there is not), we see no reason why it would necessarily conform to
that independently ... adopted by most jurisdictions." 143 The Court held
that "California law, not federal law, governs the imputation of knowledge
to corporate victims of alleged negligence, and that is so whether or not
California chooses to follow the majority rule." 144 The key point on this
first issue was that state-and not federal-law governed the general issue
of the imputed knowledge of corporate officers acting against the corporation's interest.
At issue under FDIC's second cause of action was a narrower issuewhether California law was "displaced" of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"). 145 This federal
statute directs that the FDIC, as receiver, "step into the shoes" of the failed
savings and loan institution and obtain the rights of the insured depository
139

O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 80-81.
The FDIC assened claims based on two California causes of action: The first required the
Court to decide whether federal common law or California state law determines ''whether the knowledge of corporate officers acting against the corporation's interest will be imputed to the corporation";
and the second required the Court to decide whether federal common law determined ''whether knowledge by officers so acting will be imputed to the FDIC when it sues as a receiver of the corporation."
/d. at 83. It may be notable that FDIC brought suit as receiver for the failed savings and loan, and not
in its capacity as the United States government. Arguably, FDIC's case for a federal rule would have
been stronger if the United States was a party to the action; the litigation otherwise was between two
private parties.
141
/d. at 84 (quoting Brief for Respondent 15 n.3).
142
/d. at 83 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
143
O'Me/veny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 84 (internal quote omitted).
144
Jd. at 84-85 (internal quote omitted).
145
/d. at 85-86.
140
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institution that existed prior to receivership. 146 The FDIC claimed that this
authority under FIRREA included a nonexclusive grant of rights to the
FDIC receiver that could be "supplemented" by federal common law because of the high federal interest in such an area of law. 147 Justice Scalia
concluded that FIRREA embodied a comprehensive and detailed federal
regulatory scheme containing specific federal rules of decision on enumerated issues relevant to the FDIC's role as a receiver! 48 Employing the
Latin phrase inclusio unius, exc/usio alterius, Justice Scalia read the statute
as providing a limited and exclusive list of federal rules which existed
against the backdrop of state law. 149 Matters left unaddressed by the FIRREA were left subject to the disposition of state law .150
The 0 'Melveny & Myers Court emphasized an important principle of
federal common law rulemaking-that cases justifying the establishment of
a "special federal rule" are "few and restricted" and limited to situations
where there is a "significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law." 151 The record in the case before it failed to
indicate such an interest or conflict. 152 Without the requisite "significant
conflict" serving as the "precondition for recognition of a federal rule of
decision," 153 judicial lawmaking would be considered illegitimate and state
law would apply. 0 'Melveny & Myers represents a strong statement by the
Supreme Court substantially restricting courts' ability to fashion federal
common law. Even the federal value of "uniformity of law" was rejected
as an appropriate ground for federal common law rule. 154 The "significant
conflict" requirement strengthens the Court's prior holding in Kimbell
Foods, and reiterates the Court's preference for legislatively-created law at
either the federal or the state level. 155 In some disputes since 0 'Melveny &
146

Jd. at 86 (internal citation omitted).

147 ld.
148

ld. at 86.
ld. at 86-87.
ISO /d. at 85.
149

ld. at 87 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
FDIC argued that the federal deposit insurance fund may be depleted if state law were adopted
as the rule decision, and such depletion would create a conflict between a "specific, concrete" federal
policy and state law. /d. at 88. The Court rebuked FDIC's argument by finding that neither FIRREA
nor prior law set an anticipated level for the deposit insurance fund and that there was no federal policy
that the fund should always win. /d.
ISJ Id. at 87.
lSI
2
IS

154

Justice Scalia rejected the idea that the efficiency of federal agency procedure or work effort

was an adequate federal policy or interest. Jd. at 88. He wrote that "uniformity of law might facilitate
the FDIC's nationwide litigation of these suits, eliminating state-by-state research and reducing uncertainty-but if the avoidance of those ordinary consequences qualified as an identified federal interest,
we would be awash in 'federal common-law rules."' Jd.
ISS Formulating policy is a role reserved to those "who write the laws, rather than those who interpret them." ld. at 89. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion added further support to this notion when
he explained that while state courts may engage in judicial rulemaking, federal courts are "courts of
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Myers between private parties, federal courts have been reluctant to displace state law by finding a significant conflict with a federal interest. 156
However, it is curious that reference to this case has been conspicuously
absent from the CERCLA appellate case decisions under review in this
article.
The 0 'Melveny & Myers holding was soon restated and reinforced in
Atherton v. FDIC, 151 where the Court held that absent a significant conflict
between some federal policy or interest and state law, courts must refrain
from fashioning rules of federal common law! 58 At issue was whether
courts should look to state law, a federal statute, 159 or federal common law
to find the applicable standard to measure the legal propriety of a bank's
officer's actions. 160 Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, rejected the
FDIC's assertion that the need for uniformitY. mandated a federal common
law rule of decision, thereby reaffirming one of Kimbell Foods' central
premises by stating, "to invoke the concept of uniformity . . . is not to
prove its need." 161 The Court held that the federal statute provided a liability floor (gross negligence), and that state law would provide the rule of
decision if the state liability standard exceeded that of gross negligence. 162
The crux of the opinion was that a significant conflict between a federal
policy and state law did not exist, making reliance on or creation of federal
common law improper. 163
limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers." !d. at 90 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77,95 (1981)).
156
See, e.g., Woodward Governor Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Flight Sys., Inc., 164 F.3d 123, 127 (2d
Cir. 1999).
157
Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
158
ld. at 225. As in O'Melveny & Myers, FDIC was not acting in its capacity as the United
States ~ovemrnent, but as receiver for a federally chartered savings association. Jd.
19
The statute at issue was 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (k) (2000), which provides that a "director or officer
of a federally insured bank may be held personally liable for monetary damages in an [FDIC]-initiated
civil action ... for gross negligence or similar conduct ... that demonstrates a greater disregard of a
duty of care (than gross negligence)." /d. at 216 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (k) (2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
160
Atherton, 519 U.S. at 215-16.
161
!d. at 220.
162
/d. at 216.
163
The FDIC invoked two arguments to allege a significant conflict between application of a
state law standard of conduct and the federal policies that underlie the banking system: (I) a common
law standard must be applied because the banks in question were federally chartered, and (2) an analogy to the conflict of laws "internal affairs doctrine." /d. at 221-26. The Court rejected the first argument by reminding FDIC that federally chartered banks are governed more by state law than federal
law and to "point to a federal charter by itself shows no conflict, threat, or need for federal common
law." /d. at 223. FDIC's second argument, an analogy to the internal affairs doctrine, which was
described as "a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs" was similarly rebuffed. /d. at 224. The Court held that
the internal affairs doctrine seeks to prevent conflict by requiring that there be only one point of legal
reference for an entity, but that nothing in the doctrine indicated that the single source of law must be
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The Supr~me Court's holdings from Kimbell Foods up through Atherton exemplify a clear attitude of restraint in federal court lawmaking almost to the point of demonstrating a general hostility towards federal
judges fashioning common law rules of decision when state law might apply to the dispute. Perhaps this view is based upon an attitude that federal
courts should have more circumscribed and specifically identified sources
of power. Absent a showing that an action involves uniquely federal concerns and that there is an actual and significant conflict between the applicable state law and the purpose underlying the federal statute at issue, the
recent Court has insisted that federal courts' hands are tied with respect to
creating new common law. 164 By emphasizing a predominant legislative
role in the creation of law and rules of decision, the Court has indicated
that, especially after 0 'Melveny & Myers and Atherton, the task is not one
to be undertaken frequently by the federal judiciary. 165 It has also suggested with the rhetoric employed in its decisions that the burden is on both
the party arguing for a federal common law rule and the court implementing it. As the review of the CERCLA cases demonstrates, this clear expression of judicial restraint has been ignored by certain lower federal
courts.
3. Extending the Kimbell Foods Principle to the CERCLA Contextthe Bestfoods Case
In United States v. Bestfoods, 166 the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether a parent corporation could have derivative liability for response
costs due to its participation in or exercise of control over a subsidiary firm
liable under CERCLA. 167 The Court held that: (1) a parent corporation
may be charged with derivative CERCLA liability as an "owner" for its
subsidiaries' actions in operating a polluting facility only when state law
allows the "corporate veil to be pierced"; 168 (2) the "participation and control" test employed by the district court to evaluate a parent corporation's
federal. /d. "To find a justification for federal common law in [FDIC's] argument, however, (was] to
substitute analogy or formal symmetry for the controlling legal requirement ... the existence of the
need to create federal common law arising out of a significant conflict or threat to a federal interest."
/d. (citing O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85,87 (1994)).
164
See id. at 224-25.
165
The FDIC, in both O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton, was not litigating in its government capacity, but in its capacity as a receiver for failed institutions. Atherton, 519 U.S.a! 225. The FDIC was
not, in either case, pursuing purely federal interests. /d. If the FDIC were litigating in its governmental
capacity, the federal interests advanced may have warranted creation of federal common law rules of
decision in both cases. /d. at 225.
166
524 u.s. 51 (1998).
167
168

/d.

!d. at 55.
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control of a subsidiary may not be used to impose CERCLA liability; 169
and (3) a parent corporation may be held liable as an "operator" under
CERCLA in instances other than the parent's sole operation of, or joint
venture with, a subsidiary. 170 The first of these holdings bears directly on
the issue of defining CERCLA liability for corporate conduct by reference
to state corporate law concepts. The Court did not expressly decide the
issue of whether federal courts should use new federal common law or
state law to determine CERCLA liability for parent corporations, 171 but it
clearly indicated a preference that courts should not use statutory gaps as a
basis for rejecting fundamental corporate law principles and creating federal common law. 172 If anything, the Bestfoods opinion reinforced the
principles espoused in the earlier line of cases stemming from the Kimbell
Foods case.
The Bestfoods Court's preference for making fundamental corporate
law doctrine the rule of decision to determine CERCLA liability appears to
indicate that the Supreme Court favors adopting state law rules as a matter
of federal statutory interpretation or as the substantive legal rule under the
federal common law. 173 The Court's reasoning focused on two points.
First, it followed the general principle of corporate law that parent corporations are not liable for the acts of their subsidiaries, and that since that
principle had not been explicitly rejected by the text of CERCLA, it was
presumed to apply to the case at hand. 174 A second traditional corporate
law principle supplemented the first one with the Court's additional holding that if a court "pierced the corporate veil" or ignored the parent corporation's legal form, there could be derivative liability for the acts of the
subsidiary company. 175
The important point to be taken from the Bestfoods decision is that
169

Jd. at 59. Justice Souter, writing for the Court, held that the district court's focus on the "relationship between the parent and subsidiary ... erroneously, even if unintentionally, treated CERCLA as
though it displaced or fundamentally altered common law standards of limited liability." Jd. at 70. If
the participation-and-control test was adopted in the CERCLA context, a relaxed CERCLA-specific
rule of derivative liability ''would banish traditional standards and expectations from the law of CERCLA liability." /d. Such a rule, however, cannot arise from congressional silence and the Court found
CERCLA's silence on the matter "dispositive." Jd.
170
/d. at 55. A parent corporation could incur direct liability if it actually managed, directed, or
conducted operations specifically related to the pollution, because such activities fall directly within the
reaches of CERCLA 's § I 07(a) liability provisions. /d. at 66.
171
/d. at 64 n.9. The Court did not address the question of whether state law or federal common
law rules should determine liability under CERCLA because it had not been challenged by the parties.
Id. This lack of clarity has influenced later federal court decisions to adhere to their own decisions
favoring and employing the federal common law methodology. See, e.g., United States v. Exide Corp.,
No. 00-CV-3057 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3303, at *18-19 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2002).
172
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 70.
173
Mank, supra note 32, at 1190-91.
174
/d. at 1191.
175 /d.
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bedrock state corporate law concepts would not be easily cast aside solely
because the issue arose in federal CERCLA litigation. Justice Souter expressed this point by noting that CERCLA' s failure to deal with the particular issue of parent/subsidiary liability did not mean that the "entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiffs
cause of action is based upon a federal statute.'' 176 Congressional silence
regarding "a matter as fundamental as the liability implications of corporate ownership demands application of the rule that in order to abrogate a
common-law principle, the statute must speak directly to the issue addressed by the common law." 177 This statement suggests that CERCLA's
broad remedial purposes alone do not justify displacing fundamental corporate law principles and imposing new, federal common law rules for
corporations assessing liability for response costs. Instead, explicit statutory language contrary to such fundamental principles is required.
The Bestfoods Court's view of congressional silence on liability questions would also seem to be relevant with respect to the question of asset
purchaser liability under CERCLA and it would suggest that current state
corporation law provides the rule of decision for actions brought under
sections 107 and 113. 178 The Court failed to explicitly resolve whether federal common law or state law should serve as the rule of decision in Bestfoods. The Court, however, held that federal courts could not invoke
CERCLA' s silence as to liability of parent corporations to displace or fundamentally alter common law standards of limited liability. 179 A welldeveloped body of state corporation law existed with respect to corporate
parent/subsidiary liability prior to CERCLA's enactment. 180 With CERCLA's failure to speak directly to the issue, the Bestfoods decision indicates that federal courts should defer to that body of state law as the rule of
decision when determining liability for response costs.
A similarly well-developed body of state corporation law exists regarding asset purchaser liability. 181 Nearly every state recognizes that asset
purchasers do not incur successor-in-interest liability unless one of four
common law exceptions is met, and there is no "reason to think that states
176
177
omitted).
178

Bestfoods, 524 U.S. &162-63 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979)).
/d. at 63 (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)) (internal quotation marks

State corporation laws must yield to federal common law when they directly conflict with the
underlying policies ofCERCLA. E.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 80 (1994). But see
Mank, supra note 32, at 1194-95 (discussing whether Bestfoods suggests a limited federal common law
based upon a majority ofstates'laws).
17~ .
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 70.
180
I JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAGEN, COX & HAGEN ON CORPORATIONS§ 7.16 (2d ed.
2003).
181
See, e.g., Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J ., concurring).
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will alter their existing successor liability rules in a race to the bottom to
attract business." 182 CERCLA's silence regarding asset purchaser liability,
it follows, should receive similar treatment to that given parent corporations in Bestfoods-Congress' silence should be dispositive and federal
courts should defer to state corporation law rules. When read in conjunction with Kimbell Foods, 0 'Melveny & Meyers and Atherton, Bestfoods
strongly suggests that federal courts are quite limited in using federal
common lawmaking power to fashion new rules of decision that deviate
from background state law concepts. The four circuit courts which have
addressed the issue of asset purchaser liability under CERCLA after the
Bestfoods decision have deferred to state corporation law as the rule of
decision. 183 On the surface, these results appear to indicate that Bestfoods
choice of law reasoning has been extended to apply to the asset purchaser
CERCLA liability context. As the discussion in Part III will indicate, these
courts have reached a result consistent with Bestfoods in extremely inconsistent ways. With Bestfoods, the Supreme Court has made it clear that in
these statutory "gap filling" situations, the federal courts should have limited autonomy to make law in the common law fashion.
III. CERCLA: FEDERAL LAW CREATES A LIABILITY SCHEME FOR THE
CLEANUP OF HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES
A

Statutory Structure

CERCLA was enacted in response to the serious environmental and
health risks posed by industrial pollution. 184 This comprehensive statute
grants the President broad power to command both government agencies
and private parties to clean up hazardous waste sites, with the desired result
being that those who are "responsible for any damage, environmental
harm, or injury from chemical poisons may be tagged with the cost of their
actions." 185 CERCLA's purpose, therefore, is fourfold: (1) to make those
182

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir.
1998) ~citing Anspec Co., 922 F.2d at 1250).
13
United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d I, 54 (1st Cir. 2001); IBC Mfg. Co. v. Velsicol Chern.
Corp., No. 97-5340, 1999 WL 486615, at *3 (6th Cir. July 1, 1999); Atchison, 159 F.3d at 358; North
Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642,650 {7th Cir. 1998). After Bestfoods, the Sixth Circuit
addressed the issue of whether the corporate veil could be pierced and a sole shareholder be held jointly
and severally liable under CERCLA as an "arranger." See Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distrib.
Co., 166 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 1999). The court followed Bestfoods and held that the shareholder could
have arranger liability if under Ohio law (the forum state) the corporate veil could be ''pierced" because
of his "intimate participation in the arrangement for disposal" of the waste. /d. at 846. The appellate
court then held that Ohio law should be applied to resolve the CERCLA liability issues relating to
corporations and officers, and it remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether Ohio
law mandated piercing the corporate veil under the facts. /d. at 847-48.
184
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 55.
ISS
S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 13 (1980).
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who release hazardous substances into the environment strictly liable for
response costs, mitigation, and third-party damages; (2) to establish broad
Federal response authority and a fund to remediate contaminated sites and
mitigate damages where a liable party cannot be found; (3) to provide an
opportunity for victims to be compensated for their losses and injuries; and
(4) to provide that the fund be financed, in large part, by the industries and
consumers who profit from products and services associated with hazardous substances. 186
CERCLA differs substantially from most other federal environmental
statutes in that it does not establish a regulatory regime for an ongoing activity or for a particular industry. It is purely a remedial statute that looks
backward to affect the cleanup of locations contaminated by prior conduct.
CERCLA can be compared to the Resource Recovery and Conservation
Act ("RCRA") which regulates the treatment, storage, and disposal of solid
and hazardous wastes. 187 But CERCLA is more than a statute authorizing
hazardous waste site cleanup. Passed by Congress in the wake of the Love
Canal episode, CERCLA also attempts to allocate the financial costs of
cleanup and natural resource damage to those actors believed to be responsible for the past dumping. 188 Unlike many other environmental enforcement statutes, there is no statutory limit to the amount of CERCLAimposed cleanup costs! 89 The Act's broad remedial goals and the urgent
public purposes underlying its adoption have been invoked by courts to
justify their extremely broad interpretation of its liability provisions. 190 As
a result, CERCLA liability has, in fact, been far reaching and has resulted
in the assignment of substantial cleanup and natural resource damage
costs. 191
CERCLA contains a broad array of tools for securing the cleanup of
hazardous waste disposal sites. Both governmental and private party rights
of action exist under§ 107(a) of the Act to provide a strong incentive for
private remediation actions. 192 Increasingly, the government has used its
186

126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW§ 4A.01(2) (2003).
188
/d. § 4A.02(1 )(a).
189
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
187

°

19

For example, in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (II th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991), the appeals court held that a lender would be considered to be an "operator" potentially responsible party merely by holding a security interest and "by participating in the
financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to control the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes." Jd. at 1557.
191
See generally Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Cannon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199
(1996).
192
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). A private party may recover "any other necessary costs of response ... consistent with the national contingency plan." /d. § 9607(a)(4)(B). The purpose of the
National Contingency Plan ("NCP") "is to provide the organizational structure and procedures for
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authority under § 106 to order one or more potentially responsible parties
("PRPs") to clean up a site, leaving it to them to locate other PRPs with
whom to share the costs. Joint and several liability principles apply under
CERCLA, 193 and PRPs have the right to seek contribution from other persons who are liable, or potentially liable, under § 107(a). 194 Contribution
claims are barred, however, against parties that have entered into settlement agreements with the govemment. 195 In short, CERCLA's liability
provisions encourage rapid remediation of hazardous waste sites and allocation of the resulting financial responsibility for the cleanup.
CERCLA has been held to impose strict liability for the recovery of response costs associated with hazardous waste cleanups on four categories
of PRPs. 196 These include: (1) current owners or operators of the hazardous waste facility, unless the PRP meets the requirements for the "innocent
purchaser defense;" (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated the site at which such disposals occurred; (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person; and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person. 197 Congress attempted to cast a wide net in designing the four PRP
categories, reflecting a general theory that "everyone who had some hand
in the creation of the [hazardous waste disposal] must ... pay to remedy
it." 198 Consequently, CERCLA liability depends on identification of an
actor as being included in one or more of these four PRP categories, not on
whether the PRP has actually caused the problem in a linear, causation-infact way. With potential, multi-million dollar cleanup liability and the
attendant negative publicity, it is not surprising that many potential targets
of CERCLA cost recovery and contribution actions have strenuously attempted to convince courts that they should be excluded from any one of
preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and
contaminants." 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (1994).
193
Joint and several liability is not mandated by CERCLA, but when applicable, its application is
permitted under principles of federal common law. United States v. Monsanto Corp., 858 F.2d 160,
171 (4th Cir. 1988); see also 126 CONG. REC. 30,897 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph) (stating that
reference to the terms joint and several liability "has been deleted, and the liability of joint tortfeasors
will be determined under common or previous statutory law").
194
42 u.s.c. § 9613(1) (2000).
195
196

/d. § 9613(f)(2).

THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND
READINGS 633-35 (4th ed. 2002).
197
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). References to CERCLA in the text will refer to section numbers
included in the Congressionally-enacted bill and not the codified section numbers included in the footnotes.
198
Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. I, II (1993).
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these four liability-inducing classifications. On the other hand, governmental environmental agencies and private parties who have spent substantial sums of money funding site cleanups have the opposite incentives.
Although Congress clearly set forth CERCLA's general remedial purpose, its drafting tended to skimp on the important details of assessing and
allocating liability. On one hand, CERCLA's broad liability provisions
and its sweeping references to those who are subject to liability could reflect Congress's intent to leave refinement of the Act's liability provisions
to the courts. 199 Alternatively, the statutory silences and other omissions
could merely reflect the rushed development of the final legislation. 200
Regardless, there is some legislative history indicating Congressional intent to have the federal courts develop a "common law" to supplement the
Act's limited and incomplete textual provisions.201 Since its original passage in 1980, courts have struggled with the statute's inadequacies by exercising substantive lawmaking powers to fill in the gaps left by the hurried,
incomplete drafting of the CERCLA legislation. 202 Most notably, the 1983
decision of United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., found in the CERCLA legislative history support for courts using a federal common law approach to
199

Watson, supra note 191, at 291-94 (discussing the circularity and vagueness of§ 107(a)).
This characteristic of the CERCLA legislation could also reflect the twin possibilities that Congress
either a) hastily moved to enact the statute but it never resolved these crucial issues during the legislative process or b) tried but failed to reach resolution on these important questions. Rather than reflecting an intentional choice of drafting style, it could merely indicate legislative desperation in the face of
an i~nding deadline and no clear consensus.
00
CERCLA, as finally enacted by Congress, represents a compromise between three different
bills presented on the floors of the House and Senate. As such, there is no committee report for the
Act. Nevertheless, the floor debates and colloquies regarding the final form of the legislation provide
some insight into the federal courts' role in interpreting and applying the liability provisions. See, e.g.,
126 CONG. R.Ec. 31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio) ("To insure the development of a uniform
rule of law, and to discourage business dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in
States with more lenient laws, the bill will encourage the further development of Federal common law
in this area."); cf supra note 186 (statement of Sen. Randolph); 126 CONG. R.Ec. 24,337 (Sept. 4,
1980) (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.) (stating that federal courts should interpret the Superfund bill
to create a federal cause of action to impose liability on PRPs). These quotations suggest a role for the
federal courts in shaping the meaning of the new statute. However, they do not necessarily reveal the
Congressional intention to establish a new, federal rule of decision separate from state law rules. See
John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA 's Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1444-45 (1997) (discussing the improbability of the development of a federal common law interpreting CERCLA).
201
Watson, supra note 191, at 291.
202
See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998); Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1246 (6th Cir. 1991).
We agree ... that § 9607(a) is not ambiguous. However, it may be textually incomplete in the sense that it fails to spell out in so many words the universally accepted
rule that a reference to liability of corporations includes successors-a rule that we
conclude Congress intended to apply to the definition it used.
/d.
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establish the basic liability questions of the federal statute.
Numerous
academic arguments have been raised challenging the accuracy of this conclusion as a general matter. 204 Suffice it to say, courts faced with complex
CERCLA litigation issues have turned to the Chem-Dyne rationale as a
justification providing them flexibility in reaching their rulings. ChemDyne, a district court opinion, has provided the authority for broad claims
of federal common law rulemaking.
After the fundamental issues of CERCLA liability had been addressed
in the first decade of litigation, the federal courts were then asked to answer a second round of questions--often involving questions of indirect or
corporate successor's liability for CERCLA cleanup expenses. During the
last fifteen years, federal courts have frequently been asked to rule upon a
narrow, yet highly important liability issue-when are successor corporations liable for their predecessor's CERCLA obligations? This, in tum, has
led to a more narrowly-focused question of when a company purchasing
the assets of a firm also acquires that firm's CERCLA liabilities. This legal issue-setting the standard for assigning the CERCLA liability of a
company purchasing the assets of a PRP-raises important liability issues.
However, beyond this question of defining substantive law, it implicates
even more significant questions of judicial methods and the legitimacy of
rules of decision. 205 How should federal courts select the appropriate rule
of decision for a question such as this? The discussion that follows sets
forth the nature of the choice of rules in the asset purchaser context, and
then it turns to the more general issue of determining how a federal court
should give a federal statute meaning in a situation such as this.

B. Successor-in-Interest Liability Under CERCLA
The "persons" who are liable under section 107(a), as a general rule,
are jointly and severally liable for response costs. 206 A "person," under
CERCLA is defined as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, commercial entity," or government entity. 207 CERCLA, however, does not define the term "corporation," and the statute's
203

572 F. Supp. 802, 805-07 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (citing the statement by Rep. James Florio that issues of joint and several liability "shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common
law").
204
See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 200, at 1443-44; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 30, at 526.
205
Watson, supra note 191, at 293 n.387 ("The only real issue that has arisen is whether, in creal·
ing common law rules to supplement the text ofCERCLA, courts should adopt state law rules or fashion nationwide federal rules."); discussion infra Parts 111.8-C.
206
See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808.
207
42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2000). It is clear that the express language ofCERCLA does not I)
identify corporate successors as a separate category of PRP or 2) specifically list corporate successors
as a sub-category of ''person." Finding that such successors are to be included as part of the definition
of "corporation" would require some external rationale for reading this additional meaning into the
term.
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legislative history fails to shed light on the legislative intent concerning the
meaning of the term. 208 There is no indication, therefore, that Congress
intended "corporation" to mean anything other than a business entity defined by state corporation law. 209 Following this reasoning, if state law
governs the definition of "corporation" for CERCLA purposes, the state
laws regarding corporate successorship should also be incorporated by
implicit reference. 210 The meaning of the term "corporation" should include all corporate successors recognized under state law. In addition to
this argument, the general principles of statutory construction provided
within the United States Code support such an interpretation. These uniform rules of federal statutory construction state that '"company' or 'association' when used in reference to a corporation, shall be deemed to embrace the words 'successors and assigns of such company or association. "' 211 Following this line of thought, corporate successors in interest,
therefore, could be PRPs under CERCLA solely by virtue of their status as
a successor and not as a result of their own conduct.
This argument has been extremely persuasive to the federal courts.
Every circuit that has confronted the issue of successor-in-interest liability
has found that Congress implicitly intended for CERCLA response cost
liability to attach to corporate successors-in-interest. 212 The Eighth Circuit
has suggested that corporate successor liability
is so much part and parcel of corporate doctrine, [that] it
could be argued that Congress would have to explicitly exclude successor corporations if it intended its use of a legal
term of art, "corporation," not to include established conceptions of the extent, life span, and path of corporate liabilities.213
Successor liability furthers CERCLA's two primary goals of providing
swift and effective responses to hazardous waste sites and placing the costs
208

Sisk & Anderson, supra note 30, at 511-12.
See id.
210
See Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("(T]he existence and status of a 'corporation' ... should be determined by reference to the
law under which the 'corporation' was created.").
211
I U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
212
See North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing cases). In
the early 1980s, this was the position adopted by the EPA and the Department of Justice in an EPA
enforcement memorandum. EPA Memorandum from Courtney M. Price, Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, Liability of Shareholders and Successor Corporations for
Abandoned Sites Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Uability Act
(CERCLA) 11-16 (June 13, 1984) reprinted in CAROLE STERN ET AL., CERCLA ENFORCEMENT: A
PRACTITIONER'S COMPENDIUM OF ESSENTIAL EPA GUIDANCE AND POLICY DocUMENTS (1996) at Tab
I [hereinafter EPA Memorandum].
213
United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478,486 (8th Cir. 1992).
209
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of such responses on those responsible for creating or maintaining the hazardous conditions. 214 Absent successor liability, corporations would be
able to escape CERCLA liability for response costs that were triggered by
releases of hazardous substances by dying mere "paper deaths, only to rise
phoenix-like from the ashes, transformed, but free of their former liabilities. "215
With this threshold issue resolved in favor of finding that the meaning
of the term "corporation" under CERCLA included corporate successors,
the subordinate, and more difficult, question became: When would existing
liabilities of the predecessor transfer to the successor? This technical, corporate law question would be addressed and decided as a choice of law
question: Should existing state corporate law or newly-developed federal
common law principles control this indirect assignment of liability? Federal courts approached this issue with some regularity as CERCLA litigation progressed over the last fifteen years. This appellate jurisprudence
was formed against a backdrop of varied corporate law principles, each
having different levels of successor liability exposure. As a result, the selection of one successor liability rule or another was considered to be instrumental in establishing greater or lesser "flow-through" CERCLA liability within the particular circuit or district. A review of these fundamental
corporate law concepts follows.
C. General Corporate Law Norms for Successor-in-Interest Liability

1.

The Tension Between the Dynamism of Corporate Form and the
Continuation of Corporate Liability

As a general matter, individuals may be held liable for their actions
under a wide variety of civil and criminal law doctrines. Within this general statement, it can be said that corporations and other business organizations can be subjected to liability as well. However, businesses such as
corporations are not static entities: they acquire subsidiaries and assets,
they merge with other companies, they undertake joint ventures, and they
dissolve when there is no continuing reason for their existence. American
corporate law tradition has long acknowledged this dynamic nature of
business firms and it has created doctrines to deal with the difficult questions surrounding corporate successors. One of the thorniest of these is the
highly-significant question of when does the successor of a corporation
exist free of the liabilities of its predecessor? Over the years, American
corporate law has developed answers to this and other questions--carefully
balancing the need for business development and innovation with the goal
of minimizing fraudulent conduct undertaken solely for the purpose of
214
215

Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1247.
Mexico Feed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 487.
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avoiding prior liability. In this process, such difficult line-drawing has
been the exclusive province of the states in their fashioning of the corporate law of each jurisdiction.
State law on successor liability has established patterns that are surprisingly consistent from state to state. In certain situations, successor
corporations do assume the prior liabilities of their predecessors. For
example, the surviving entity of two, merged corporations will remain
liable for the debts of the predecessor corporations in most jurisdictions.216
The purpose of this extension of corporate successor liability is to prevent
corporations from evading their previous responsibilities through
ownership changes effectuated by mergers and buy-outs.217
The
fundamental concept underlying this rule is that the exchange of corporate
stock should not relieve a corporation from liability for its misdeeds.
However, not all corporate recombinations and transitions result in
continuing legal liability. One major exception to the successor liability
principle is that "in the vast majority of states, . . . where one company
sells or otherwise transfers all its assets to another company, the latter is
not liable for the debts and liabilities ofthe transferor."218 This rule of nonliability for asset acquisitions arose out of the bona fide purchaser rule, 219
and was designed to promote the free alienability of property and to
enhance the efficiency of commercial transactions. Mere succession to the
property of a corporation does not subject the buyer to the seller's
liabilities. 220 Buying a firm's paper clips does not subject it to the seller's
general legal liabilities.
The asset purchaser rule--with its widespread and uniform acceptance-has become a well-understood principle for structuring corporate
activities. However, the rule has the potential for manipulation and abuse
by actors wishing to benefit from its immunity features without genuinely
engaging in a property purchase. If the asset purchaser immunity were too
broadly available, corporate existence might be manipulated to secure frequent and unjustified escape from real corporate debts and liabilities. 221 A
216

E.g., Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Mich. 1976).
See Mexico Feed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 487.
218
Sisk & Anderson, supra note 30, at 512-13 (emphasis added).
219
See id. at 513 (citing Graham v. R.R. Co., 102 U.S. 148, 153 (1880)). The bonafide purchaser rule provides that one who in good faith pays reasonable value for assets takes such assets free
of creditors' claims. !d.
220
15 W.M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,§ 7122 at 227
(Perm. Ed. 1999) ("(T]he purchasing or transferee company is not liable on the other company's obligations merely by reason of its succession to such company's property.").
221
There is anecdotal evidence that transactions have been designed to employ the asset sale
principles of state corporate law to eliminate creditors' claims against predecessor corporations. See,
e.g., J. Maxwell Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles. Reorganization Law. and the Just
Demand that Relief Be Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANKR. DEVS. J. I, 8-9
(1995).
217
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well-advised company might undergo a mandated change in its form, not
substantially alter its basic business operation and emerge from this process
having shed legitimate, previously-incurred debts and liabilities. In order
to prevent this form of abuse, over the years state corporate law throughout
the United States has developed exceptions to the general rule of asset purchaser non-liability to prevent companies from fraudulently using the corporate form to evade liability. Each state's corporate law set the norms for
business conduct by setting out asset purchaser liability rules. The doctrine
which has developed has become remarkably uniform and settled, identifying a number of discrete situations where the substance of a transaction,
not its form, is of central importance. These four, universally-recognized,
common law exceptions impose successor liability on corporations when:
(1) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the
liability; (2) the transaction amounts to a de facto consolidation or merger;
(3) the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the transaction was fraudulently entered into to escape liability. 222
Although each of these four situations admit some flexibility allowing
for argument, they set forth a relatively stable standard of corporate successorship liability under the law of most states. As the Seventh Circuit
phrased it in North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., these exceptions to the
general rule of asset purchaser immunity seek to identify only those transactions "where the essential and relevant characteristics of the selling corporation survive the asset sale," thus rendering it equitable to hold the purchaser liable for the seller's obligations. 223 The underlying idea in the de222

Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990). The third of these
exceptions-the mere continuation principle-applies when the successor company seems to merely be
a reorganized copy of the predecessor corporation. See North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d
642, 654 (7th Cir. 1998). The mere continuation exception to non-liability of asset purchasers allows
recovery when the purchasing corporation is substantially the same as the selling corporation. /d. It
attempts to distinguish bona fide sales of assets between two distinct corporations from fraudulent
reorganizations of a single corporation. /d. The inquiry under this exception focuses on whether the
purchaser continues the corporate entity of the seller, regardless of whether the seller's operations are
continued. /d.
Application of the exception is based upon equitable factors, though courts generally consider
five elements in deciding whether to impose successor liability: (I) the divesting corporation's transfer
of assets; (2) payment by the buyer of less than fair market value for the assets; (3) continuation by the
buyer of the divesting corporation's business; (4) a common officer of the buyer and divesting corporations who was instrumental in the transfer; and (5) inability of the divesting corporation to pay its debts
after the asset transfer. United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d I, 53 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Mexico Feed &
Seed, 980 F.2d at 487 (stating that the elements of the mere continuation exception emphasize an identity of officers, directors and stock between the selling and purchasing corporations). No single factor
is determinative, and courts generally employ a "common sense" approach to decide whether the
seller's corporate entity has continued after the asset sale. As the Seventh Circuit noted, the exception
"requires close scrutiny of corporate realities, not mechanical application of a multi-factor test." North
Shore Gas Co., 152 F.3d at 654.
223
/d. at 651.
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velopment of these exceptions is one of an equitable concept of fairnessthat it would be unfair if a corporate successor were able to dodge liability
while maintaining the essence of the prior enterprise. But state law over a
lengthy period of time has established legal norms for distinguishing equitable from inequitable conduct.

2. Adding a Fifth Exception to Expand Asset Purchaser Liability
Drawing the line between legitimate, non-liability producing asset
transfers and formally correct, yet essentially manipulative corporate transformations has not proved easy for some states. In these jurisdictions, corporate law has evolved to broaden the scope of "pass-through" liability for
asset purchasers. Some state courts have created a small number of additional exceptions to the general rule of asset purchaser imrnunity224 with the
most significant "fifth exception" being the "substantial continuity" or
"continuity of enterprise" test. The "substantial continuity" test exists as a
slightly modified variant of the "mere continuation" test listed above with
the primary difference being that liability may be imposed under this exception without requiring a continuity of shareholders. 225 Originating in a
line of Michigan products liability cases, the substantial continuity standard
has been advanced as a way of restricting the immunity granted by asset
purchasing and expanding the liability of participants in such a structured
transaction. Not surprisingly, this theory, with its wider liability net, was
suggested in an EPA memorandum in 1984 as a preferred litigation theory
for assigning CERCLA cleanup liability. 226 Perhaps EPA feared at this
early stage in the administration of CERCLA that PRPs would successfully
use existing corporate successorship rules to evade CERCLA cleanup liability. To achieve important CERCLA cleanup goals, the EPA pressed
this aggressive, non-mainstream view of successor corporation liability.
There is little debate regarding the applicability of the traditional four
exceptions to the asset purchaser non-liability principle. However, there is
disagreement whether the federal courts should expand these four conventional categories of exceptions to include a fifth-the "substantial continu224

In Ray v. A/ad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977), the California Supreme Coun imposed successor liability on asset purchasers in what has come to be known as the "product line" exception to asset
purchaser immunity. See Alfred R. Light, "Product Line" and "Continuity of Enterprise'' Theories of
Corporate Successor Liability under CERCLA, II MISS. C. L. REv. 63, 68 (1990). Under this rule, a
successor corporation will be liable for defects in products that a predecessor company manufactured if
the asset purchaser continues to make the same product even without a continuity of ownership of the
prior firm. /d. Justified under a theory that the successor company destroyed the plaintiff's remedy
and because it was in the best position to spread the risk of injury, the doctrine finds liability in the
absence of any direct causation. See A lad Corp., 560 P.2d at I 0; Light, supra, at 68. Not surprisingly,
many states have explicitly rejected the theory as have many federal couns. /d. at 69 n.32. This theory
has not emerged in CERCLA successor liability cases.
22S
Schnapf, supra note 32, at 451-52.
226
EPA Memorandum, supra note 212, at 11-16.
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ity" test. These federal courts have resolved this difficult issue of assigning asset purchaser liability for CERCLA response costs with an inconsistent mixture of decisions applying the narrower "mere continuation"
exception in some circuits, with others adopting the broader and more recently-created "substantial continuity" exception. 227 The practical importance of determining whether creation of the federal common law "substantial continuity" test is permissible judicial lawmaking is that the test substantially increases an asset purchaser's exposure to liability. A purchaser,
under the mere continuation doctrine, generally will be free from liability if
there is a bona fide change in ownership. That same purchaser, under the
substantial continuity exception, however, is not protected from CERCLA
liability if, despite a true ownership change, the business operates in substantially the same fashion as it did prior to the asset sale. Theoretically, a
court's choice of one rule of decision or the other could have a significant
impact on successor corporation liability and, as such, could affect a substantive change in the assignment of financial responsibility for the site
cleanup.
3.

Examining the "Substantial Continuity" View

In the first few years following CERCLA's enactment, EPA sought to
convince courts to expand CERCLA liability for asset purchasers by
broadening the scope of the traditional mere continuation exception to asset
purchaser immunity. It had recommended the adoption of a federal common law standard imposing CERCLA liability if "the new corporation continues substantially the same business operations as the [predecessor] corporation."228 This "substantial continuity" exception, pushed by EPA in
early days of CERCLA, attempted to impose successor liability whenever
the purchaser's business operations retained substantial continuity with
those of the seller, regardless of whether there was a significant ownership
change. 229 EPA's concern was to fmd solvent PRPs and to extract government cleanup costs from them. It did not want to let them melt away
through the process of corporate reorganization, regardless of the liability
limitations provided by state corporate law. The agency's intention was to
attach CERCLA liability to a solvent party whenever it could find one and
its advocacy of this broader liability standard initially found favor in several federal circuit courts.
227

Ironically, the courts finding for the more sweeping "substantial continuity" position in this
judicial debate often do so in an effort to obtain "national uniformity" on the crucial question of successorship legal liability. This article demonstrates that the move to this liability standard has had just the
opposite effect by recognizing a diversity of liability rules within the federal system that vary according
to each federal judicial circuit. Also, the "substantial continuity" is an extreme minority rule, thereby
makin~ the "national uniformity" argument even more difficult to make.
2 8
Mank, supra note 32, at 1166 (citing EPA Memorandum, supra note 212, at Tab I).
229 See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992).
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The use of the substantial continuity test in the context of CERCLA
cost recovery or contribution actions required the courts to reason by analogy and to transfer legal doctrine from one subject matter to another. The
Supreme Court of Michigan is credited with first articulating the test in
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., but it is probably correct to identify a
line of federal labor relations and products liability cases as earlier roots of
this expanded liability concept. 23° Courts generally consider a series of
eight factors to determine whether a successor corporation will be held
liable for response costs under the substantial continuity test: (1) retention
of the same employees; (2) retention of the same supervisory personnel; (3)
retention of the same production facilities in the same location; (4) manufacture of the same product; (5) retention of the same name; (6) continuity
of assets; (7) continuity of general business operations; and (8) public representations as a continuation of the seller's previous enterprise. 231
Not surprisingly with such a multi-factor test, courts have adopted a
"totality of the circumstances" approach when determining whether to impose liability. This approach takes into account the individual characteristics of a particular transaction and attempts to ensure that the public policy
of fairness is afforded to the affected parties. The policy of fairness actually inserts a ninth factor into the substantial continuity test: knowledge. 232
"[K]nowledge or notice ensures that 'substantial continuation' corporations
not only would be able to protect themselves through purchase price adjustments or satisfactory indemnity provisions, but would be in some way
responsible for the [hazardous waste discharges] remedied."233
Those circuit courts that have chosen to apply this as a federal common
law test in the CERCLA context have reasoned that the "substantial continuity" theory was warranted 1) because of the need for national uniformity
with respect to CERCLA and 2) the possibility that parties "would frustrate
230

See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, I 80 (I 973); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg.
Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1985); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883-84
(Mich. 1976).
231
See Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d at 838.
232
United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 488 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Golden
State Bottling, 414 U.S. at 180).
233
/d. The element of knowledge has been accepted as a prerequisite for imposing liability for
CERCLA response costs under the substantial continuity test. See id. (refusing to impose liability
because successor corporation did not have notice that the predecessor was identi tied as a PRP); Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 840-41 (imposing liability under the substantial continuity test when
there was no colorable question of knowledge of and benefit from the predecessor's conduct for which
CERCLA liability attached); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (9th Cir.
1992) (refusing to apply the substantial continuity test because the successor corporation did not have
notice of the predecessors PRP status when the offending business practice was discontinued nine
months before the asset sale).
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the aims of CERCLA by choosing to merge or consolidate under the laws
of states which unduly restrict successor liability."234 At least one commentator has argued that uniformity and a relaxed liability threshold, as
found under the substantial continuity test, would further the purposes and
goals of acts such as CERCLA, which attempt to establish uniform, farreaching, national standards for imposing liability. 235 Curiously, although
the expanded liability standard has been adopted or recognized by four
circuits, it has not become a uniform rule of decision in the federal courts,
as more recent decisions have moved away from the expanded liability
theory. With the current trend in decisions, these earlier appellate court
decisions run the risk of actually becoming an isolated "minority" position
on the issue. Prior to the 0 'Melveny & Myers and Bestfoods decisions,
federal courts had been willing to apply the substantial continuity test for
the sake of "uniformity."236 In the wake of these more recent Supreme
Court decisions which emphasize the use of state law norms, the future of
the substantial continuity test as a federal common law model would seem
to be seriously in doubt.

N. COURTS IN ACTION: JUDICIAL INNOVATION IN CHOOSING LAWASSET PURCHASER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
Litigation is one of the unfortunate hallmarks of CERCLA. Due to the
substantial financial liability associated with being a PRP in a hazardous
waste site cleanup, significant incentives exist to litigate liability questions
and to resist expansive theories of responsibility. During CERCLA's first
decade, the federal and state governments actively sought to find solvent
parties to pay for the hazardous waste site cleanups that were mandated
under the act. Due to the size of the costs and the limited economic capacity of current site owners and operators, government attempted to cast its
liability net broadly, attempting to reach other business entities and individuals related to defunct or insolvent parties. Not surprisingly, successors
of firms directly involved in site-polluting activities were targeted as PRPs
in CERCLA cost recovery and contribution actions. But the term "succes234

North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642,650 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988)) (internal quotations omitted).
But see Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1991) (arguing that the
laws on successor liability in the fifty states are largely uniform).
235
See Schnapf, supra note 32, at 439. On the other hand, some critics have rejected the substantial continuity test as excessive and unfair.
236
Choosing the "substantial continuity" liability rule represents an unusual impulse if the aim is
to establish national "uniformity" in CERCLA asset purchaser liability determinations. The "substantial continuity" rule has been recognized in a handful of non-CERCLA cases and only in a distinct
minority of states. To suggest that a federal appellate court's adoption of this liability principle is being
done to achieve national "uniformity" really means that this rule "should" be the national law as a
matter of normative policy. Its selection would certainly not be choosing a majority, uniform state
corporate law principle.
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sor" has many legal meanings and consequences and these definitions have
traditionally been established under state corporate law. The wide variety
of state corporate law traditions provided for a number of kinds of corporate successors. Importantly, this doctrine also defined the legal rules for
"passing through" liability to various kinds of successors. Not surprisingly, this question of transferred liability has been encountered in a wide
range of corporate situations and the law has developed over the years according to the policy preferences of each state. The crucial policy question
presented by this legal question is, when should liabilities of prior legal
entities be recognized as continuing debts or obligations of corporate successors? In every jurisdiction state law has answered this legal and normative question.
What about liabilities that are created by federal law? More specifically, what about CERCLA liability for the recovery of hazardous waste
site cleanup expenses? Without a general federal corporate law and in the
absence of a clear statutory directive in CERCLA, the issue of successor
liability remained an open question awaiting resolution in cleanup cost
recovery litigation. In fact, many questions existed. How would federal
courts allocate CERCLA liability in cases where corporate successors were
listed among the identified PRPs? How should they rule? Would state
corporate law principles guide their judgment or would they be free to create their own corporate successorship rules of decision under an application
of federal common law rulemaking? These issues were brought to the federal courts as the federal government and private PRPs sought to find more
solvent liable parties to help pay cleanup costs.
Ultimately, a sub issue of the larger corporate CERCLA successor liability issue-that of corporate asset purchasers-rose to the attention of
the federal circuit courts beginning in the late 1980s and these courts were
required to select a rule of decision for their circuits. This issue carried
with it significant financial consequences since the CERCLA-mandated
cleanup expenses would often run into many millions of dollars. Equally
important was the fact that clearly responsible PRPs would frequently be
dissolved or otherwise become non-existent businesses, in financial terms
unavailable for site cleanup cost recovery. After having spent these millions of dollars in undertaking remedial action, government and private
parties began to look for more "indirect" PRPs including corporate successors, waste facility owners as well as waste disposers. These "indirect"
PRPs, including asset purchasers, became natural targets of opportunity
when more "directly responsible" PRPs were not available.
This effort to secure payment of cleanup expenses from asset purchasing successors ran into an interesting and confusing legal conundrum.
Measured by traditional, stable and largely-consistent state corporate law,
many asset purchase transactions were properly structured so as to insulate
the "buyer" of the corporate assets from the predecessor "seller's" CER-
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CLA liabilities. Since CERCLA did not contain any specific language
extending cleanup liability to a broader range of corporate successors than
provided for by state law, there was no way to argue that CERCLA had
affected an express preemption of state law principles. Beginning in the
late 1980s, federal courts were asked to find a way to circumvent the limitations imposed by state law, not by way of recognizing an implied preemption in CERCLA, but rather by exercising their federal common
lawmaking powers. This they did in a number of decisions. By employing
this analytical approach to the significant asset purchaser liability question,
the federal appellate courts have adopted a range of positions on this choice
of law problem with a wide range of justifications. As the prior discussion
indicates, the United States Supreme Court had decided the pivotal Kimbell
Foods case in 1979 and that decision should have provided lower courts
with the analytical framework for determining when to rely on state law
and when to develop federal common law rules. Curiously, the discussion
which follows will reveal that prior to 1994, federal courts failed to apply
the Kimbell Foods three-part test to help them to determine whether to create federal common law rules of decision concerning corporate successor
and asset purchasers' liability for CERCLA-imposed response CQsts. The
circuits that have decided this issue in the post-1994 0 'Melveny & Myers
era generally have adopted state law as the rule of decision after consideration of the Kimbell Foods test. This indicates that a circuit split exists regarding the propriety of a federal common law exception to the general
rule of non-liability for asset purchasers. The following discussion analyzes each of these decisions and finally comes to some conclusions about
why a federal court would choose to ignore existing Supreme Court precedent and venture into the untethered world of federal common lawmaking.
A

Stage One: The Early Appellate Cases Struggling to Give CERCLA
Meaning by Choosing Federal Common Law as the Law From the
States
1.

Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.

In the mid and late 1980s, the courts had yet to define the statutory parameters of CERCLA. Even basic liability concepts were yet to be established. Section 107 stated that certain categories of parties were "liable"
for cleanup costs and natural resource damages, but it gave no specific
guidance on what legal principles would determine how liability was to be
assigned. Several case decisions during this period formulated crucial legal standards in several areas, relying on a supposed implicit federal common law authority imbedded within the new statute and contained within
the act's legislative history. The idea that some conception of the federal
common law applies to define corporate successor liability stems, in large
part, from the Third Circuit's 1988 holding in Smith Land & Improvement
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Corp. v. Celotex Corp. 231 In this case, the present owner of a parcel of contaminated land, Smith Land & Improvement Corp., spent over $218,000
remediating pollution caused by an asbestos waste pile that had been
placed there by a prior land owner, the Philip Carey Company ("Carey"). 238
Carey had sold the land to another party in 1963 and by the 1980s, Smith
Land & Improvement Corporation was the current owner. 239 Rather than
bring a contribution action against Carey, the plaintiff sought "indemnification"240 from the defendants Celotex Corporation and Rapid-American
Corporation (collectively, "Celotex") who were described by the plaintiff
as "corporate successors" of Philip Carey Company. 241 Under this theory
of the case, Celotex would not be liable under any conventional CERCLA
liability theory since it did not fit into any of the statute's four statutory
PRP categories. Any possible CERCLA liability would have to be based
solely upon corporate law theory having the legal effect of transferring the
cleanup cost responsibility from the predecessor corporation (Carey) to its
successor (Celotex). 242 This case is especially significant since it confronted the issue of when to extend CERCLA liability to a company on the
basis of its legal relationship to another, usually defunct, business that is
clearly a PRP yet is financially unavailable.
Smith Land presented the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, and the federal appellate courts in general, with a case of first impression on the issue of corporate successor-in-interest liability under
CERCLA. The court came to the unsurprising conclusion that in enacting
CERCLA, Congress "intended to impose successor liability on corporations which either have merged with or have consolidated with a corporation that is a responsible party as defined in the Act."243 Writing for the
panel, Judge Weis did not explain, in a clear way, why such as result was
in line with the Congressional intent other than to suggest that "the costs
associated with clean-up must be absorbed somewhere."244 This pragmatic
statement reflected a blunt admission that the court believed that cleanup
expenses should not be borne by the Superfund or by PRPs when another
237

85 I F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988).
/d. at 87-88.
239 /d.
238

240 /d. at 88.

The court probably meant to say that the plaintiffs were attempting to obtain contribution from the defendants for their equitable share of the cleanup costs under CERCLA's § 113.
241 /d.
242

As Judge Weis stated, "plaintiff argues that defendants are responsible for Carey's derelictions
on the theory of corporate successor liability." /d. at 90. Although a novel legal proposition at that
time, the court was aware of the position taken by EPA in its 1984 enforcement memorandum arguing
in favor of successor liability under the expanded "continuity of business" or substantial continuity
theory. /d. at 91 n.2. Even though EPA was not a party to the present lawsuit, its views were noted by
the court.
243
/d. at 92.
244
/d. at 91.
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solvent actor related in some way to the polluted waste site was in range.
On a superficial level, this opportunistic view could be justified by the
court's belief that corporate successors were, in reality, the same business
or individuals who had been the PRPs and that to think otherwise was to
permit legal form to overwhelm actual substance.
However, the conclusion that Congress intended CERCLA liability to
reach corporate successors did not answer the question of what the law
should be. In a confusing process of reasoning, the court concluded that 1)
the concept of corporate successor liability was "neither completely novel
nor of recent vintage," 24s 2) the policy reasons for making successors liable
for torts applied with equal force in the CERCLA context, and 3) Congress
expected the courts to develop a federal common law to supplement the
CERCLA statute. 246 This largely unsupported syllogism led the court to its
conclusion that Congress implicitly intended for successor corporate liability to be read into the law by federal courts exercising common law powers. Curiously absent from the court's discussion was any mention of a
rationale for selecting a common law rule of decision or any reference to
the Supreme Court's Kimbell Foods decision which had been issued nine
years earlier. Also, while the court could have done so, its decision lacked
any significant policy analysis of which successor corporations should bear
the cleanup costs caused by its predecessor.
By fashioning this new federal common law, the court in Smith Land
indicated that the general doctrine of successor liability would be added to
the meaning of CERCLA, although only in the context of corporate consolidations and mergers. The opinion specifically disavowed a more general application of its ruling in other contexts. It did note, in passing, that
successorship situations involving the purchase of assets were to be governed in a way that "the successor will not be saddled with the seller's liability except under certain conditions."247 This decision reflected a strong
policy position intent on finding a non-governmental "deep pocket" to pay
the cleanup costs imposed by CERCLA. 248 The Smith Land court dealt
with the source of its authority in a casual way, stating that it recognized a
new corporate successor rule governed by "traditional concepts" and "gen245

/d.

246
247

/d.

/d. (citing Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1986)). In Polius the court
said: "(u]nder the well-settled rule of corporate law, where one company sells or transfers all of its
assets to another, the second entity does not become liable for the debts and liabilities, including torts,
of the transferor." 802 F.2d at 77.
248
The only policy-based rationale for imposing the costs of hazardous waste site cleanup on a
successor corporation was the vaguely-expressed concept of unjust enrichment benefiting the corporate
purchaser. The Smith Land case states that as between the Superfund or a successor, the successor
should bear the costs. "Benefits from use of the pollutant as well as savings resulting from the failure
to use non-hazardous disposal methods inured to the original corporation, its successors, and their
respective shareholders and accrued only indirectly, if at all, to the general public." 851 F.2d at 92.
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eral doctrine."249 Unmistakably, though, the court emphasized that state
law should be the substance of its rule, especially if it presented a national
uniformity not easily manipulated by forum shopping. 250 The Smith Land
case does reflect the attitude that it is the judicial role to resolve litigated
conflicts, and in so doing, it is the appropriate role of the federal courts to
choose rules of decision consistent with their view of the underlying statutory policies. In this case, however, the Third Circuit's holding did not
carefully analyze its decision-making as either statutory interpretation or
the creation of a federal common law. It did not acknowledge the limited
role in judicial lawmaking that the Supreme Court had articulated in Kimbell Foods. The Smith Land court left the clarification of this point for
later courts.
2.

Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc.

Two years after the Third Circuit's Smith Land decision, the Ninth Circuit faced a similar issue in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc. 251 In
this case, Asarco produced slag as a by-product of its copper smelting activities in Ruston, Washington. 252 Over a period of nearly fifteen years,
Asarco transferred the slag to Industrial Mineral Products (IMP) to be marketed as a filler material to stabilize the ground at log sorting yards. 253
Louisiana-Pacific was one of IMP's customers who used the slag and was
later forced by the government to clean up its yards when it was found that
heavy metals from the slag had leached into the soil and the groundwater.254 In the mid-1980s, L-Bar Products, Inc. bought substantially all of
the assets of IMP.m Louisiana-Pacific then brought a CERCLA action
against Asarco for recovery of the costs it incurred in cleaning up the slag
pollution at its facility. 256 In an attempt to deflect or reduce its own potential CERCLA liability, Asarco then filed a third-party lawsuit against L249 /d.

A year later, a district court in Massachusetts would adopt the traditional rules of successor liability in the context of an asset purchaser following the reasoning of the Smith Land holding. In
re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 712 F.Supp. 1010, 1012-13 (D. Mass. 1989).
250
Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92. In remanding the case to the district court for further consideration, the Third Circuit directed the lower court to "consider national uniformity; otherwise, CERCLA
aims may be evaded easily by a responsible party's choice to arrange a merger or consolidation under
the laws of particular states which unduly restrict successor liability." !d.
251 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
252
/d. at 1262.

253 /d.

254

/d. The exact relationship between Asarco and IMP was unclear in the appellate court's description of the facts of the case.
255 /d.
256 /d.
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Bar Products seeking contribution from it based on L-Bar's status as a corporate successor of IMP through the purchase of IMP's assets. 257 In its
defense, L-Bar asserted that it was not responsible for IMP's CERCLA
liability as an asset purchaser under principles of existing Washington State
corporate law. 258 The district court agreed and it granted L-Bar's motion
for summary judgment. 259
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court and in so doing it agreed,
without discussion, with the Smith Land conclusion that Congress intended, as a general matter, to impose CERCLA liability on corporate successors.260 For the reasons stated above, courts have consistently come to
this conclusion, reasoning that any other CERCLA interpretation would
lead to massive evasion of the statute's cost-shifting rationale. The court
adopted the Third Circuit's conclusion without analysis, but apparently it
did so by way of interpreting the meaning of the federal statute at issue. 261
But where would the substance of corporate successorship law be found?
Judge Wright stated that, in agreement with the Smith Land court, "the
issue of successor liability under CERCLA is governed by federal law"262
and by this, he meant federal common law. 263 By taking this approach, the
Ninth Circuit fell into the common judicial pattern of giving CERCLA
meaning by resorting to the "federal common law." To these courts, common law meant cases of non-statutory and non-constitutional interpretation, that is, cases where the federal court develops a rule of decision
through its autonomous rulemaking power. This approach accepted the
view first expressed in the influential 1983 district court decision of United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., which held that CERCLA's legislative history
251

Jd. Asarco actually was asking the Ninth Circuit to employ its federal common law powers to
adopt the "substantial continuity" or "continuing business enterprise" exception to the non-liability
principles of traditional corporate successorship law. /d. at 1265. This suggested expansion of liability, derived from the Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. case, 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976), was
declined by the Louisiana-Pacific court on the ground that it would not be applicable under the facts.
Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1265-66. The court used unusual analogical reasoning to reach its
conclusion that the expanded continuing business enterprise exception did not apply to this case. It
concluded that the current facts were not as egregious as those in an earlier FIFRA case, Oner II, Inc. v.
EPA, 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979), where the court had found the doctrine to be applicable. See Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1265-66 (explaining the factual differences that make Oner II a more egregious case).
258
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1450, 1452 (W.O. Wash.
1989).
259
/d. at 1453. District Court Judge Bryan applied state law-Washington State-to the question
of successor liability concluding, inexplicably, that there was not a significant difference between
federal and Washington law. /d. at 1452.
260 909 F.2d at 1262.
261 /d. at 1263.
262 /d.

263 Jd.

at 1263 n.l. This is a curious conclusion since the Smith Lond court never clearly specified that it was fashioning federal common law.
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reflected the view that the federal courts were expected to create common
law to supplement the statute, and that such rules would be acceptable if
they furthered the policies underlying CERCLA. 264 Springing from this
limited authority, the Louisiana-Pacific court took this charge as a broad
grant of authority to create federal law from whatever sources it wished to
use. But what sources would be consulted and what methods would be
used?
The Louisiana-Pacific court made absolutely no reference to the Supreme Court's Kimbell Foods decision or the methodology that case set out
for deciding these kinds of cases. Without explanation, the court ruled that
it "must look to other circuits and the states for guidance in fashioning the
federallaw." 265 Mirroring the Third Circuit's Smith Land holding, the Louisiana-Pacific court decided that the "traditional rules of successor liability
in operation in most states should govern. " 266 Why choose these state rules
of decision? Perhaps the Ninth Circuit believed that the corporate successorship liability rules were substantially similar from state to state thereby
creating "national uniformity" and, as a result, preventing forum or jurisdiction-shopping by corporations seeking favorable legal rules. Establishing such a consistent pattern of state law would suit a federal system of
hazardous waste cleanup liability and would also result in a predictable and
easy-to-implement liability scheme for courts. In its drive for universallyconsistent legal rules, the Louisiana-Pacific court believed that it retained
considerable flexibility within its federal common law rulemaking powers
to craft non-uniform and non-traditional legal rules when the purposes of
CERCLA would be "frustrated by state law."267 Finding this frustration of
statutory purpose was held by the court to be within its discretion as it
"found" the common law. 268 In this way, the Ninth Circuit preserved for
itself a broad role in identifying federal statutory goals and great autonomy
in selecting the federal common law that would advance those goals. 269
264

See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (explaining
that the policy ofCERCLA was to provide nationwide uniformity due to the fact that the pollution of
land, ~oundwater, surface water and air presents potentially interstate problems).
65
909 F.2d at 1263. The court did say that it was looking elsewhere for guidance because Congress had not addressed the issue of CERCLA successor liability.
266
/d. (emphasis added).
267
/d. at 1263 n.2.
268
See id. (finding that a state law that unduly limits successor liability could "cut off the EPA's
ability to seek reimbursement from responsible parties ... [which] would result in great expense to the
taxpayer, which is contrary to CERCLA's purposes").
269
As a demonstration of this judicial freedom to determine federal common law, the LouisianaPacific court felt that potentially it could expand the reach of the asset purchaser liability beyond the
limits of traditional Washington State corporate law. Asarco had asked the court to embrace the more
expansive "continuing business enterprise" position in an effort to hold L-Bar liable even though an
asset purchaser would not be liable under traditional principles. /d. at 1265. While the court did not
reject Asarco's request, it did hint that it could have adopted the expanded exception. /d. at 1265-66.

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

476

[Vol. 36:425

Interestingly, the court reached a similar result to that which would have
been obtained following the Kimbell Foods analysis. As with other decisions in the circuits, however, that Supreme Court precedent does not appear to have influenced the analysis in the case.

B. Stage Two: Widening the Net for Corporate Successor Liability by
Announcing Federal Rules of Decision to Achieve CERCLA 's
Purposes
l.

United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co. 270

The Eighth Circuit encountered the issue of CERCLA successor liability in United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed. The facts in this case gave a
federal appellate court the first opportunity to consider the asset purchaser
fact pattern. As with many of the early CERCLA decisions, EPA had
spent over $1 million in cleaning up a rural Missouri site contaminated
with waste oil containing PCBs being stored for later reprocessing. 271 EPA
then sought a recovery of costs from the owners of the land, the waste oil
company that owned the storage tanks which had been filled with the PCBlaced oil, and the corporate successor of the tanks' owners. 272 The
principal defendant in Mexico Feed & Seed, Moreco Energy Co., had purchased a competitor's assets, including tanks that contained and leaked
contaminated waste oil.273 Under the facts before it, the district court apparently believed that it could not impose successor liability against
Moreco Energy under the traditional corporate asset purchaser doctrine
known as the "mere continuation" rule. 274 However, it found for the federal government and imposed joint and several liability for the $1 million
270

980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992). For convenience, the Eighth Circuit's decision will be styled in
the footnotes as Mexico Feed & Seed II and the District Court's opinion in the case, United States v.
Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 764 F.Supp. 565 (E. D. Mo. 1991 ), as Mexico Feed & Seed I.
271
Mexico Feed & Seed II, 980 F.2d at 482-83.
272
!d. at 483.
273
!d. The asset purchaser Moreco Energy operated a pre-existing waste oil refining business and
purchased the assets at issue to gain access to the seller's waste oil trucking operation. !d. The purchaser primarily was interested in obtaining the trucks, routes, drivers and collective expertise that the
seller had accumulated. !d. at 483. The court applied the mere continuation exception and found that
the purchaser could not be liable for response costs. !d. at 489 (discussing Moreco's liability under the
mere continuation and substantial continuation exceptions). Acquiring the trucking network could not
render the purchaser a mere continuation of the successor because the purchaser was a pre-existing
competitor, already engaged in the business of the seller. !d.
274
/d. at 487. The district court appeared determined to find a theory that would support its find·
ing of the joint and several liability of Moreco Energy. In fact, it is not clear that the United States
even argued that Moreco Energy should be liable as a corporate successor under the legal theory
adopted by District Judge Gunn. Mexico Feed & Seed I, 764 F. Supp. at 572 n.3 (rejecting the government's argument under the consolidation or de-facto merger exceptions to asset purchaser immunity).
Perhaps, the court believed that Moreco Energy was the only solvent "deep pocket" remaining and
upon whom the sizable cleanup liability could be imposed. Also, it did not help Moreco Energy that its
counsel failed to appear on the first day of trial without requesting a motion for continuance. /d. at 568.
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upon Moreco Energy based upon an expanded "substantial continuity"
theori 75 which extended successor liability in a wider range of situations.276 Moreco Energy took its appeal to the court of appeals. 277 The
appellate court considered two issues: 1) whether a corporate successor
was a PRP under § 107 of CERCLA and 2) what theory of successorship
liability would be applied in CERCLA cost recovery cases. 278 Both of
these issues were questions of first impression in the Eighth Circuit, and
the court eagerly ruled on both questions.
The threshold issue was whether CERCLA's use of the term "corporation" included corporate successors within its meaning. 279 Judge Beam,
writing for the court, agreed with all of the previous federal court decisions
finding that "successor corporations are within the meaning of 'persons'
for the purposes of CERCLA liability."280 He approached this question as
a matter of statutory interpretation attempting to fix the meaning of the
term to both capture the implied congressional intent and to effectuate the
purposes of the statute. 281 In terms of implied meaning, the court turned to
the general statutory rule of construction contained in Title 1 of the United
States Code that deemed references to corporations to "inherently include
corporate successors."282 Other courts had reached the same conclusion
that in enacting CERCLA, Congress implicitly intended for this more extended definition of "corporation" to be read into the narrower definition
actually written into the statute. 283 To buttress this view, Judge Beam echoed the Sixth Circuit's view in Anspec that corporate successor liability
was a traditional legal understanding presumptively to be included into the
term "corporation."284 So long-settled was this concept in his view that
Congress would have had to "explicitly exclude successor corporations if it
275

Mexico Feed & Seed I, 764 F. Supp. at 572 (citing United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637,
641 (W.D. Ky. 1990)). The district court spent absolutely no time analyzing the question of what law
should determine the rules of decision for the successor liability question. Judge Gunn concluded that
Moreco Energy was liable as a successor corporation under the "substantial continuity'' or "continuity
of enterprise" exception to the asset purchaser non-liability rule. /d. at 573. Unfortunately, the court
did not elucidate its reasons for complete adoption of the Distler test or its rationale for finding that it
was satisfied.
276
Moreco Energy, the corporate successor to the waste oil re-processor, was particularly motivated to appeal this judgment since the entire (or a substantial portion) of the $1 million award was
likely to fall on its shoulders. The predecessor corporation, Pierce Waste Oil Service, had been dissolved .r;ears earlier and it had ceased to exist as a corporate entity. !d. at 572.
2 7
Mexico Feed & Seed If, 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992).
278
/d. at 486.
279 /d.
280

/d. at 487.
!d. at 486.
282 /d.
281

283
284

E.g., Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1246 (6th Cir. 1991 ).
Mexico Feed & Seed If, 980 F.2d at 486.
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intended its use of the legal term of art, 'corporation,' not to include established conceptions of the extent, life span, and path of corporate liabilities."285 To finally reinforce this opinion, the court held that CERCLA's
fundamental purpose of assigning cleanup costs to "those responsible for
creating or maintaining the hazardous condition" would be defeated if polluting corporations could reinvent themselves and "rise phoenix-like from
the ashes [of their prior corporate forms], transformed, but free from their
former liabilities."286 Thus, the meaning given to "corporation" should
effectuate this basic statutory purpose so as to avoid easy circumvention
and evasion of cleanup liability.
Up to this point in the analysis, the Mexico Feed & Seed court followed the general pattern of prior federal appellate decisions by broadly
interpreting CERCLA's use of the term "corporation" to include corporate
successors. On the second issue before it, the court ruled consistently with
the Fourth Circuit in Carolina Transformer Co. that a firm purchasing the
assets of another should be liable for the obligations of the seller when it
represented a "substantial continuation" of the prior company's business. 287
This represented an expansion of the prevalent state corporate law "mere
continuation" rule which the Eighth Circuit thought was "justified" under
its view of the fundamental purposes of CERCLA. 288 Bringing this CERCLA issue within two previous lines of decision in the labor and products
liability fields, the court believed that the broader liability rule was necessary to avoid statutory evasion. 289 Notably, the court did not clearly or
thoroughly address the strictly legal question of why this more "liabilityfriendly" test would be selected as its circuit rule in CERCLA cases.
Without a clear source of federal statutory or constitutional law to guide it,
the court awkwardly maneuvered to justify its choice not with reference to
prevailing corporate law standards but rather with the policy goal of
achieving the CERCLA purpose of finding a party to shoulder site cleanup
costs.290 Once again, rather than employing the choice of law analysis directed by the Supreme Court's Kimbell Foods decision, the Eighth Circuit
struggled to improvise a rule of decision on this crucial issue based upon
28S /d.

286 /d. at 486-87.
287 See id. at 487-90 (discussing Moreco's liability under the "substantial continuation" test).

The
appellate court's inability to use either the "mere continuation" and the "substantial continuity" tests to
find successorship liability due to the specific facts of the case reinforces the Fourth Circuit's finding
that successor liability is justified only where the facts so indicate. See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992). In Mexico Feed & Seed, the Eighth Circuit did not
discuss whether federal common law or state law should provide the rule of decision because the parties failed to raise the issue. Mexico Feed & Seed 11, 980 F.2d at 487 n.9.
288 Mexico Feed & Seed 11, 980 F.2d at 488.

289 /d.
290 See id.
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its own view of the overarching CERCLA policy rather than any systematic view of appropriate federal court lawmaking authority. After affinning the district court's use of the "substantial continuation" rule, 291 the appellate court reversed on its application the finding that the asset purchaser,
Moreco Energy, did not substantially continue the prior business. 292
The Mexico Feed & Seed decision is significant for at least three reasons. First, the appellate court did not identify the source of its substantive
legal choices. Nowhere was it clearly stated whether the court was acting
to fashion federal common law or merely interpreting congressional intent
in enacting CERCLA. Needless to say, the suggested guidance incorporated in the Kimbell Foods decision was not even mentioned in the Eighth
Circuit's opinion. In fact, Judge Beam appeared to be genuinely confused
about whether state or federal law properly applied to the issues at hand. 293
To the extent that he believed he was using federal law, Judge Beam's purpose was to establish nationally-unifonn CERCLA rules that would treat
similarly-situated parties fairly. Ironically, the court adopted an asset purchaser liability test that generally did not find any resonance in any state's
corporate law and would create liability in an entirely unequal fashion.
Second, the Mexico Feed & Seed opinion specifically described the
purpose of traditional corporate successorship law as providing rules "to
prevent corporate successors from adroitly slipping off the hook"294 or
evading "debt through transactional technicalities."295 This characterization of state corporate law rules viewed them mainly as devices assisting in
the achievement of CERCLA cost recovery policies. However, the court
overlooked the fact that these rules do more than prevent fraudulent evasion of pre-existing and enforceable liabilities; they set the legal boundaries
between lawful and illicit transactions. In fact, the widespread adherence
to the general "mere continuation" exception to the asset purchaser nonliability rule reflected a remarkable consistency on the nonnative policy
question of where this boundary should be. Not all corporate transactions
would be collapsed under the traditional principles--in fact, asset purchasers are presumptively exempt from successorship liability unless they fall
into one of four articulated exceptions. 296
291
292

/d. at 489.
/d. at 489-90.

293

This confusion is best revealed by a footnote comment of Judge Beam. He stated that:
[t]he issue of whether federal or state law should be used in analyzing successor liability was not raised by the parties and we do not decide it. However, considering
the national application of CERCLA and fairness to similarly situated parties, the
district court was probably correct in applying federal law.
/d. at 487 n.9 (emphasis added). The court did not amplify its reasoning.
294
/d. at 487.
295 /d.
296

/d. Applying this mainstream corporate successorship law to the facts at hand would not have
made Moreco Energy, the asset purchaser, liable for the site cleanup costs. Surprisingly, the Eighth
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Third, the court aggressively expanded the reach of the traditional successorship rules that have been recognized in nearly all jurisdictions by
affirming the district Court's adoption of the "substantial continuity" test
for the asset purchaser liability in the CERCLA context. Judge Beam ruled
that the "substantial continuity" test was "justified" in this area as a means
of preventing the evasion of CERCLA cleanup liability. 297 In reaching this
result, the court seemed determined to establish a principle that would deny
a "responsible party" the opportunity of using corporate successorship
rules as a means of negating CERCLA liability through careful transactional design. Apparently, the panel believed that new legal barriers had to
be constructed which would prevent well-advised actors from escaping
their otherwise legitimate financial responsibilities. Nowhere does the
court explain why pre-existing and stable corporate asset purchaser doctrine was inadequate to the task of drawing the line between continuing and
terminating liability in asset purchaser situations.
The only justification suggested for this expansive ruling was that
"corporate successor liability [should] be imposed in such a way to further
CERCLA's essential purpose of holding responsible parties liable."298 But
this is an entirely circular statement since determining who is "responsible"
depends entirely upon the legal theory establishing who is liable as a corporate asset purchaser successor. The asset purchaser is not liable based
upon its acts or status as a waste site owner or operator, arranger for hazardous waste disposal or transporter. Rather, liability stems from a vicarious form of liability based solely upon its corporate successor status. The
court in Mexico Feed & Seed appears to have selected a broader, more expansive liability doctrine in order to make it easier for the federal government to shift cleanup expenses to an available, solvent party having some
successorship relationship to the actual PRPs. Under this interpretation of
CERCLA, the court has ascribed a legal meaning to the concept of CERCLA liability based upon its own view of "responsibility" under the statute.
In its eagerness to find a way to shift costs, the court has not only ignored
available state corporate law as a rule of decision under the Kimbell Foods
rule but also has articulated an interpretation of CERCLA purposes that
finds little actual support in the text or the legislative history of the statute.
Circuit ruled that even utilizing the expanded reach of the "substantial continuity" exception to the
general asset purchaser non-liability principle would still not have led the court to find Moreco Energy
liable. /d. at 490. The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Mexico Feed & Seed is notable in suggesting that the
achievement of CERCLA's cost recovery purposes demanded that a broader liability rule than that
imposed under mainstream state corporate law be adopted by the courts. Nowhere is there evidence in
the record of this case indicating that abusive CERCLA evasions had taken place. The court seemed to
adopt its legal conclusion as a preventative measure.
297
/d. at 488.
298
/d. at 489.
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United States v. Carolina Transformer Co.299

In Carolina Transformer, the Fourth Circuit was presented with the

familiar fact situation of the federal government seeking to identify solvent
PRPs from whom they could recover cleanup costs. 300 Here, the EPA had
sued a number of PRPs in an effort to recover nearly a million dollars in
cleanup costs for work it had done in the remediation of the PCBcontaminated site where Carolina Transformer had salvaged and repaired
used electrical transformers. 301 The group of PRPs facing this potential
multi-million dollar liability included Carolina Transformer Co., two individual directors and stockholders, and FayTranCo, a corporate purchaser of
most of Carolina Transformer's assets. 302 The district court granted EPA's
motion for summary judgment and it found all defendants jointly and severally liable for all of EPA's response costs303 and, in addition, imposed
treble punitive damages for their refusal to comply with EPA's cleanup
order. 304 Interestingly, the trial court reached its conclusion on FayTranCo's asset purchaser liability by accepting the government's argument
that it possessed a federal common law-making power and that CERCLA
demanded that it develop a nationally-uniform rule of decision. 305 Not only
did District Court Judge Boyle assume that CERCLA created liability for
corporate successors in general, he felt it within his power to apply a "substantial continuity" or "continuity of enterprise" test for asset purchaser
liability to attach liability to FayTranCo. 306 While this choice of substantive law was made in the name of securing "national uniformity," the district court's opinion cited no CERCLA case or legislative authority for its
choice.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling on the basic questions of statutory meaning. 307 Not surprisingly, Judge Widener's opinion
joined the three other circuits in holding that CERCLA liability of "persons" reaches the successors of corporations or other business entities as a
299

978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992).
/d. at 834.
301
/d. at 834, 841. The district court had a warded EPA response costs of over $977,000 and, in
addition, punitive damages of three times that amount ($2.9 million) for a grand total of $3.9 million.
/d. at 841. The Fourth Circuit affirmed this judgment in its Carolina Transformer ruling. /d.
302
See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1033-35, 1040 (E.D.N.C.
1989) (explaining the relationship between the co-defendants and their liability for the cleanup).
303
/d. at 1036, 1040.
304
/d. at I 040.
305
See id. at I 038-39 (stating that, because "CERCLA is a federal statute which is designed to
promote an overriding federal interest[,) ... [but) does not address the issue of successor liability[,) ...
the court must fashion federal rules of decision which further the interests ofCERCLA").
306
Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 840.
307
/d. at 837.
300
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308

matter of congressional intent.
However, this inferred conclusion of
statutory coverage did not contain any particular legal theory of successor
liability. Where should the appellate court look? One thing is certain, the
Carolina Transformer court did not consider the decision making methodology set forth by the Supreme Court's Kimbell Foods decision. Grounding his opinion on "traditional and evolving principles of federal common
law," Judge Widener suggested that federal courts possessed a broad discretion in fashioning rules of decision in individual cases.309 In the Fourth
Circuit's view, Congress intended for federal courts to supply these rules
"interstitially" to achieve CERCLA's purposes and it was up to federal
judges to determine when this was necessary. 310
Judge Widener elaborated his major point by holding that this general
successorship liability principle extended CERCLA liability to asset purchasers under certain situations.311 In a more careful discussion of corporate law theory than undertaken by the district court, the appeals court approved of the lower Court's decision to adopt and apply the broadened
Curiously, Judge
liability-extending "substantial continuity" test. 312
Widener suggested that CERCLA did not require any fixed liability theory
but rather, federal courts possessed great contextual flexibility to choose
the rules "justified by the facts of each case."313 In the truest common law
style, the court reserved for itself federal common lawmaking powers to
supply the missing links in statutory design. But what policy emphasis
would discipline such broad discretion? The Carolina Transformer court
was persuaded that it should select a liability theory that would implement
its view that "CERCLA is a remedial statute [and] its provisions should be
construed broadly to avoid frustrating the legislative purpose."314 In its
view, the pre-eminent legislative purpose was finding a "responsible party"
to shoulder the cleanup costs that had been incurred by the government. 315
But who should be "responsible" for CERCLA costs when a corporate
successor had purchased the assets of a polluting predecessor? Certainly,
CERCLA did not answer this fundamental liability question. Resorting to
the norms of traditional and highly-consistent state corporate law theory
apparently would not suffice because a legally well-advised party could
308
309
310

/d.
/d.

/d. at 837-38.
See id. at 838 (explaining that asset purchasers take on liabilities of the predecessor corporation when one of four exceptions are met: (I) the successor expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the
liabilities of the predecessor; (2) the transaction may be considered a de facto merger; (3) the successor
may be considered a "mere continuation" of the predecessor; or (4) the transaction is fraudulent).
312 /d.
311

313

/d. at 837.

314

/d. at 838 (citing Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991)).

315

/d. at 837.
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structure a transaction that would confine CERCLA liability in the predecessor company and insulate the asset purchaser. In fact, this had probably
occurred in the FayTranCo transaction in the case. The Fourth Circuit felt
justified in ignoring state corporate law principles because the application
of those concepts would have resulted in the avoidance of CERCLA response costs. 316 The court examined the record and found the "unmistakable impression that the transfer of the [predecessor] business to [the successor] was part of an effort to continue the business in all material respects yet avoid the environmental liability arising from the PCB contamination at the ... site."317
The Carolina Transformer court apparently believed that it was necessary to create its own "federal common law" corporate successor liability
principles to prevent an otherwise "lawful" evasion of CERCLA. In this
way of thinking, the Court's formulation of broad successorship concepts
that would find more solvent "responsible parties" would be justified in the
name of achieving the basic purposes of CERCLA. Judge Widener believed that it was legitimate to manipulate corporate successorship doctrine
in order to replenish cleanup funds that had been spent on site remediation.
Finding the asset purchasing successors liable would both fill gaps in statutory meaning as well as permit the courts to assign costs to those it believed were "responsible" for them. Traditional concepts of asset purchaser liability apparently were inadequate to achieve this objective. Thus,
Carolina Transformer represents the high point of judicial intervention in
the name of federal common lawmaking: the court identifies the statute's
goal and then creates a legal rule to achieve the purpose. Once again, the
Kimbell Foods decision was not a factor in the decision and the O'Melveny
& Meyers case would not come down for two more years.
3. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc. and City Management Corp.
v. U.S. Chemical Company, Inc.
The issue of successor corporate liability under CERCLA initially
reached the Sixth Circuit in 1991 in Anspec Company v. Johnson Control,
Inc. 318 The fundamental legal approach taken in Anspec to the choice of
law problem would dictate the result three years later in City Management
316

See id. at 837 (stating that, under the facts of the case, the defendant could not be liable under
the prevailing "mere continuation" doctrine applicable under state corporate successorship principles).
317
/d. at 841. After reviewing a seemingly tailor made set of facts with which to apply the substantial continuity test, the court found that the successor corporation satisfied seven of the eight enumerated elements of the test /d. at 840-41. The factors are: (I) retention of the same employees; (2)
retention of the same supervisory personnel; (3) retention of the same production facilities in the same
location; (4) production of the same product; (5) retention of the same name; (6) continuity of assets;
(7) continuity of general business operations; and (8) whether the successor holds itself out as the
continuation of the previous enterprise. /d. at 838.
318
922 F.2d 1240, 1243 (6th Cir. 1991).
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Corp., an asset purchaser successorship situation.319 In Anspec, a federal
district court had dismissed a CERCLA action brought by an existing landowner, Anspec, who had cleaned up a parcel of industrial land that had
been contaminated by a prior owner and operator, Ultraspherics. 320 As in
most of these cases, the facts describe a tangled web of corporate behavior.
After selling the property to Anspec, Ultraspherics was formally merged
into the Hoover Group, a subsidiary of a larger finn, Johnson Controls. 321
Upon completing the site assessment and portions of the cleanup, Anspec
filed suit under CERCLA and state law to recover the costs associated with
the remedial work. 322 After being rebuffed in the district court, Anspec was
successful in convincing the appellate court to join the Third and the Ninth
Circuits in ruling that CERCLA imposes transfer cleanup liability on corporate successors in a merger situation. 323
The most interesting feature of the Anspec court's holding was that it
reached its conclusion purely as a matter of statutory construction and not
as an exercise of federal common lawmaking power. 324 In fact, the court
took great pains to argue that its interpretive approach did not involve the
court in "creating or fashioning" federal common law. 325 Without citing or
mentioning Kimbell Foods, Judge Lively cited the Supreme Court decision
in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., for the proposition that
a federal court was only empowered to create federal common law when
Congress had left it to the courts to "flesh out" a statute by fashioning substantive rules or when a federal rule of decision was needed to protect
uniquely federal interests. 326 The Anspec court stated a clear view that it
wished to avoid venturing into the realm of federal common law decisionmaking-a position that stands in stark contrast to other appellate holdings
very willing to embark into federal common lawmaking. 327 The Sixth Circuit in Anspec refused to characterize its action in this case as ')udicial
319

City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chern. Co., 43 F.3d 244,246 (6th Cir. 1994).
Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 793, 793-94, 796 (E.D. Mich. 1989). In
this decision, District Judge Zatkoff granted motions to dismiss for all of the corporate defendants
including Ultraspherics, which had actually disposed of the hazardous sludge and liquids from a metal
and plastic grinding process and degreaser wastes into an underground storage tank and two aboveground tanks which were spilled onto the ground and into the groundwater. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1243.
In its ruling, the trial court found no CERCLA liability because Ultraspherics no longer existed as a
corporate entity and the two corporate successors were not to be considered PRPs under the statute.
Anspec, 734 F. Supp. at 795.
321
Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1243.
322 /d.
320

323

/d.
/d.
325
/d.
326
/d.
327
/d.
324

at 1245.
at 1245-47.
at 1245-46.
at 1245 (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 631, 640 (1981 )).
at 1246.
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lawmaking," rather choosing to describe its function as mere statutory interpretation.328 CERCLA, the court said, was a law that was not "ambiguous" but rather, "textually incomplete."329 Therefore, the court's task was
to discern Congress's intent in enacting § 107(a), the principal liability
provision in CERCLA. Acting with this purpose, Judge Lively had little
. difficulty in deciding that Congress had intended to include successor corporations within the meaning of the term "corporation" when it passed
CERCLA. 330
After reaching this conventional conclusion on the question of CERCLA liability for corporate successors, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case
back to the district court with a brief instruction. 331 As almost an afterthought, the appeals court ordered the lower federal court to follow Michigan law in its application of successor liability.332 By deciding the threshold "interpretive" issue that Congressional use of the term "corporation" in
CERCLA's § 107 impliedly included corporate successors, Judge Lively
did not explain how federal courts in his circuit should determine successor
liability. There was no consideration of the choice of law question and no
discussion of the reasoning behind his limited instruction to employ state
law.333 Curiously, the appellate court gave no attention to the question of
328

/d. at 1245-46. The Sixth Circuit's determination that the state law definition of"corporation"
should be followed under CERCLA to impose liability on successors-in-interest overturns what was
considered a persuasive Sixth Circuit district court case. See United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637
(W.O. Ky. 1990). The Distler court held that because the language in CERCLA §§ 101 and 107 was
ambiguous, that Congress "intended [for] the courts to develop common law'' to interpret the two
sections. /d. at 640. Citing Smith Land, the Distler court stated that "courts applying the doctrine of
successor liability in CERCLA cases are to apply it in such a fashion as to further the goals of the Act
whether that be done by applying the traditional rule (mere continuation] or some variation (substantial
continuity]." /d. at 642. The court adopted and applied the substantial continuity test and imposed
successor-in-interest liability for response costs. /d. at 642-43. The court's analysis is contrary to that
in Anspec, and presumably superceded.
:!29
Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1246.
330
This conclusion resulted from an analysis combining factors including 1) the "universal acceptance" of the usual meaning of the term "corporation," 2) the United States Code's general constructional rules defining the words "company" and "association," and 3) the overall legislative purposes of
CERCLA emphasizing swift and effective site cleanup and the "polluter pays" principle. /d. at 124647. This third element, the legislative purposes of the statute, resulted in the Sixth Circuit ruling that
''the remedial nature of CERCLA 's scheme requires the courts to interpret its provisions broadly to
avoid frustrating the legislative purposes." /d. at 1247. Such an interpretive emphasis would seemingly provide courts with a basis for attaching the broadest possible meaning to any liability-related
provision within CERCLA.
331
/d. at 1247-48.
332
/d. at 1248.
333
Judge Kennedy's concurring opinion in Anspec differed from that of the majority opinion in
that it directly applied the Kimbell Foods factors to determine whether the court should create federal
common law to resolve the issue of successor liability. /d. at 1249-51. However, even while employing the Kimbell Foods analysis, the conclusion mirrored that of the majority by looking to state law. /d.
at 1251. The issues in Anspec were not seen by Judge Kennedy as requiring a national common law
resolution, and the states' laws regarding successor liability were found to be generally uniform. /d. at
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why state law should govern this issue of federal law or why federal courts
should be bound by state law rules. Again, conspicuous in its absence was
any reference to the Supreme Court's holding in Kimbell Foods or the rest
of its federal common law jurisprudence. Since the facts in Anspec presented only a corporate merger and a parent/subsidiary relationship, the
issue of successor liability in the asset purchaser setting was never considered. Three years later, the circuit decided City Management Corp. v. US.
Chemical Co./34 which presented that precise question.
City Management Corp., like many CERCLA disputes, involved a
highly convoluted fact pattern. City Management attempted to purchase a
Michigan-based solvent reclamation business known as U.S. Chemical Co.
or USC. 335 After extensive negotiation between the parties, the two firms
entered into an "asset purchase and sale agreement" for all of the tangible
and intangible assets of USC's business operations. 336 City Management
agreed to pay $720,000 over a fifteen year period and to assume any hazardous waste cleanup liability on USC's Roseville, Michigan property. 337
City Management did not know that at the same time it was working to
acquire USC's assets, USC had already been notified by EPA that it had
been labeled a PRP for contributing hazardous wastes to the Metamora
Landfill in Lapeer County, Michigan. 338 EPA had initiated a cleanup of
that landfill and the agency had spent $44 million in response costs up to
that point.339 It was now identifying PRPs-like USC-who would be
allocated shares of the cleanup expenses. 340 The initial EPA Allocation
Report had assessed USC a minimum share of $5.3 million for cleaning up
the site. 341 During its negotiations with USC, City Management was not
informed by USC about the Metamora landfill cleanup liability. 342 This
news would come to it after the deal had been closed when a group of
1249. The relevant state corporate laws were not found to frustrate CERCLA's "polluter pay" policies,
because in adopting "state corporate law on the issue of who is a liable 'corporation' under § 9607,
specific state rules that are unreasonable, aberrant, or hostile to federal interests will not be applied."
/d. at 1250 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,479 (1979)). Judge Kennedy also stated that application of a federal common law rule would "disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law"
and "create uncertainty in future commercial transactions." /d. (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979)). Judge Kennedy reasoned that state corporate law has "evolved over
decades and [is] frequently codified in state statutes, is well developed and easily discovered and applied. By contrast, at least in the near term, there is no established body of federal common law on the
issues ~resented in this case." 922 F.2d at 1250-51.
3 4
43 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1994).
335
/d. at 247-48.
336
/d. at 248.
337 /d.
338
339
340

/d. at 247.
/d.

!d. at 248.

341/d.
342

/d. at 247.
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PRPs contacted City Management informing it that the PRPs expected it to
pay USC's share of the cleanup expense. 343
Rather than wait for the PRPs to come after it in a CERCLA cost recovery action, City Management sought a declaratory judgment stating
that, as the purchaser of USC's assets, it was not liable as a successor corporation to USC for any of USC's environmentalliabilities. 344 The district
court granted summary judgment to City Management, finding that it did
not have successor liability under any of the exceptions to the mainstream
asset purchaser non-liability rule. 34s On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the
appellate court began its analysis by stating flatly that the Anspec decision
dictated the resolution of the case. 346 In Judge Milburn's opinion, the earlier Anspec holding provided controlling precedent in two ways: 1) it directed that CERCLA liability contains successor corporations within the
meaning of "person," and 2) it stated that successor liability would be determined by state law rather than federal common law. 347 This latter conclusion-that state law established the operative rule of decision-was
stated as the circuit rule and the sole issue for the court was deciding what
Michigan corporate law was as it applied to asset purchasers. 348 After carefully reviewing the applicable state law, the Sixth Circuit decided that
Michigan law followed the mainstream "mere continuation" exception to
the asset purchaser non-liability principle. 349 Having Anspec as the governing circuit opinion, the court did not feel compelled to explain why it
should apply state law in this situation. It was just following precedent. 3so
343

!d. at 248.
/d. at 249.
34
s Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 624,638-39,641-42 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
346
City Mgmt., 43 F.3d at 250.
347 /d.
344

348

/d. at 250-53.
/d. at 252-53.
3
so The court did make a confusing comment in drawing this conclusion. Judge Milburn distinguished City Management from Mexico Feed & Seed by stating that since Mexico Feed & Seed was
"decided by applying federal law rather than state law, it is clearly inapplicable to this case." /d. at 253.
This comment suggests that the City Management court thought that state law could not serve as the
rule of decision in a federal common lawmaking ruling. In this way, its decision was clearly wrong.
The Sixth Circuit has reiterated its support for the AnspedCity Management line of cases in later opinions by citing them for the proposition that questions of corporate successorship liability rules are to be
derived from state law. See, e.g., IBC Mfg. Co. v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 1999 WL 486615, at *2 (6th
Cir. July I, 1999) (citing Anspec for the proposition that "[i)n determining whether one corporation is a
successor of another, we apply state law"); Cytec Indus., Inc. v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d
644, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing City Mgmt. for the proposition that "[t]he liability of a successor
corporation for CERCLA liability is determined by reference to state corporation law, rather than
federal common law").
349
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4. B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski351
The Second Circuit finally reached the issue of CERCLA successorship liability in B. F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, which was one component of an
exceedingly long and complex series of federal court cases initially styled
B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha. 352 This case involved the cleanup of two Connecticut landfills whose remedial costs had been resolved by consent decree for nearly $5.4 million. 353 At this point, two PRP coalitions, mostly
composed of large corporate waste disposers that had been included in the
settlement, sought to shift part of their liability to other generators and
transporters which had not been included in the earlier consent decree. 354
In addition, the federal government and the State of Connecticut also pursued additional cleanup costs against non-settling parties.355 Curiously, the
district court was particularly unsympathetic to all of these plaintiffs and it
had granted summary judgment in favor of most of the defendants. 356 The
Second Circuit heard the appeal from the district court's disposition and it
considered the corporate successorship issue as one of a large number of
CERCLA questions. 357
Without formulating any particular theory, the district court had
granted summary judgment in three corporate successor situations where
the business and assets had been sold and the buyer was being targeted by
the government as a PRP solely on the basis of successorship status. 358
Apparently the success of Mexico Feed & Seed and Carolina Transformer
had emboldened the federal government into making this kind of legal argument in later cases such as this one. The Second Circuit in Betkoski addressed the threshold question of whether CERCLA assessed liability to
successor corporations in the conventional manner previously adopted by
351

99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996).
See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Munha,
855 F. Supp. 545 (D. Conn. 1994); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Munha, 840 F. Supp. 180 (D. Conn. 1993);
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 815 F. Supp. 539 (D. Conn. 1993).
353
Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 512.
354
/d. at512-13.
355
/d. at 512.
352

356

The industrial coalition attempted to add II 51 PRPs as third party defendants but Judge Boyle
only allowed 41 parties to be joined. /d. at 5 II. Beyond this, summary judgment was granted to every
third party defendant that had requested that relief and the court later dismissed, on its own motion,
nearly all of the remaining defendants including many who had never moved for summary judgment.
/d. at 513. The governmental plaintiffs did not fare much better with the court finding that they had
failed to adequately prove their additional cleanup costs. /d.
357
/d. at 515-20 (discussing component parts, releasability, negligible amounts, EPA designation,
successor liability and transporter site selection in its analysis of the district court's CERCL.A interpretation).
358
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 840 F. Supp. 180,185,190-91 (D. Conn. 1993).
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the Anspec, Carolina Transformer and Mexico Feed & Seed courts. 359 Interpreting the statute as had all the previous courts of appeal, the Second
Circuit concluded that "CERCLA's statutory language, properly read, provides for successor liability."360 By embracing this position, Judge Cardamone did nothing out of the ordinary; but merely joined every other appellate court that had considered the point.
But what was to be the substantive law implementing the concept of
successor corporate liability? And how should the federal court fashion
this rule of decision? As had been the case in prior decisions, the Betkoski
court emphasized the advancement of CERCLA "goals" as the primary
policy rationale for selecting its legal standard?61
The Betkoski court found that "because the substantial continuity test is
more consistent with the Act's goals, it is superior to the older and more
inflexible 'identity' [or "mere continuity"] rule."362 However, Judge Cardamone did not articulate which of CERCLA's goals made the substantial
continuity rule superior. Instead, he emphasized that CERCLA is a "broad
remedial statute" and that it should be construed liberally to give effect to
its purposes. 363 Once again, the rhetoric of "holding responsible parties
liable for the costs of the cleanup" was employed without any inquiry into
why and under what circumstances an asset purchaser should be considered
"responsible."364 The Betkoski court knowingly selected the "substantial
continuity" liability theory as the "appropriate legal test for successor liability under CERCLA"365 because it believed this standard would capture
more responsible parties and allocate more liability. Viewing its function
as selecting a legal liability principle consistent with its own view of statutory purposes, the court apparently believed that it had wide discretion to
fashion the law.
One thing that was clear from Betkoski was that the Second Circuit did
not mention or adopt the decisional methodology of either Kimbell Foods
or 0 'Melveny & Myers, which had been issued by the United States Supreme Court two years before. There was nothing unusual about this omission. However, the court seemed to intentionally isolate itself from the
Supreme Court's direction. So certain was the Betkoski court of its decision that it refused a subsequent request to reconsider the matter specifi359

Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 518 (noting that Anspec, Carolina Transformer and Mexico Feed all held
that CERCLA makes "successor corporations liable, in certain circumstances, for their predecessors'
acts").
360 /d.
361

362
363
364
365

/d.at519.
/d.
/d.at514.
/d. (emphasis added).
/d. at 519.
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cally in light of these two, relevant, Supreme Court precedents. 366 The
main Betkoski opinion did not cite the O'Melveny & Myers decision nor its
explicit statement that cases justifying the creation of a special federal
common law rule of decision were "few and restricted" and limited to
situations where there is a "significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law."367 The demanding tone of the Supreme Court policy reflected in the Kimbell Foods, 0 'Melveny & Myers,
and Atherton line of decisions, and the policy of judicial restraint they espoused, was completely sidestepped by the Second Circuit in Betkoski. 368
366

Two of the losing parties in Betkoski petitioned the Second Circuit for a rehearing due to the
court's failure to cite Kimbell Foods and O'Melveny & Myers. See B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 112
F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1997) (denying petition for rehearing). The petitioners suggested that the court's
choice of a federal common law rule of decision was inconsistent with another contemporaneous decision, Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways. Inc., 97 F.3d I (2d Cir. 1996). In a per curiam order denying the petition, the court recognized Kimbell Foods and 0 'Melveny & Myers. but insisted that their
lawmaking was justified in light of these cases. Betkoski, 112 F.3d at 90-91. Explaining its action, the
court's order stated that "[its] primary reason for adopting a federal common law rule was the concern
that allowing state law rules such as the inflexible and easily evaded 'identity' rule to control the question of successor liability would defeat the goals of CERCLA." /d. at 91. Clearly minimizing the
strength and direction of the two Supreme Court opinions, the Second Circuit continued to stress its
empirically-untested proposition that state rules were "lenient" and that they would result in a "defeat"
of federal CERCLA policy. /d. Clearly, the court had been convinced during the prior appeal that this
was true and no petition for rehearing would reverse this idea.
367
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647,651 (1963) and Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,68 (1966)).
368
Not all federal appeals courts ignored the Supreme Court's Kimbell Foods decisional methodology in CERCLA cases at the time of the Betkoski decision. For instance, in Redwing Ca"iers. Inc. v.
Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489 (lith Cir. 1996), the Eleventh Circuit confronted a similar choice
of law issue in a case raising the issue of whether a limited partner may be held liable for the partnership's CERCLA liability. That court identified the central problem when it noted that "[o]ne of the
more significant gaps in CERCLA 's scheme arises where the right to recovery created by the Act
confronts state law governing business entities like corporations and partnerships." /d. at 1499. While
admitting that federal courts had reached differing conclusions on whether state or federal common law
provides the appropriate rule of decision, the court held that ultimately federal law determines the issue
ofCERCLA liability. /d. at 1500.
However, with that conclusion the Redwing Carriers court employed the Kimbell Foods analysis
to detennine whether "federal law'' should be a unifonn common law rule or the applicable state law
rule. /d. at I 501. Its conclusion was that the Kimbell Foods factors directed it to select a rule of decision "according to the applicable state law rule." /d. The third Kimbell Foods factor, "the potentially
unsettling effect of a federal common law rule on relationships grounded on state law," provided the
strongest support for applying state law as the rule of decision. /d. at I 502. At issue was limited partner liability, a concept created and defined by state statute. The court found that existing state law
limited-partnership statutes define the breadth of limited liability, and "[g]iven the popularity of the
limited-partnership structure ... [the court] hesitate[d) to upset the expectations investors have under
current state law rules by adopting a federal common law rule." /d. In conclusion, the court found that
there was "no imperative need to develop a general body of federal common law to decide cases such
as this." /d. at 1501 (quoting Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 673 (1979)). The court's
carefully-crafted opinion stands in stark contrast to the asset purchaser decisions ignoring the Supreme
Court's direction, basing decisions upon the court's own view of the appropriate achievement ofCERCLA goals through broad federal common law rules for decision, and the willingness to recognize
stable commercial expectations.
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Rather, the appellate court concluded that it had the authority to fashion a
rule of decision imposing CERCLA liability on asset-purchasing corporate
successors that exceeded the stringency of the consensus corporate law
theory all in the name of furthering CERCLA' s statutory purposes and
limiting avoidance. 369 The decision bore the hallmark of the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Carolina Transformer. Regardless of the limited, lawcreating role described in the Kimbell Foods series of decisions, the Betkoski court viewed its judicial function as one of shoring up deficiencies in
an important remedial statute-CERCLA. Once again, the court considered its function as reinforcing its own view of CERCLA's fundamental
purposes and developing legal liability principles to effectuate those purposes.
C. Stage Three-Shifting the Choice ofLaw Rules after the Bestfoods
Decision-Beginning to Recognize the Limits ofJudicial Authority

1.

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Brown & Bryant,
Inc.37o

In the aftermath of 0 'Melveny & Myers and Atherton, the Ninth Circuit was presented with an opportunity to revisit its earlier holding in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc. 371 that the parameters of successor liability under CERCLA are to be fashioned by federal common law. 372 In
that prior case, the Louisiana-Pacific court had joined the Third Circuit's
position in Smith Land & Improvement that recognized judicial authority to
employ federal common law rulemaking to establish a rule of decision in
the asset purchase corporate successorship context. 373 Exercising its com-

369 There was no clear evidence that these successors

were attempting to "game the system" by
structuring transactions in a manner to limit vicarious liability. The court, perhaps influenced by the
possibility that parties would use conventional, state corporate asset purchaser rules in ways that would
avoid continuing CERCLA liability, exercised its common law powers to announce a rule that would
deter this practice. The Betkoski court believed that it was justified in creating federal law to guard
against the possibility of such a manipulative result in the name of furthering CERCLA goals. No
empirical data, analysis or particular statutory language supported such an interpretation. Betkoski, 99
F.3d at 519.
370 159 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1998).
371 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1992). The Louisiana-Pacific court held that federal common law
applied to determine an asset purchaser's CERCLA liability, and upheld a district court's grant of
summary judgment to an asset purchaser from whom contribution was sought under state law successor-in-interest theory. /d. at 1262-63. The court adopted state successor liability laws as the rule of
decision because they mirrored those of most states, and refused to extend asset purchaser liability by
adopting the substantial continuity test. /d. at 1265. The court found that the asset purchaser had no
knowledge of the predecessor's CERCLA liability or of the waste generated by the predecessor's
discontinued business practices, and the Ninth Circuit reserved its decision on whether to adopt the
substantial continuity test because of the lack of knowledge. /d.
372
Atchison, 159 F.3d at 361.
373 Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1263.
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mon law powers in Louisiana Pacific, the Ninth Circuit adopted a rule
based upon prevalent state corporate law norms. Within the context of that
case, this meant that the court selected the mainstream "mere continuation"
principle to serve as the common law rule in CERCLA asset purchaser
situations within the Ninth Circuit. 374
In Atchison, PureGro, a purchaser of assets from a defunct
owner/operator, was sued in a private cost recovery and contribution action
as a successor-in-interest under CERCLA by another PRP wishing to employ the "substantial continuity" exception to asset purchaser nonliability.375 The district court had been willing to apply this expanded liability
test but it concluded that the facts did not justify a finding of successor
liability and granted summary judgment for PureGro. 376 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit was asked to reassess its prior Louisiana-Pacific decision
from two, self-interested perspectives. First, the appellant PRP railroad
desired for the court to exercise its federal common law powers to expand
CERCLA liability by adding an additional successor liability exceptionthe "substantial continuity" test-and applying it to the facts at hand. 377
Second, the respondent, PureGro, argued that "recent Supreme Court decisions" had undermined the Louisiana-Pacific holding that federal common
law governs the CERCLA successor liability issue and that this more recent precedent required the application of state law to the question. 378 In
Atchison, then, the appeals court was asked by a party to reinterpret its
prior federal common law rule of decision to embrace the more expansive
"substantial continuation" exception to the general non-liability principle
applicable to asset purchasers. 379 The court refused to do this, but in reaching this conclusion it considered and struggled with the method of analysis
that was expressed by the Supreme Court in O'Melveny & Myers and
Atherton. Most unusual in this case was the fact that the Ninth Circuit
ruled twice, issuing two opinions: one "original opinion,"380 followed ten
months later by an "amended opinion."381 A comparison of the two Atchison decisions vividly demonstrates just how hard it is for federal judges to
374

/d. at 1265-66.
Atchison, 159 F.3d at 361.
376 /d.
375

377

/d. at 361-62.
/d. at 362.
379
/d. at 364. In fact, the railroad PRPs had convinced the district court to adopt the "substantial
continuation" exception. /d. at 361. However, even applying this more generous standard, the district
court had found the "substantial continuation" exception inapplicable under the facts of the case and
granted summary judgment to the asset purchaser, PureGro. /d.
380
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant Inc., 132 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 1997)
Hereinafter, this opinion will be styled as Atchison I.
381
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant Inc., 159 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1998).
Hereinafter, this opinion will be styled as Atchison II.
378
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relinquish their discretionary control over the formulation of common law.
In the first or "original" Atchison opinion, the Ninth Circuit directly
considered the appeal from PureGro's point of view that the Supreme
Court's O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton decisions challenged the earlier
Louisiana-Pacific ruling that had easily assumed that federal courts could
fashion a rule of decision from their common lawmaking powers. 382 It did
so only after the issue was raised for the first time on appeal by PureGro.383
In fact, Judge Daly Hawkins titled this section of his opinion "Revisiting
Louisiana-Pacific" and began it with a statement that PureGro had made a
"persuasive argument that the Supreme Court's decisions ... call into
question the ease with which Louisiana-Pacific created a set of federal
rules for successor liability under CERCLA."384 The court then reiterated
the main points made in 0 'Melveny & Myers and Atherton that federal
common law rulemaking was needed only in "few and restricted" instances
and that the party requesting such a rule has a "heavy burden" to prove that
there is a need for uniformity or that state rules conflict with federal policy.3ss
Beyond stating the policy of the Supreme Court's recent decisions, this
first opinion adopted and applied the three-part Kimbell Foods analytical
methodology, finding: 1) no need for federally-imposed uniformity in an
already largely uniform, state corporate law and 2) no conflict between
state rules and federal policy. 386 Interestingly, on this second point, Judge
Daly Hawkins directly debunked the frequently-suggested "conflict with
CERCLA" justification for federal courts exercising common law powers
to expand asset purchaser liability. He wrote that:
[S]ince states already have rules in place to prevent the use
of the corporate form to avoid liability, the only possible
justification for a new, federal (and more expansive) rule is
to "enrich the fund" by imposing liability on more asset pur382

Atchison I, 132 F.3d at 1299-1302.
/d. at 1299 n.2. Reflecting the court's ambivalence towards the entire issue of the Supreme
Court-mandated restraint in fashioning federal common law rules, Judge Daly Hawkins added the
following introduction to his consideration of the question: "Although we do not have to entertain it,
we exercise our discretion to do so since it is a purely legal question of considerable significance." /d.
With this comment, the judge suggested that the lower federal courts possessed the option of deciding
whether or not to follow the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on matters of federal jurisdiction.
More likely, this remark reflects the difficulty with which federal courts have in declining the opportunity to "make law."
384
/d. at 1299.
385 /d.
383

386

/d. at 1300-QI. These are: I) whether federal interests require a nationally uniform body of
law, 2) whether application of state law would frustrate or conflict with specific objectives of federal
programs, and 3) the extent to which application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law. /d. at 1300 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,
728-29 (1979)).
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purchasers . . . . As the Court pointed out in 0 'Melveny,
these "more money" arguments are unavailing. 387
With this language, the Ninth Circuit had finally expressed the unstated
reality that federal court manipulation of common law doctrine actually
constituted illicit, judicial lawmaking that was clearly outside the bounds
of recent Supreme Court doctrine. The actual policy choice of finding
more entities "responsible," the court observed, was more appropriate for
Congress rather than the federal judiciary.388 The prior justification of
implementing CERCLA policy goals which had been offered in the earlier
appellate cases was not to be found in Louisiana-Pacific. In addition, in a
separate part of the opinion, the judge left no doubt about the impact of the
0 'Melveny and Atherton decisions on the present legitimacy of the Ninth
Circuit's Louisiana-Pacific decision. He wrote, "While we are reluctant to
question the essential holding of Louisiana-Pacific, 0 'Melveny and Atherton, intervening decisions by the Supreme Court, squarely refute the wisdom of fashioning a federal common law on this issue [of asset purchaser
liability under CERCLA]."389
Finally, this original Atchison opinion reached the inescapable conclusion, derived from the Supreme Court's methodology, that "state law dictates the parameters of successor liability under CERCLA."390 With resounding force, the Ninth Circuit both swore fidelity to the Supreme
Court's federal common law precedent and it defined the CERCLA liability rules in asset purchaser situations.
In an unusual step, Judge Daly Hawkins issued an "amended opinion"
approximately ten months after releasing the "original opinion."391 While
the amended ruling did not alter the specific outcome in the case, it did edit
the language of the prior decision in several significant ways. Most importantly, his opinion deleted all of the previously quoted material from the
"original opinion," especially that which suggested that the appropriate rule
of decision was to be determined with reference to state law. The appellate
court retained its references to the Kimbell Foods, O'Melveny and Atherton
decisions, however, it did not mention the Supreme Court's decision in
Bestfoods that had been handed down merely four months earlier. After
387

/d. at 130 I.
With reference to the 0 'Melveny & Myers case, the Atchison I court stated that,
The imposition of liability under any statute "involves a host of considerations that
must be weighed and appraised .... Within the federal system, at least, we have decided that that function of weighing and appraising is more appropriate[) for those
who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them."
/d. (citing O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1993)).
389
/d. (emphasis added).
388

390

39

/d.

t Atchison II, !59 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1998).
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analyzing the substantive corporate successorship issue in a manner consistent with the Kimbell Foods preference for state law, Judge Daly Hawkins
inserted a new paragraph into the amended opinion which confused the
final analysis of the choice of law issue.392 He stated that it was not necessary to determine whether state law dictated the parameters of CERCLA
successor liability "as we would reach the same result under federal common law."393 By so doing, the court retained its Louisiana-Pacific conclusion based on federal common law decision making despite the fact that the
court had reasoned that state law should be the source of the decisional
rule. This is a curious conclusion since it entirely ignores the Kimbell
Foods, O'Melveny and Atherton analysis which preceded it in the opinion
and clings to the Court's desire to determine a federal common law rule. 394
Perhaps all it does is establish state corporate law as the substantive basis
for the federal common law rule. This outcome reveals just how hard it is
for a federal court to "let go" of the power to interpret statutes and to announce operative legal rules. It also indicates how difficult it is for these
same courts to explain the basis for their holdings.
2. North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc. 395
This case involved a familiar fact pattern with a current hazardous
waste site owner-Salomon, Inc.-seeking other parties who could share
part of the $20 million CERCLA cleanup costs for a contaminated, Denver,
Colorado mineral ore processing plant. 396 It discovered that the Coke
Company had mined vanadium and uranium ores in the mid-1930s and had
regularly transported "radium slimes" to the Denver site for processing and
disposal. 397 Further research had indicated that under a 1941 reorganization plan, the Coke Company had sold most of its assets to North Shore
Gas in exchange for gas company stock. 398 As it turned out, North Shore
Gas was the only corporation still in existence and solvent when Salomon
looked for other parties to help pay for the cleanup.399 However, exercising
392
393
394

/d. at 364.
/d.

The Ninth Circuit explains this retention of its control over the selection of the appropriate
rule of decision in terms that emphasize the similarity of legal outcomes under the state Jaw and the
federal common law tests. However, it is unmistakable that the court wishes to stress the fact of its
control by stating that "we choose not to extend the 'mere continuation' exception to include the
broader notion of a 'substantial continuation."' /d. In spite of its recognition of 0 'Melveny and Atherton, the Atchison II court refused to cede authority over the choice of legal doctrine in the corporate
successorship context.
395
\52 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 1998).
396
/d. at 645.
397 /d.
398
399

ld. at 646.
/d. at 647.
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what it considered to be its "federal common law" authority, the federal
district court granted North Shore Gas's motion for summary judgment
ruling that the company was not liable under any of the traditional exceptions to the general asset purchaser non-liability principle.400 Salomon, Inc.
appealed this result and the case moved on to the Seventh Circuit for resolution.401
Strangely, before the Seventh Circuit, neither party briefed the choice
of law question-should the court apply federal common law or state law
to the asset purchaser issue?402 Even with the benefit of the thencontemporaneous Atchison and Bestfoods decisions, the North Shore Gas
court refused to undertake a Kimbell Foods analysis of the corporate successorship issue. Judge Cudahy's opinion revealed that he was aware of
the issue but he opted to apply what he considered to be federal common
law, thinking "it prudent to reserve the choice-of-law question until we are
confronted with a case in which the parties have argued the issue.'..w3 The
court seemed most interested in joining the "crowd" of other circuits that
had employed their federal common law powers in earlier cases to identify
a rule of decision.
Not surprisingly, the appeals court took the unexceptional first step and
joined six other circuits by finding that Congress intended to extend CERCLA liability to corporate successors. 404 It then parroted the reasoning of
the Third Circuit in the Smith Land case that resort to federal common law
was warranted because of the need for national uniformity in rules and the
need to prevent parties from "frustrat[ing] the aims of CERCLA" by taking
action under protective state law. 405 This mantra was repeated without any
careful analysis or empirical justification. There appeared to be no evidence that the successor corporation had attempted to manipulate the transaction in order to avoid CERCLA liabilities. In fact, the entire asset sale
transaction had been undertaken in 1941 as the result of an effort to comply
with the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 which required utilities to eliminate non-utility investments. 406 The resulting reorganization
and later corporate disintegrations led to the fact that North Shore Gas was
the only currently solvent business entity having any connection to the
1941 events.407 This, of course, led Salomon Inc. to pursue North Shore
Gas as a successor who would be responsible for a portion of the defunct
400

/d. at 651.

401/d.
402 /d. at 650.
403 /d. at 650-51.
404 /d. at 649.
405 /d. at 650 (citing Smith Land &

Improvement Corp. v. Ce1otex Corp., 851 F.2d 86,92 (3d Cir.

1988)).
406

/d. at 646 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 79k (2000)).

407 /d. at 647.
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Coke Company's CERCLA cleanup costs.408
Despite its awareness of the recent Atchison decision which had referred to the Kimbell Foods line of cases and the analytical method required by the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit refused to follow the
reasoning of O'Melveny & Myers and Bestfoods. 409 In light of the explicit
rejections of such arguments in 0 'Melveny & Myers and Atherton, the
Sixth Circuit's earlier decision in Anspec and the Ninth Circuit's recent
decision in Atchison, the Seventh Circuit in North Shore Gas assumed that
"federal common law supplies the rule of decision"410 without undertaking
a Kimbell Foods or other kind of analysis. Feeling free to fashion its own
rule of decision, it referred exclusively to general treatise authority and
earlier federal decisions in devising its rules for deciding the successor
liability question. State court decisions were not a factor, at least in terms
of reference. In the end, the North Shore Gas court decided to analyze the
successor liability issue under the "mere continuation" exception to the
general, state-law asset purchaser rule. 411 Judge Cudahy took the matter a
step beyond announcing the applicable legal rule. After an extensive
analysis, he found that, under the facts developed at trial, an identity of
ownership existed sufficient to impose successor liability on the asset purchaser.412 The opinion reflected a thorough evaluation of the case but, significantly, the appellate court reversed the trial judge's ruling on the successor liability question. 413
3. United States v. Davis414
The latest circuit court to address this CERCLA issue has been the
408 /d.
409 North Shore Gas Co., 152 F.3d at 642.

See supra Part 11.8.3 for a discussion of United States

v. Besf.?ods, Inc.
10 /d. See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 220 (1997) ("To invoke the concept of 'uniformity,'
however, is not to prove its need."); O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (stating that
creation of a federal rule of decision is "limited to situations where there is a 'significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law"') (citing Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63,68 (1966)); Atchison II, 159 F.3d at 364 (overruling Louisiana-Pacific and stating
that "(t]he imposition of liability under any statute involves a host of considerations that must be
weighed and appraised . . . . Within the federal system, at least, we have decided that that function of
weighing and appraising is more appropriately for those who write the laws, rather than for those who
interpret them.") (citing 0 'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 89) (internal quotations omitted).
411 Interestingly, later federal court decisions in the Seventh Circuit interpreted North Shore Gas
as a case indicating that state law should govern asset purchaser liability determinations in federal
litigation. See, e.g., Ryan Beck & Co. v. Campbell, No. 02 C 7016, 2002 WL 31696792, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 2, 2002); Fararo v. Sink LLC, Nos. 01 C 6956,01 C 6957, 2002 WL 31687671, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 27, 2002).
412 The court did not discuss whether the substantial continuity test would result in liability because the issue was not briefed by the parties. North Shore Gas, 152 F.3d at 654 n.8.
413 /d. at 658.
414 261 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2001).
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First Circuit, which in United States v. Davis held that state law provides
the rule of decision in suits brought to impose CERCLA liability on asset
purchasers.415 The United States v. Davis case involved the $55 million
groundwater and soil cleanup of a ten acre waste disposal site in Smithfield, Rhode Island. 416 After the main PRP-United Technologies Corporation-had settled with the government, it sought to recover part of its
liability from non-settling defendants including Black and Decker and
Electroformers as corporate successors to Gar Electroforming Division, an
electroplating company that had arranged to dispose of its wastes at the
Davis site. 417 The district court adopted the ruling of the magistrate judge
who had found that Black and Decker was liable under either state law or
federal common law successorship rules.418 On appeal, the court was asked
to choose between these two approaches as a fundamental choice of law
question. 419
Undertaking consideration of the choice of law question de novo, the
appeals court surveyed the current circuit split regarding whether federal
common law or state law should govern asset purchasers' CERCLA liability and found the Kimbell Foods and 0 'Melveny & Myers approach controlling, going so far as to describe it as the majority rule. 420 Interestingly,
the First Circuit had previously established the practice of turning to state
law in similar CERCLA choice of law situations. For instance, in its 1993
John S. Boyd Co. decision, the court had set forth a circuit rule that federal
courts should tum "to state contract law to provide the substantive rule, so
long as it is not hostile to the federal interests animating CERCLA.'>421
This "not hostile to the federal interest" rule was expressed in the John S.
Boyd Co. case solely by reference to holdings in other federal courts but
415
416
417

/d. at 54.
/d. at 15, 17.

/d. at 14, 17, 18 & n.l2. Gar had operated an electroplating business in Danbury, Connecticut, producing wastes containing nitric acid, copper, nickel and cyanide. /d. at 35. CWR, a waste
transporter, had picked up five drums from Gar and the court concluded that these five drums containing 275 gallons of waste were delivered to the Davis site for disposal. /d.
418
/d. at 52.
419
/d. at 52-53.
420
This position was consistent with prior First Circuit decisions interpreting CERCLA. Curiously, the court had held in previous cases that allhough federal law governed the validity of liability
agreements under CERCLA, state law would provide the substantive decisional principles in the absence of specific federal statutory guidance. For instance, in JohnS. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992
F.2d 401, 406 (1st Cir. 1993), the appellate court had ruled that a "majority of courts have turned to
state contract law to provide the substantive rule, so long as it is not hostile to the federal interests
animating CERCLA." The First Circuit reached this conclusion without any reference to the Kimbell
Foods decision.
421
JohnS. Boyd Co., 992 F.2d at 406 (using Massachusetts law for guidance in interpreting a
separation agreement between two corporate parties). See also Am. Policyholders Ins. Co. v. Nyacol
Prods., Inc., 989 F.2d 1256, 1263 (I st Cir. 1993)(rejecting the use of a uniform federal rule of decision
to govern interpretation of an insurance policy's scope of coverage regarding CERCLA liability).
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without regard or reference to the Supreme Court's earlier Kimbell Foods
precedent. What this suggests is that courts will be persuaded to accept a
particular line of reasoning from analogous federal decisions as a matter of
devising their own sense of judicial policy and not as an issue of consistency with Supreme Court direction. This is not to say that the Supreme
Court is totally irrelevant to the lower federal courts. When a decision of
the Supreme Court confirms a prior appellate position, the holding will be
recognized.
The United States v. Davis court interpreted the Supreme Court's Bestfoods decision as confirming the First Circuit's earlier CERCLA choice of
law holding in the John S. Boyd Co. case and by referring to Justice
Souter's Bestfoods opinion which noted that the statute gives "no indication that the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply
because a plaintiffs cause of action is based upon a federal statute.'>422 In
its view, the First Circuit combined the Bestfoods and the 0 'Melveny &
Myers approaches by concluding that state law would presumptively apply
in these cases unless there was a "specific, concrete federal policy or interest that is compromised by the application of state law."423 After spending
considerable time in explaining its choice of law methodology, the court
concluded in one sentence that the application of state law would not frustrate any federal objective and by so doing, upheld the use of state law. 424
Apparently, once the circuit established the John S. Boyd Co. rule on
choice oflaw matters, the issue was largely settled thereafter.m
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE ABSENCE OF CONCRETE LAW

What is a federal court and what should it do? These fundamental
questions lie at the heart of this article. The general and conventional answer to this question is that the federal judiciary exists to announce and
implement federal law-that is, federal constitutional, statutory and treaty
law for the most part. Under this view, the scope of federal court authority
is bounded by the bodies of law they are charged to apply. In theory, this
circumscribed notion of federal judicial power presents a restrained vision
of federal judges and denies them the freewheeling authority of general
jurisdiction that state court jurists have to create common law when the
422

Davis, 261 F.3d at 54 (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998)).
/d. (quoting Atchison II, 159 F.3d at 363-64).
424
/d. The commonly-stated rationales for creating a federal common law rule of decision which
were so persuasive in cases adopting the "substantial continuity" test were never mentioned in United
States v. Davis. These reasons-the need for national uniformity and the avoidance of responsibilityreceived no attention from the court.
425 /d.
423
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situation requires. At least, that is one theory of federal judicial power.
Another view considers federal judges in a more dynamic way, effectuating their view of the law to implement federal statutory or constitutional
policy. Obviously not as constrained as the first vision, this latter approach
employs the flexibility of statutory interpretation and the potential
expansiveness of federal common law doctrinal development to announce
the meaning of federal law. These competing ideas about the appropriate
role of federal judges reflects a serious disagreement over the allocation of
power in American society.
The specific focus of this article has been on the behavior of federal
courts in defining the legal rules for assigning CERCLA-based liability in
the corporate asset purchase situation. Although a narrow sub issue of the
more general corporate successor liability issue, the asset purchase scenario
is significant because it presents an important legal liability question without a clear statutory answer. CERCLA does not expressly provide for the
imposition of cleanup liability on corporate successors. In this instance,
the federal court is being asked to make highly consequential decisions in
the absence of a clearly identifiable congressional policy preference. Perhaps this kind of question is just an attenuated form of statutory interpretation, which asks the court to determine or infer "what would Congress have
done with this issue" had it addressed it at the time of CERCLA's enactment or revision? On the other hand, the resolution of this issue could be
viewed as judicial excess. This view of the issue sees judges going beyond
the limits of statutory interpretation and venturing into the area of explicit
judicial lawmaking, filling in legal rules without any idea of how Congress
would have wanted to act. Undoubtedly, identifying the border between
interpretation and lawmaking is an elusive pursuit-with the boundary
being more imagined than real. It also presents profound questions about
the limits on judicial authority-a more political than legal question.
This research has examined how federal courts of appeal respond to
this most concrete question-when is a corporate asset purchaser liable for
CERCLA cleanup costs?-in the face of statutory silence. The following
discussion draws salient conclusions about this federal court litigationlitigation that has spanned the past fifteen years.
A. The Findings of a Review of CERCLA Asset Purchaser Liability Cases

1.

Ubiquitousness of the Asset Purchaser Issue

Not surprisingly, this issue has come to the attention of all circuits except the Fifth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit over the past
fifteen years. Throughout the life of CERCLA, there has always been a
desire on the part of government or private PRPs to identify other PRPs to
share the cleanup costs or to cover unaccounted-for orphan shares. As the
initial government-led hazardous waste site cleanups of the 1980s gave
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way to the government-ordered private PRP site remediation, the hunt for
other solvent PRPs became more intense. This occurred at a time when the
cost of cleanups was rising into the multi-million dollar level. With this
backdrop, it is understandable that existing liable parties would try to cast
the liability net more broadly to reach corporate successors with CERCLA
liability. Existing corporate law doctrine in most states, which had developed over the years, recognized a range of situations where liabilities of
predecessor corporations would actually "pass through" to bind their successors. In the late 1980s, the federal government attempted to use these
theories to make CERCLA liabilities attach to a larger number of corporate
successors. In this litigation, federal courts uniformly held that as a general
matter, Congress intended, through an implied reference, for CERCLA to
impose liability on corporate successors. This conclusion did not answer
the more complicated question of deciding what legal principles would
determine when an asset purchaser would be saddled with the CERCLA
liability of its seller. The courts would grapple with this issue for more
than a decade, reaching a range of outcomes following a number of analytical approaches.

2.

The Clarity and Invisibility of the Supreme Court's Message
Regarding Federal Court Choice of Law

In the world of perfect federal court theory, things are straightforward
and orderly. In this way of thinking, the twin hallmarks of the American
federal court system are its hierarchical structure and precedential effect.
The United States Supreme Court stands atop that hierarchy with the regional courts of appeal enjoying a localized supremacy over the district
courts within their geographical areas. This is a judicial system of perfect
symmetry in its structural design. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has
recently written, "The Supreme Court's focus is, and must be, broader, for
our primary purpose is to guide and shape the development of federal law
generally, so as to enable lower courts to perform their responsibilities
more effectively and fairly and to guarantee equal justice to all citizens. " 426
When the Supreme Court speaks on a matter pertaining to federal law,
its rulings are generally treated as controlling precedent in the lower federal courts. For instance, a court of appeals would look for relevant Supreme Court precedent in deciding a case before it. At the very least, the
legal pronouncements of the high court are ones that must be distinguished
or confined by judges who wish to reach different results.
As the discussion in Part II indicates, the Supreme Court has clearly
expressed its policy regarding the freedom of the lower federal courts to
426

SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT

JUSTICE 212 (2003).
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announce rules of decision under their federal common lawmaking powers.427 Originating in the Kimbell Foods case decided in 1979 and concluding with the Bestfoods decision of 1998, the unmistakable policy is one of
judicial restraint and presumptive reliance on state law theory in the absence of an alternate federal statutory direction or a significant conflict
with federal law. The Court's rhetoric over the years has become increasingly severe in its tone and less open to improvisation in the name of federal common law. These cases have emphasized that statutory gap-filling
exercises do not routinely authorize federal courts to develop speCialized
federal rules of decision. As Justice Scalia wrote in the 0 'Melveny &
Meyers case, "matters left unaddressed in ... a scheme [of federal statutory
regulation] are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state
law.'"' 28 State law is to fill the gap in all cases except those truly exceptional, "few and restricted" ones where there is a "significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.'"' 29 These
are strong words that greatly tip the balance towards the use of state law in
federal cases.
Throughout this twenty-four year period, the clear message to federal
courts being asked by litigants to employ the federal common law to fill
the statutory gaps or omissions was to use state law first and to leave legislative judgments to Congress. The Supreme Court's policy direction has
opposed federal courts using their untethered initiative to develop legal
principles without a clearer link to statutory guidance. With this firm and
highly-detailed Supreme Court guidance regarding the methodology for
selecting rules for deciding cases such as those involving the CERCLA
liability of asset purchasers, the results and reasons should have been predictable and should have consistently applied the mainstream state corporate law. Strangely, this did not happen. In six of the court of appeals decisions previously discussed, there was absolutely no reference to any of
the Supreme Court's decisions in the Kimbell Foods line of cases. In fact,
even in the 1998 North Shore Gas case, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged
427

See supra Part III.
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79,85 (1994).
429
!d. at 87. The Court has not been particularly clear about the theory behind its direction to
choose state law as the rule of decision. In these "gap-filling" situations it has been vague about
whether state law is selected I) as state law, 2) as the interpreted federal statutory rule or 3) as the
federal common law. As Justice Scalia remarked in 0 'Melveny & Meyers:
The issue in the present case is whether California rule of decision is to be applied to
the issue of imputation or displaced, and if it is applied it is of only theoretical interest whether the basis for that application is California's own sovereign power or federal adoption of California's disposition.
ld. at 85 (emphasis added). It would seem as though this question would be more than just one of
"theoretical interest" and would represent the selection of a state law principle as the substantive federal
rule. Perhaps the nicety of classification is not that important since state law controls as the rule of
decision and the most important point is that the federal court is prohibited from fashioning its own
legal theory to decide the case.
428
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the existence of these decisions, but it refused to analyze the choice of law
issue in light of them because the question had not been briefed by the parties. Oddly, the Seventh Circuit did not order the briefing and rehearing or
consider the legal issue de novo. It was not until the later Ninth Circuit
opinion in Atchison and the First Circuit's decision in United States v.
Davis that the Supreme Court's analytical directive became part of any
court of appeals decision in a CERCLA asset purchaser case.
Why has the Supreme Court been substantially ignored for nearly
twenty years? The answer could be a practical one. It could be that no
party has briefed the issue arguing Supreme Court precedent and no judicial clerk has ever discovered these cases through independent research.
While these rationales are possible, they do not seem probable. What
seems more plausible is that federal courts appear determined to resolve
the litigation brought to them. Whether claiming to act under their federal
common law powers or just jumping at the chance to find the "appropriate"
rule to decide the matter before them, these courts appear to be more interested in applying the legal principles that they believe fit the case at hand
than in automatically applying available state law. Federal judges want to
judge. Until the recent Atchison and Davis cases, the Supreme Court's call
for limited judicial authority has been largely ignored and avoided by the
lower federal courts. 430
3.

How Do Federal Courts Select a Rule of Decision in the Absence
of Statutory Guidance?

Supreme Court precedent is not perfect and it is also not selfexecuting. In fact, as this article indicates, these ponderous expressions
live lives of selective impact. As much as the Court would like to restrain
federal court activism and initiative, it actually has less effect than many
would believe. The fact that so few cases actually reach the Supreme
Court for consideration means that the federal courts of appeal, in reality,
have the last word on the selection of legal principles and analytical approaches to common problems. 431 An examination of the cases under review in this article would confirm this continuing authority of appellate
courts. But how did they approach the purely legal question of selecting
the rule of decision for asset purchasers under CERCLA? The analysis
reveals a good deal of confusion and an eclectic group of approaches to the
430

It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has not been consistent in applying its Kimbell
Foods decisional methodology even in its own opinions. In Bestfoods v. United States, even though the
Court emphasized the use of state law to answer questions related to corporate parent/subsidiary liability, it did not cite or otherwise refer to the Kimbell Foods, 0 'Melveny & Meyers, and Atherton cases.
431
Of all of the cases analyzed in this article, Supreme Court review was sought in only two of
them, and in both cases it was denied. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851
F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989) and B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.Jd 505
(2d Cir. 1996}, cert. denied sub nom. Zollo Drum Co. v. B.F. Goodrich, 524 U.S. 926 (1998).
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issue.
While each decision presents unique facts, all of the cases approach the
same, essentially legal question-does "pass through" CERCLA liability
attach to an asset purchaser of a prior corporation? The pre-existing firm is
usually a clearly-liable PRP; but often not solvent or even operating. On
the other hand, the asset purchasing company is being confronted with the
prior firm's liability under legal theories that do not respect the asset purchase form of the transaction. Is the asset purchaser immunized from its
seller's liabilities under the presumptive traditional rule or is it liable under
an equity-based exception to the rule? At base, each case represents a
practical attempt to find another liable party to bear part of the CERCLA
cleanup expense. This important liability question should be answerable
from the statute that established the legal liability in the first placeCERCLA. But, unfortunately, it is not. As the prior discussion indicates,
there is no direct, statutory answer to the general question of successor
corporation liability. Sensing the potential for a gaping hole in the liability
of "responsible" parties under CERCLA, all of the court opinions under
consideration here found that Congress intended for CERCLA liability to
extend to corporate successors. This result, they reasoned, was justified
both by analysis of the statute's text as well as by the policy goal of discouraging the easy evasion of the cleanup law.
These appellate cases easily concluded that under CERCLA, the term
"corporation" includes successors. As a result of this reasoning, the courts
established the principle that successor entities could be liable under the
statute for shares of the sizable cleanup costs mandated by the law. A second, and considerably more difficult question, presents itself in these cases.
It is the question that asks judges to give legal meaning to the corporate
successor label and to devise rules assigning financial liability in the CERCLA context. This represents the heart of the matter-determining who
must pay and under what circumstances. Liability assignment represents a
fundamental judicial role for the state court judge announcing tort or contract rules of decision in a common law or statutory system. Where do
federal judges look to answer these questions in the CERCLA asset purchaser situation? The case analysis reveals several general conclusions
about the behavior of the appellate courts: 1) they do not approach the
"rules of decision" question in a unified or consistent way, 2) their action
reflects a strong sense of obligation to decide the cases before them and to
advance CERCLA's statutory goals, 3) they generally do not follow Supreme Court guidance on the appropriate method for choosing their rules,
and 4) they often do not have a clear idea of how to select the operative
legal principle to apply in the asset purchaser cases before them.
When examining the cases from the perspective of understanding what
the courts, themselves, believe they are doing in identifying a rule of decision, four distinct patterns emerge. First, one court-the Sixth Circuit-
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considers its function to be solely interpreting a federal statute. In Anspec,
the court makes a strong point that it is not fashioning a federal common
law rule but rather, interpreting § 107(a}-the central liability provisionconsistently with CERCLA's main purposes. 432 The court goes to great
pains to avoid the characterization that it is "making" new federal common
law. In this way, the appeals court can perform the statutory "gap filling"
function of providing missing substantive provisions in the name of
legislative interpretation.
Second, several courts describe their holdings as establishing federal
common law with the approval of CERCLA's legislative history. An example of this approach can be found in the Smith Land case, where the
Third Circuit found its authority for this point in the 1983 district court
opinion in Chem-Dyne and that decision's citation to the floor comment by
Representative James Florio. Cases taking this view, such as Smith Land,
Louisiana Pacific and Carolina Transformer, all view themselves as having a highly flexible power to fashion circuit rules finding successor liability in such a way to achieve what they consider to be fundamental CERCLA purposes. In the name of creating federal common law rules that
provide for a smooth, national uniformity of application, most of these
courts look to "traditional" or "general" doctrine developed in the states to
serve as their own rules of decision. 433 However, at least one court in this
group--the Fourth Circuit in Carolina Transformer--did not feel bound by
prevailing state corporate law norms and considered its common law power
to be highly fact-sensitive and contextual.434 Acting as a true "common
law" court, the Fourth Circuit believed that it could develop a rule structure
from the facts of cases that would come to it.
Third. In this category of decisions, courts appears genuinely confused
about what their opinions accomplish. These cases are striking in their
lack of clarity, with statements as varied as they are "probably" deciding
432

Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1242, 1245-46 (6th Cir. 1991).
In Louisiana Pacific, the Ninth Circuit's view was that it was establishing federal common
law for asset purchaser liability and that law just happened to be the same as the state corporate law in
California. Later in the Atchison decision, the court reaffirmed its previous position but concluded that
"we choose not to extend the 'mere continuation' exception to include the broader notion of a 'substantial continuation."' Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant Inc., 159 F.3d 358,364
(9th Cir. 1998). This comment appeared to reflect the idea that the appeals court could revise the
federal common law at some later point but that it chose not to do so in Atchison due to the adequacy of
the existing rule.
434
The Carolina Transformer case reviewed asset purchaser liability rules applied by the district
court and it upheld the trial court's adoption of the more liability-producing "substantial continuity"
test. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 840 (4th Cir. 1992). Curiously, Judge
Widener believed that flexible, common law rules would advance the CERCLA goals of I) deterring
evasion of cleanup liability and 2) promoting uniformity in liability rules. These two goals appear in
tension if not inconsistent with each other. /d. at 837.
433
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federal law,435 they are choosing a "common law" test based on "traditional" rules rather than that of a given state,436 and they approach cases
"on the assumption that federal common law supplies the rule of decision.'7437 Although unclear about exactly what kind of judicial action they
are taking and not referring to the Supreme Court's directives on common
law decision making, these courts broadly construe their powers, finding in
a number of instances that the substantial continuity exception-not a majority rule-should or could be the rule of decision. 438 These courts appear
to be willing to set the asset purchaser liability rules according to their
views of what justice and CERCLA policies demand. Frequently, they cite
the fair and equitable administration of the law439 as well as the need to
foster national uniformity in rules and the blocking of forum shopping by
PRPs. These courts also feel free to make and change the rules as their
perception of the needs change. The conclusion to be drawn from these
case decisions is that many federal appellate courts have been willing to
function as common law decision makers even if they did not admit to doing so.
Fourth. The final category of decisions is represented by the most recent cases and they, at least, mention the federal common law decisional
methodology established by the Supreme Court in the Kimbell Foods line
of cases. The most prominent example of this viewpoint is the First Circuit's decision in United States v. Davis. Davis represents a court directly
acknowledging the choice of law issue before it and employing the Supreme Court's suggested technique without regret. This view accepts the
fact that federal courts are making common law or non-statutory rules of
decision, but it is presumptively using state law to fill in the substantive
rule. While recognizing the autonomy that a number of other circuits had
demonstrated in using their common law powers to find a non-state law
"federal substantial continuity test" applying to asset purchase fact situations, Judge Lipez stayed close to the First Circuit's decisional methodology previously announced in the John S. Boyd Co. case and concluded that
"the majority rule is to apply state law 'so long as it is not hostile to the
435 United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 487 n.9 (8th Cir. 1992).
436 Betkosld, 99 F.3d at S 19.
437 North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., I 52 F.3d 642, 65 I (7th Cir. 1998).
438 Mexico Feed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 488 (adopts the "substantial continuity" test by concluding
that under CERCLA that test is "justified'' to attach liability to responsible parties); Betkoski, 99 F.3d at
519-20 (adopts the "substantial continuity" test at a party's urging after concluding that the test is more
consistent with CERCLA's goals); North Shore Gas, 152 F.3d at 654 n.8 (adopts "mere continuity" test
after noting that the "substantial continuity" test had not been argued but suggesting that it might apply
it in the right circumstances). No court ever explains the reasoning behind any of these assertions or
cone lusions.
439 Nonh Shore Gas, 152 F.3d at 650.
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federal interests animating CERCLA. "'440 This "majority rule" was drawn
from the Kimbell Foods tradition as well as the more recent Bestfoods decision, which the court characterized as leaving little room for the creation of
a federal rule of liability under CERCLA. 441 Under Davis, the federal
court's main task was twofold: 1) to identify the relevant state law principle and 2) to decide whether its use "would frustrate any federal objective.'>«2 Finding no evidence of such "frustration," the court summarily
concluded that the Connecticut state law was the "correct test for determining successor liability."443 The Supreme Court would be pleased to know
that at least one federal circuit was heeding its direction.

B. The Surprising Case of "Judicial Amnesia" in the CERCLA Asset
Purchaser Cases
1.

What Decisional Methods Don't the Federal Courts Follow?

If one only read the opinions of the United States Supreme Court and
assumed lower federal court fidelity, one would believe that all courts encountering the CERCLA asset purchaser liability question would carefully
and cautiously apply the Kimbell Foods/0 'Melveny & Meyers prescription
for interstitial common law development. By this it is meant that they
would first look to the rules provided under state corporate successorship
law to set the presumptive benchmark and then they would decide whether
these rules "substantially" conflicted with the policies contained in CERCLA. If there was no such conflict, the state law would serve as the federal common law based rule of decision. On the other hand, if these state
rules did seriously interfere with the achievement of CERCLA policies, the
judges would be permitted under their common law powers to fashion another rule of decision more consistent with the statutory goals. Lawsuits
would presumably focus on the questions of whether interstitial common
law was warranted and whether a "substantial conflict" with federal law
existed. At least, this would be the world view under a pristine vision of
lower court obedience to Supreme Court mandate. As the prior discussion
reveals, this ideal of a restrained federal judiciary operating within narrow
bounds of decisional authority plainly does not exist. Federal courts desire
to judge controversies and to choose their own rules of decision unhindered
by constraining principles announced from above.
440

United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d I, 54 (lstCir. 2001).

441/d.
442

/d. In Davis, the asset purchaser corporate law principle was derived from Connecticut law
based on a provision in the asset purchase agreement between the buyer and seller of the assets. /d. at
53 n.48. In a more contested case on this issue, the selection of which state law controls could be
extremely important should there be a variation between law of the different states. The federal court
must also determine what the law of the state actually is and this requires a degree of discretion as well.
443
/d. at 54.
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What explains this general avoidance of Supreme Court direction in
this area of choice of law? Is this an act of poor case briefing by parties,
inadequate research by law clerks or straightforward judicial defiance? It
is difficult to assign a clear, singular reason for the observed phenomena.
While it is true that parties have failed to brief and present the Kimbell
Foods argument, it is also correct to note that courts possess a de novo
power to announce what the relevant principles of law are in a given case.
Courts have also ignored this precedent when it has been brought to their
attention. Federal judges can also instruct their clerks to research a particular line of reasoning or authority and they can direct the parties to brief
issues that were not presented to the courts in the first place. But with the
exception of the First Circuit in the United States v. Davis litigation, this
formal approach has largely been the "road not taken" and an explicit example of intentional judicial avoidance. 444
2.

Explaining "Judicial Amnesia"

There are several plausible explanations for this fact. First, courts and
litigants may be confused by the conceptual complexity of the federal
common law approach of giving interstitial meaning to federal statutes.
The doctrine in this area may be hard to fathom and more difficult to mold
into a successful argument. It may be commonly believed that federal
common law is only available in narrow situations and that it is not readily
available for "filling in" statutory meaning in cases such as the asset purchaser litigation. Second, perhaps because they are so used to disputing
matters of statutory interpretation, parties may tend by intellectual habit or
past practice to argue that a statute should be "interpreted" in a certain way
even if there is no specific congressional guidance on the particular outcome. Arguing for a particular interpretation of a "silent" statute may actually give litigants the opportunity to persuade a willing court to "make
law" in the name of "interpretation." From the Court's point of view, taking this supposed "interpretive approach" may allow them to feel comfortable in doing what they might consider to be a traditional judicial function-interpreting existing legal principles. By embracing this interpretive
characterization, judges could then avoid the criticism that they were
usurping the legislative function of Congress and legislating from the
bench.
Third, courts, even federal courts, like to judge matters coming before
them. This simple statement has particular resonance in liability-assigning
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It is worth noting that the United States Supreme Court has itself forgotten to follow the decisional methodology that it set out for the lower federal courts to follow in Kimbell Foods and its progeny. In fact, a careful review of the Bestfoods decision, where Justice Souter indicated that state law
should provide the rule of decision, does not even make reference to the Kimbell Foods case as support
for the direction. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). Apparently, even the Supreme
Court can fall prey to the same practices followed by the other federal courts.
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cases such as the CERCLA asset purchaser litigation that has been the subject of this article. They wish to weigh the evidence and give a "fair"
judgment for one party or the other. Expressed in reverse, courts want to
prevent inequitable results from happening especially when there is an important policy value at stake. Functioning this way, federal courts, like
their state counterparts, desire to independently sort through the relevant
facts and to arrive at a just solution. By following this "judging impulse,"
federal judges apparently behave much the same as the state judiciary despite their narrower decisional focus.
Fourth, federal courts may view their role as being "implementers" of
an important federal public health and safety law having a high degree of
social, environmental, and financial significance. This is especially true
since the statute at issue-CERCLA-was so poorly drafted, leaving so
many critical legal questions unanswered. Stepping into this role of furthering Congress' intent would appear natural since CERCLA is viewed by
many courts as a necessary, "make the polluter pay" law whose goals
should be reinforced. Within the context of the asset purchaser liability
issue, federal judges might not want (what they believe to be) "responsible" parties to escape hazardous waste site cleanup costs through the tactical use of corporate succession theories and transactional structuring devices. With this outlook, these courts may be willing to identify legal theory that will provide powerful support for the policies underlying the
CERCLA statute.
Fifth, and finally, these courts might actually be demonstrating judicial
defiance of the Supreme Court's directive to employ state law as the rule of
decision in this kind of case. Although this may sound like heresy in a
court system designed in a hierarchical fashion, this may actually represent
the reality. The lower federal courts do not conceive of themselves as
merely automatons mindlessly applying state law in federal cases. Federal
judges, usually no shrinking violets, want to judge cases and they wish to
apply their own judicial discretion in reaching their results. Having a convenient case of "judicial amnesia" in these instances also carries little risk
of reversal since the Supreme Court is extremely unlikely to hear such a
case and as yet has not heard one. In the end, it is clear that, at least in this
area of federal environmental law, the federal courts act more like state
general jurisdiction courts exercising broad lawmaking powers, largely
unrestrained by the limiting doctrines announced by the Supreme Court.
The highest court might be the drummer, but the lower federal courts appear to be dancing to their own beat.

